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Abstract:  
Using a unique, hand-collected data set on hedging activities of 150 US oil and gas 
producers, we study the determinants of hedging strategy choice. We also examine the 
economic effects of hedging strategy on firms’ risk, value and performance. We model 
hedging strategy choice as a multi-state process and use several dynamic discrete 
choice frameworks with random effects to mitigate the unobserved individual 
heterogeneity problem and the state dependence phenomena. We find strong evidence 
that hedging strategy is influenced by investment opportunities, oil and gas market 
conditions, financial constraints, the correlation between internal funds and investment 
expenditures, and oil and gas production specificities (i.e., production uncertainty, 
production cost variability, production flexibility). Finally, we present novel evidence of 
the real implications of hedging strategy on firms’ stock return and volatility sensitivity to 
oil and gas price fluctuations, along with their accounting and operational performance. 
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1. Introduction 
To date, scant empirical research has attempted to explore how hedging programs are 
structured by non-financial firms (e.g. Tufano, 1996; Géczy et al, 1997; Brown, 2001; Adam, 
2009). The goal of this study is to add to the literature by shedding light on how firms hedge 
risks and on the determinants and consequences of their choices. We answer the following 
questions: What are the determinants of hedging strategy choice? What are the real 
implications of hedging strategy choice on the firm’s stock return and volatility sensitivity relative 
to the underlying risk factor, and on firms’ operational and financial performance? It is important 
to understand why firms within the same industry and with the same risk exposure vastly differ 
in terms of their hedging strategy. Differences in firms’ hedging practices seem to come from 
differences in firm-specific characteristics rather than differences in their underlying risk 
exposures. Therefore, explaining how firms structure their hedging portfolios and measuring 
their related economic effects should provide a better understanding of how hedging affects 
corporate value. 
This study contributes to the literature on corporate hedging in several ways. We use an 
extensive and new hand-collected data set on the risk management activities of 150 US oil and 
gas producers with quarterly observations over the period 1998-2010. Relative to the empirical 
literature, our data collected from publicly disclosed information avoid the non-response bias 
associated with questionnaires and provide detailed information about hedging activities. 
Moreover, unlike other previous studies on risk management in the oil and gas industry, our 
data set is quarterly rather than annual and covers a far longer period. In addition, we study 
hedging activities of both commodities (oil and gas) separately, which gives deeper insight into 
oil and gas producers’ hedging dynamics. Finally, the study period coincides with the application 
of the new derivative accounting standard FASB 133 in the United States, which is expected to 
influence corporate risk management, as well as the new SOX and NYSE regulations 
introduced in 2002 after the Enron collapse. 
In addition, we innovate in terms of the econometric methodology, which better captures 
hedging dynamism and improves the reliability of the statistical inference of our findings. We 
consider derivative choice as a multi-state process and examine the effects of firm-specific 
characteristics and oil and gas market conditions on the choice of hedging strategy. To alleviate 
the effects of unobserved individual heterogeneity and state dependence, we use dynamic 
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discrete choice methodologies with random effects that account for the initial condition problem 
(Heckman, 1981). We thus distinguish the effects of past hedging strategy choice and 
observable and unobservable firm characteristics on current hedging behavior. We use a 
dynamic panel random effects probit model to explore the determinants of hedging strategies 
based on one instrument only (i.e., swap contracts only, put options only, costless collars only). 
In addition, we use a dynamic random effect multinomial mixed logit to explore the determinants 
of hedging strategies based on a combination of two or more instruments (i.e., hedging 
portfolios). For the multinomial mixed logit, we chose swap contracts as our base outcome, 
which allows us to determine why firms chose hedging portfolios with payoffs departing from 
strict linearity. Finally, we use a dynamic generalized random effect ordered probit model to 
answer the question of why firms chose linear or non-linear instruments. To our knowledge, all 
the previous empirical studies were conducted in a static framework.  
In addition to the standard hypotheses pertaining to underinvestment costs, tax incentives, 
financial distress costs and managerial risk aversion, our comprehensive data set allows us to 
reliably test the empirical relevance of some theoretical arguments and predictions that have 
been explored slightly or not at all. In particular, we test the implications of the prediction of 
Froot et al (1993) and Spano (2004) related to the impact of the correlation between internally 
generated cash flows and investment opportunities. We also test the empirical relevance of the 
overinvestment problem as theorized by Morellec and Smith (2007) and identified empirically by 
Bartram et al (2009), namely that large profitable firms with few investment opportunities face 
overinvestment problems. In addition, we test the real effects of the quantity-price correlation as 
theoretically suggested by Brown and Toft (2002) and Gay et al (2002 and 2003). We also test 
the empirical relevance of the existence of other hedgeable (i.e., IR, FX and basis risks) and 
non-hedgeable (production uncertainty, production cost variability) risks on hedging strategy of 
the principal market risk related to oil and gas prices, as theorized by Moschini and Lapan 
(1995), Franke, Stapleton and Subrahmanyam (1998), Brown and Toft (2002) and Gay et al 
(2002 and 2003). Further, our data set allows us to verify the implications of production flexibility 
suggested by Moschini and Lapan (1992). We also explore the impacts of the economic 
conditions of the oil and gas market on derivative choice. Finally, we empirically investigate the 
real implications of hedging strategy choice on the firm’s stock return and volatility sensitivity to 
oil (gas) price fluctuations, and the accounting, market and operating performances of oil and 
gas producers. 
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Our results reveal significant state dependence effects in the hedging strategy that should be 
accounted for when studying firms’ risk management behaviors. Accounting for this state 
dependence allows us to better distinguish the effects of observable and unobservable 
characteristics on hedging preferences. Overall, we find that oil and gas producers with higher 
investment programs tend to use more hedging strategies with non-linear payoffs (i.e., put 
options only, mixture of swap contracts with put options and/or costless collars) and to avoid 
strict linear hedging (i.e., swap contracts only). This result is consistent with the argument of 
Froot et al (1993) and the empirical finding of Adam (2009) that firms with larger investment 
programs tend to use non-linear strategies to preserve any upside potential. In contrast, oil and 
gas producers, which have larger undeveloped proved reserves, tend to avoid non-linear 
strategies because the investment expenditures (i.e., development costs) are less pressing. 
Moreover, we provide the first direct empirical evidence of the impact of the correlation between 
internally generated cash flows and investment expenditures, as theorized by Froot et al (1993) 
and Spano (2004). Particularly, for gas hedgers, we find that the higher this correlation (i.e., 
firms are benefiting from a natural hedge), the more gas producers tend to use linear hedging 
strategies, as predicted. For oil hedgers, the impact of this correlation is unclear. Using a more 
robust methodology, we find strong evidence of the relationship between this correlation and 
more linear strategies, as predicted. 
We also find that hedging strategies are strongly correlated to the economic conditions of the oil 
and gas market. As predicted, the use of put options and collars is related to higher volatilities 
and higher future expected prices. Swap contracts are positively related to higher spot prices. 
Consistent with the production flexibility argument of Moschini and Lapan (1992), our results 
indicate that firms with relatively higher geographical dispersion in their oil production tend to 
use more collars and to avoid swaps only. We find that more focused oil and gas producers 
(i.e., ones that derive their revenues primarily from either oil or gas production) tend to use more 
non-linear strategies. This latter finding corroborates the empirical finding of Adam (2009) that 
more focused gold producers use more put options.  
As predicted, our results suggest that higher gas production uncertainty is related to the use of 
non-linear hedging portfolios (i.e., higher production uncertainty induces higher non-linearity in 
the firm’s exposure). However, the impact of oil production uncertainty is contrary to 
expectations. Results related to the variability in production costs are significant and mixed. 
With regard to the existence of additional hedgeable risks, we find that foreign exchange (FX) 
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risk is significantly related to the use of put options, and basis risk is negatively related to swaps 
and collars. As predicted, the existence of FX and basis risks creates nonlinearity in the firm’s 
exposure, which requires more non-linear hedging. The impact of interest rate (IR) risk is 
significant and mixed.  For gas hedgers, a higher gas price-quantity correlation is positively 
related to linear hedging instruments and negatively related to nonlinear hedging portfolios, as 
predicted. In contrast, oil price-quantity correlation is negatively related to collars. 
Consistent with our predictions, we find that higher managerial shareholding is positively related 
to linear instruments and negatively related to nonlinear instruments. In addition, managers with 
higher optionholding use more nonlinear hedging strategies and avoid linear strategies. 
Surprisingly, results indicate that both higher managerial stockholding and optionholding are 
positively related to the use of collars only. Interestingly, we find that the existence of 
institutional investors induces more elaborate hedging programs with nonlinear payoffs. 
Oil and gas producers that are more leveraged but not yet close to financial distress tend to use 
more swap contracts to insure predetermined revenues. More solvent producers use more 
collars only and avoid swaps only. In line with the risk-shifting theory, producers close to 
financial distress use more hedging portfolios with nonlinear payoffs and avoid linear 
instruments. Consistent with the theoretical prediction of Morellec and Smith (2007), our results 
give the first direct empirical evidence of the role of the overinvestment problem on firms’ 
hedging behavior. Particularly for gas hedgers, we find that it is more closely associated with the 
use of linear instruments, as predicted. For oil hedgers, the impact of the overinvestment 
problem is significant and mixed. Tax function convexity seems to motivate the use of more 
linear hedging strategies, as predicted. In contrast, tax loss carryforward is negatively related to 
swaps. As suggested by Graham and Rogers (2002), tax loss carryforward appears to be 
uncorrelated with tax function convexity. 
Finally, we present novel evidence of the economic effects of hedging strategy choice on firms’ 
stock return and volatility sensitivity to oil and gas price fluctuations, realized oil and gas prices 
(i.e., prices including the monetary effects of the hedging activities) and accounting performance 
(i.e., return on equity and return on assets), market performance (i.e., Tobin’s Q) and 
operational performance (i.e., earnings per share from operations) of oil and gas producers.  
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The remainder of the paper is divided into eight sections. In section 2, we review the existing 
theoretical predictions and previous empirical studies. In section 3, we describe our data, state 
our hypotheses and construct the independent variables that might be related to derivative 
choice. Section 4 describes our dependent variables. Section 5 presents the retained 
econometric methodologies. Section 6 reports our results and discussions. In section 7, we 
check the robustness of our multivariate results by using an alternative econometric 
specification. In section 8, we investigate the real implications of hedging strategy choice 
empirically. Section 9 concludes the paper.  
2. Prior research on derivative choice 
The financial economics literature classifies financial derivatives into linear and non-linear 
instruments. Linear instruments, including swaps, futures contracts, and forward contracts, have 
a payoff function with a linear relationship to the price of the underlying asset. Non-linear 
instruments, including options (i.e., put and call options) and other products with sophisticated 
structures (e.g., costless collars, three-way collars, strangle), generate cash flows in certain 
states of nature only. At the inception, it is costless to enter into linear derivatives to mitigate 
downside risks, but there is a cost of losing upside benefits in the future. In contrast, non-linear 
instruments can avoid downside risk and allow for upside benefits but at the price of paying a 
higher premium.  
A number of theoretical models and empirical studies have been developed to explain derivative 
choices. Detemple and Adler (1988) show in a portfolio context that poorly diversified managers 
who face no borrowing or short-selling constraints will adopt linear strategies (i.e. futures 
contracts) to achieve optimal hedging. Otherwise, borrowing or short selling constraints can 
create non-linear exposures. Non-linear instruments are then required in addition to linear 
instruments, to implement optimal hedging. Applying Detemple and Adler’s model to gold mining 
firms, Tufano (1996) predicts that firms with higher cash costs and those with lower market 
values and smaller gold reserves might be more likely to use options. Contrary to Detemple and 
Adler’s prediction, Tufano (1996) finds no difference in the cash costs between firms that use 
options and those that do not. He concludes that option users tend to be larger in terms of 
market value and reserves rather than smaller. 
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In the context of firm-value maximization, Froot et al (1993) show that managers facing one 
source of hedgeable risk (i.e., price risk) will choose an optimal hedging strategy depending on 
the sensitivities of internally generated cash flows and investment opportunities to the 
underlying source of risk. If these sensitivities are similar, the firm benefits from ‘‘natural 
diversification,’’ and a linear strategy will suffice to attain the optimal level of investment; 
otherwise a non-linear strategy is required. In addition, Froot et al (1993) argue that when future 
capital expenditures are a non-linear function of some hedgeable risk (i.e., an oil and gas 
company will develop new reserves only if oil and gas prices are above a certain level), a non-
linear strategy is required.  
Adam (2002) extends the work of Froot et al (1993) and Mello and Parsons (2000) to a multi-
period framework. He argues that financially constrained firms with future investment 
opportunities should hedge. The structure of the hedging portfolio adopted will depend on the 
level of cost differential between internal and external funds as measured by the firm’s credit 
risk premium. When the marginal cost of external funding is relatively high, Adam asserts that 
the payoff of the hedging portfolio is concave, suggesting the writing of call options because the 
firm has a precarious financial condition, and is concerned mostly with funding its current 
investment programs. When this cost differential is relatively low, the structure of the hedging 
portfolio is convex, meaning long positions on put options because the firm has a sound 
financial condition, and focuses on averting shortage in future cash flows to fund its future 
investment expenditures. In intermediate cases between those two situations, the hedging 
portfolio will contain both instruments (i.e., costless collars) because such firms are focused on 
both current and future capital requirements. He concludes that unlevered firms with few future 
investment opportunities and low levels of non-hedgeable risks (i.e., production uncertainty) are 
more likely to use hedging portfolios with a linear structure. In a more recent paper, Adam 
(2009) studies the options used in gold-mining firms, and strongly supports the findings in Adam 
(2002). In addition, Adam (2009) maintains that firms facing large capital expenditures, which 
are a non-linear function of some exposure (i.e., future oil and gas prices), are more likely to use 
an insurance strategy (i.e., buying put options). 
Adam (2003) concludes that the non-linear instrument choice is driven mainly by market 
conditions. When the gold spot price is low, firms are more likely to use non-linear instruments 
(i.e., buying put options) because they are anticipating that the price will rise, hence they 
maintain the upside potential. In contrast, when gold price volatility is relatively high, firms are 
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less likely to buy non-linear instruments to avoid a greater volatility risk; those instruments also 
become more expensive as market volatility rises. Brown (2001) investigates the foreign 
exchange risk management program of an anonymous US-based manufacturer of durable 
equipment, and finds empirical evidence that when the exchange rate volatility is higher, firms 
tend to replace options with forward contracts. Brown (2001) also finds a significant impact of 
spot exchange rates on hedging portfolio characteristics (i.e., delta and gamma). The findings of 
Adam (2009) largely support the negative correlation between gold spot price and the use of put 
options. In addition, Adam (2009) observes no significant correlation between the use of non-
linear instruments and gold price volatility or gold basis (i.e., difference between the future and 
the spot price of gold).  
Departing from the firm-value maximization framework, some authors studied the impact of 
production characteristics on derivative choice. Moschini and Lapan (1992) conclude that when 
the firm has sufficient production flexibility (in the sense that it is able to change its production 
parameters after observing the future price of the output, and assuming that this future price is 
unbiased), it should make use of options by shorting a put and call option with the same strike 
price and maturity (shorting a straddle position). To hedge the convexity of its real option (i.e., 
production flexibility), the firm is subsequently required to sell convexity (short straddle). In 
contrast, when all the production parameters are fixed ex-ante (before observing the future price 
of the output), there is no production flexibility and options will be useless. Adam (2009) retained 
the number of mines in operation and the standard deviation of mine production cost as proxies 
for production flexibility in the gold-mining industry, and finds no evidence of the correlation 
between production flexibility and the use of option strategies.  
In the same context, some authors argue that the existence of some non-hedgeable risks (i.e. 
uncertainties in the quantities produced and/or in the production costs) makes exposure non-
linear and hence motivates the use of non-linear instruments. Moschini and Lapan (1995) show 
that a risk-averse firm, facing both price risk and production risk, will use more long straddle 
positions in addition to shorting future contracts. In a pure exchange economy, Franke, 
Stapleton and Subrahmanyam (1998) affirm that the risk-sharing rule tends to be convex for 
agents who face higher background (non-insurable) risks. In addition, the authors pointed out 
that the convex sharing rule could be achieved by buying put options and that the non-linearity 
in the risk-sharing vehicle is attributable to the differential background risk. Brown (2001) 
suggests that the uncertainty in the underlying foreign currency exposure is not significantly 
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positively related to option use. By modeling a profit-maximizing firm facing both price and 
quantity uncertainties and financial distress, Brown and Toft (2002) conclude that simply selling 
the expected output forward is never the optimal hedging strategy. They suggest that the 
optimal hedge is affected by the volatilities of prices and quantities and more importantly by the 
correlation between quantities produced and spot prices. Further, they find that firms with a 
negative price-quantity correlation can benefit from options and more sophisticated exotic 
instruments. This benefit is magnified by higher volatility in quantities or low price volatility. In 
contrast, a positive price-quantity correlation significantly reduces the benefit of using options. 
Firms with a negligible price-quantity correlation might use only forward contracts.  
Gay et al (2002 and 2003) argue that firms facing only price risk could achieve optimal hedging 
with linear contracts. Otherwise, as quantity uncertainty increases, non-linear strategies will be 
implemented as substitutes for linear strategies to overcome the over-hedging problem. Over-
hedging would consist in selling more quantities under linear derivatives than the already 
produced output. The degree of substitution between linear and non-linear strategies is strongly 
influenced by the price-quantity correlation. With a negative price-quantity correlation, the firm 
benefits from a natural hedge, but the over-hedging problem is more likely in those 
circumstances with declining quantities and increasing prices. Thus, firms will reduce linear 
strategies in favor of non-linear strategies. If prices are increasing, long put positions are more 
profitable because they will expire worthless, but shorting linear contracts will generate losses. 
In contrast, a positive price-quantity correlation motivates the use of linear instruments because 
quantities and prices are moving in the same direction and over-hedging is now less likely.  
Table I summarizes the theoretical predictions arising from the literature review and illustrates 
their expected empirical implications, which we will investigate for each of the hedging 
strategies adopted by oil and gas producers. 
[Table I about here] 
3. Data, hypotheses and independent variables 
Our empirical study focuses on the following question: what are the rationales for the choice of 
each hedging strategy in the oil and gas industry? In this section, we present our data, develop 
some testable hypotheses and discuss the construction of our independent variables.  
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3.1 Data 
This study is implemented on a sample of 150 US oil and gas producers over the period of 1998 
to 2010. The oil and gas industry is an excellent laboratory to test the different corporate risk 
management motivations and implications for several reasons. First, firms in this industry share 
homogenous risk exposures (i.e. fluctuations in crude oil and natural gas prices). Hence, 
diversity in the hedging strategies implemented does not come from differences in risk 
exposure, but is more likely to result from differences in firm characteristics. Second, the 
existence of financial derivatives on crude oil and natural gas offer these firms several price 
hedging methods. Futures contracts and options in oil and gas are traded in the NYMEX and 
forward contracts and swaps are traded in the over-the-counter market. Third, improvements in 
accounting disclosure related to oil and gas producing activities have made operational data 
available. These data pertain to exploration, production and reserve quantities, cash costs, etc. 
A first list of 413 US oil and gas producers with the primary Standard Industrial Classification 
(SIC) code 13111 (i.e., Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas) was extracted from Bloomberg. Next, 
only firms that met the following criteria were retained: have at least five years of historical data 
of oil and gas reserves during the period 1998-2010; the 10-K and 10-Q reports are available 
from the Edgar website, and the firm is covered by Compustat. The filtering process produced a 
final sample of 150 firms with an unbalanced panel of 6,326 firm-quarter observations. To our 
knowledge, this sample is the most recent and the largest one in the empirical literature on risk 
management in the oil and gas industry.2 
Data on these firms’ financial and operational characteristics were gathered from several 
sources. Data regarding financial characteristics were taken from the Compustat quarterly data 
set held by Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). Other items related to the institutional 
and managerial share holdings and option holdings were taken from the Thomson Reuters data 
set maintained by WRDS. Data related to oil and gas producers’ reserves, production quantities, 
cash costs, geographical dispersion, exploration, development and property acquisitions were 
                                                          
1
 SIC code 1311 ‘‘Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas,’’ which comprises companies primarily involved in the operation 
of properties for the recovery of hydrocarbon liquids and natural gas. 
2
 Jin and Jorion (2006) studied a sample of 119 US oil and gas producers with 330 firm-year observations over the 
period of 1998-2001. Haushalter (2000) used a sample of 100 U.S oil and gas producers with 292 firm-year 
observations over the period 1992-1994. Haushalter et al (2002) used a sample of 68 US oil producers with 155 firm-
year observations over the period 1992-1994.  
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taken from Bloomberg’s annual data set and verified and completed by hand-collecting data  
directly from 10-K annual reports. Quarterly data about oil and gas producers’ hedging activities 
are hand-collected from 10-K and 10-Q reports.  
3.2 Hypotheses and independent variables 
3.2.1 Investment opportunities 
Froot et al (1993) point out that firms with future capital expenditures and higher marginal costs 
of external financing (with a concave payoff) should hedge. They add that ‘’non-linear hedging 
instruments, such as options, will typically allow firms to coordinate investment and financing 
plans more precisely than linear instruments, such as futures and forwards’’ (p. 1655). They 
argue that non-linear instruments are more efficient if capital expenditures are a non-linear 
function of the underlying risk factor. Normally, firms in the oil and gas industry undertake capital 
expenditures that are step functions and depend on oil and gas prices (driven by development 
of new reserves, exploration, etc.).The larger the investment opportunities, the higher the non-
linearity of oil and gas producers’ capital expenditures. Adam (2003, 2009) finds that, with 
relatively larger investment programs, gold-mining firms tend to use more non-linear strategies. 
Hypothesis 1.a: Oil and gas producers with larger investment opportunities are more likely to 
use non-linear hedging strategies because these firms face non-linear capital expenditures that 
depend on oil and gas prices. In addition, non-linear instruments allow for future upside benefits. 
We measure the future investment opportunities by the following two proxies: the ratio of the 
cost incurred over the net property, plant and equipment at the beginning of the quarter. In the 
oil and gas industry, the cost incurred includes the total costs of oil and gas property acquisition, 
exploration and development. The second proxy is the quantity of proved undeveloped reserves 
for oil and gas respectively.3 These reserves could be seen as unexercised real options (Grulon 
et al, 2012) because oil and gas producers have the option but not an obligation to produce 
their undeveloped reserves after paying the development costs. 
                                                          
3
 Undeveloped reserves are expected to be recovered: (1) from new wells on undrilled acreage, (2) from deepening 
existing wells to a different reservoir, or (3) where a relatively large expenditure is required to (a) recomplete an 
existing well or (b) install production or transportation facilities for primary or improved recovery projects (World 
Petroleum Council). 
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An additional argument was stipulated by Froot et al (1993) to explain hedging strategy choice. 
They argue that when internally generated cash flows are closely correlated to future investment 
opportunities, firms benefit from a natural hedge, and linear strategies alone can provide value-
maximizing hedges. Otherwise, firms should use non-linear strategies to achieve more optimal 
hedges. In the oil and gas industry, the contemporaneous oil and gas prices determine the cash 
flows generated from operations. These prices also dictate the future rents associated with the 
exploration, development and acquisition of oil and gas reserves. To our knowledge, this latter 
argument was not tested empirically due to the lack of data, as Tufano (1996) notes. 
Hypothesis 1.b: Firms with a higher correlation between internal cash flows and investment 
opportunities are more likely to use linear hedging strategies because they are already naturally 
diversified. 
We calculate the correlation coefficient between internal cash flows and investment 
opportunities. Internally generated cash flows are measured by the Free Cash Flow before 
capital expenditures, as in Lehn and Poulsen (1989).4 Investment opportunities are measured 
by the ratio of the cost incurred over the net property, plant and equipment at the beginning of 
the quarter for each firm; these correlation coefficients are calculated in a rolling window by 
taking all the observations available until the current quarter.5 
3.2.2 Market conditions 
Dolde (1993) and Bodnar et al (1998), in their surveys of corporate risk management practices, 
find that managers incorporate their market views of future price movements by frequently 
altering either the size or the timing of their hedging positions. Stulz (1996) reports strong 
evidence of this view-taking, which he refers to as speculative hedging. As mentioned above, 
Adam (2003, 2009) concludes that market conditions impact derivative choice.  
Hypothesis 2.a: When spot prices are low, firms believe that they are more likely to rise; hence 
they tend to use non-linear instruments. Non-linear instruments allow firms to protect their 
                                                          
4
 Lehn and Poulsen (1989) calculate Free Cash Flow before investment as operating income before depreciation less 
total income taxes plus changes in the deferred taxes from the previous quarter to the current quarter less gross 
interest expenses on short- and long-term debt less the total amount of preferred dividends less the total dollar 
amount of dividends declared on common stock.  
5
 We take all the observations available until the current quarter because the cost incurred is given on a yearly basis.  
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downside risk and to benefit from any potential upside at a fixed cost (i.e., premium). In contrast, 
linear instruments protect downside risk but at a cost increasing with the potential increase in oil 
and gas prices. Conversely, when oil and gas spot prices are high, firms tend to lock-in the 
current prices by using linear instruments because they believe that prices are more likely to 
decrease in the future. 
In addition, Adam (2009) shows that when gold price volatility is high, managers could refrain 
from buying options because those options become more expensive. Moreover, firms will be 
exposed to additional volatility risk because the value of their options is now affected. However, 
when this additional volatility risk is not large and prices are more likely to increase, firms tend to 
use non-linear instruments to preserve any potential upside. 
Hypothesis 2.b: When the volatility of oil and gas prices is high, firms are more likely to use 
non-linear instruments.  
The following hypothesis concerns future oil and gas prices (as observed in the Futures 
contracts market). 
Hypothesis 2.c: When expected oil and gas prices are higher; firms are more likely to use non-
linear instruments to preserve any potential upside. 
We extract the oil and gas spot prices observed at the end of each quarter from the Bloomberg 
Financial Markets database. We use the West Texas Intermediate crude oil (WTI) index as 
proxy for the oil spot prices. For natural gas spot prices, we use an average index established 
by Bloomberg Financial Markets database from different locations indices (Gulf Coast, Henry 
Hub, Rocky Mountains, etc.). 
We calculate the volatility of oil and gas for each quarter as the standard deviation of spot prices 
within the quarter. For future oil and gas prices, we use (i) Bloomberg NYMEX Crude Oil 12-
Month Strip futures price, and (ii) Bloomberg NYMEX Henry Hub Natural Gas 12-Month Strip 
futures price. These two indices are established by the Bloomberg Financial Markets database 
as the arithmetic averages of oil (gas) futures contract prices over the next 12 months. 
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3.2.3 Production function characteristics 
Moschini and Lapan (1992) argue that firms with sufficient production flexibility (i.e., the firm has 
the option to choose certain production parameters after product prices are observed) are more 
likely to use non-linear instruments (i.e., short straddle position) to raise expected utility and 
preserve this flexibility option. Testing this argument empirically, Adam (2009) finds no evidence 
that production flexibility motivates gold-mining firms to use non-linear instruments. Mello et al 
(1995), by constructing an integrated model for a multinational firm with production flexibility (in 
the sense that the firm can shift its production to low-cost countries) and with the ability to use 
the financial market to hedge foreign exchange rate risk, show that the need for hedging is 
closely related to production flexibility. Indeed, Mello et al (1995) suggest that viewing 
production flexibility and hedging as substitutes is misleading. 
Generally, oil and gas firms operate in different regions of the world, and the operating costs 
(i.e., development costs, production costs) vary significantly between these regions. This 
geographical dispersion of oil and gas reserves could be seen as production flexibility because 
firms can shift their production operations from one location to another to adjust their profit 
margins to market prices. Another aspect of this production flexibility comes from the 
complementary nature of oil and gas operations. Hence, firms operating in both the oil and gas 
segments could be seen as practicing industrial diversification. 
Hypothesis 3.a: Firms with more production flexibility (i.e., higher geographical diversity in their 
production and higher industrial diversification) are more likely to use non-linear instruments 
because this operative flexibility could be seen as a real option that has a convex payoff by 
definition and that requires non-linear instruments to be hedged. 
We measure the geographical diversity of oil or gas production by 1- Herfindahl index. A higher 
value implies that the oil or gas production has higher geographical dispersion and hence the 
firm has more production flexibility. We construct two additional indices measuring the fraction 
of revenues derived from oil and gas production separately. These indices allow us to 
distinguish between producers operating primarily in the oil segment and those operating 
primarily in gas segment. 
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Moschini and Lapan (1995), Franke, Stapleton and Subrahmanyam (1998), Brown and Toft 
(2002) and Gay et al (2002 and 2003) suggest that when a firm is facing some non-hedgeable 
risks (i.e., production uncertainty and production cost variability), its total exposure becomes 
non-linear and the optimal hedging should be non-linear. The authors argue that the higher the 
production uncertainty, the greater the motivation to use non-linear instruments. Indeed, Brown 
and Toft (2002) show that in the presence of risks that are not hedged, firms are more likely to 
use non-linear instruments. Firms operating in the petroleum industry face several risks in 
addition to oil and gas price risks. Some of these additional risks are non-hedgeable with the 
existing marketable derivative instruments: these include quantity risk caused by uncertainties in 
the quantities produced and production cost risk due to variability in production costs. Some 
additional risks could be hedged with marketable derivatives: foreign exchange risk, interest rate 
risk and basis risk. 
Hypothesis 3.b: Firms facing higher additional risks have more incentive to use non-linear 
instruments because their total exposures become non-linear and the optimal hedging should 
be non-linear. In contrast, firms facing lower levels of additional risks tend to use linear 
instruments. 
Production uncertainty is measured by the coefficient of variation of the quarterly observations 
of the daily production for oil and gas respectively. For each firm, we calculate the coefficient of 
variation on a rolling window beginning with the first observation for the firm until the current 
quarter. The production cost risk is measured by the coefficient of variation of the cash cost (i.e., 
lifting cost given by Barrel of Oil Equivalent6), on a rolling window beginning with the first 
observation for the firm until the current quarter. Foreign exchange risk, interest rate risk and 
basis risk are measured by one dummy for each risk. This dummy variable takes the value of 1 
if the firm hedges the given risk and 0 otherwise. 
Moreover, Brown and Toft (2002) and Gay et al (2002, 2003) emphasize that the impact of the 
additional risks (more specifically production uncertainty) on derivatives choice is closely related 
to the level of the correlation between the output quantities and current prices. In fact, a positive 
correlation will increase the volatility of revenues because quantities and prices are moving in 
the same direction. Thus, keeping the level of production uncertainty constant, the higher the 
                                                          
6
 The lifting cost per Barrel of Oil Equivalent (BOE) is given on annual basis. We repeat the same observation for 
each quarter of the year. Oil and gas producers typically quote production in Barrels of Oil Equivalent. Naturally, one 
barrel of oil =1 BOE. For natural gas production, 6 thousand cubic feet (Mcf) of gas is counted as one BOE. 
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positive correlation, the greater the benefits of using linear instruments. A negative correlation 
will reduce variability in revenues and produce a natural hedge for the firm, but then over-
hedging is more likely to happen, and hence non-linear instruments are more advantageous.  
Hypothesis 3.c: Firms with a negative quantity-price correlation are more likely to use non-
linear instruments because over-hedging is more likely. Conversely, firms with a positive 
quantity-price correlation are more likely to use linear instruments to reduce the volatility of 
revenues because quantities and prices are moving in the same direction.  
We calculate the correlation coefficient between daily oil production and oil spot prices and the 
correlation coefficient between daily gas production and gas spot prices. For each firm, the 
correlation coefficients are constructed by taking all the firm’s observations available until the 
current quarter.  
3.2.4 Compensation policy and ownership structure 
In a value-maximizing framework, Stulz (1984) points out the crucial role of the nature of 
managerial compensation contracts in optimal hedging policies. In a subsequent seminal work, 
Smith and Stulz (1985) show that if the manager’s end-of-period utility is a concave function of 
the firm’s end-of-period value, the optimal hedging policy involves complete insulation of the 
firm’s value from the underlying risks (if it is feasible). Accordingly, a risk-averse manager 
owning a significant fraction of the firm’s shares is unlikely to hold a well-diversified7 portfolio 
and hence has more incentives to use linear hedging strategies. Linear strategies can better 
eliminate volatilities of the firm’s payoffs that directly affect the manager’s wealth. 
Hypothesis 4.a: Firms with large manager shareholding are more likely to use linear 
instruments.  
Moreover, Smith and Stulz (1985) point out that if a manager’s end-of-period utility is a convex 
function of a firm’s end-of-period value, the manager has less incentive to completely eliminate 
the underlying risks. The more a compensation package includes stock option grants, the more 
                                                          
7
 Testing the stock compensation incentives for hedging and the poorly diversified characteristic of the manager, as 
suggested by Smith and Stulz (1985), requires further information about the manager’s total wealth. Acquiring such 
information is not an easy task, but it can be done by controlling for the existence of presumably well-diversified 
outside blockholders (Tufano, 1996).  
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a manager’s expected utility tends to be a convex function of the firm value and hence he has 
more motivation to use non-linear instruments that reduce rather than eliminate the volatilities of 
the firm’s payoffs.  
Hypothesis 4.b: Firms with large stock option compensations are more likely to use non-linear 
instruments.  
We focus on the CEO compensation package because the CEO plays a crucial role in the 
corporate hedging decision. We measure the manager’s firm-specific wealth by the logarithm of 
one plus the market value of common shares held by the CEO at the end of each quarter. 
Following Tufano (1996), we use the logarithm specification to reflect that managers’ risk 
aversion should decrease as their firm-specific wealth increases.  We also use the number of 
options held by the firm’s CEO at the end of each quarter. To check whether the hedging 
strategy choice is due to risk-averse poorly diversified managers, Tufano (1996) controls for the 
existence of large outside blockholders, and argues that they should be well-diversified investors 
that are less interested in risk hedging. We subsequently control for the existence of outside 
large block-holders by taking the percentage of common shares held by institutional investors.  
3.2.5 Financial distress 
Adam (2002) extends the work of Froot et al (1993) to an inter-temporal setting, and argues that 
hedging strategy depends on the firm’s credit risk premium (i.e., marginal cost of external 
financing). When this cost differential is relatively low, the firm buys nonlinear instruments to 
avert a shortfall in future cash flows to fund its future investment programs. He asserts that 
unlevered firms with low levels of non-hedgeable risks are more likely to use linear hedging 
strategies, as conjectured by Detemple and Adler (1988). In intermediate cases between those 
two situations, Adam (2002) confirms that hedging portfolios will contain both instruments (i.e., 
costless collars). In Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) risk shifting (or asset substitution) approach, 
the convexity of shareholders’ expected utility motivates them to increase risk when the firm 
nears bankruptcy. It is then expected that highly distressed firms have more incentives to use 
nonlinear hedging strategies that increase rather than eliminate the firm’s payoff volatility. Unlike 
linear instruments, non-linear instruments, which are costly, decrease assets available for 
debtholders and preserve any upside potential for shareholders. Altogether, there will be a non-
monotonic relationship between firms’ financial soundness and nonlinear hedging strategies.  
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Hypothesis 5.a: Firms that are either far from financial distress or deep in financial distress are 
more likely to use nonlinear hedging strategies, while firms between those two extremes tend to 
use more linear instruments (i.e., swap contracts) and costless collars. 
We construct the following three variables as proxies for financial distress: (1) Following Drucker 
and Puri (2009) and Campello et al (2011), we implement Distance-to-Default as a measure of 
the future likelihood of default. Distance-to-Default is a market-based measure originating from 
Merton’s (1974) approach and used by Moody’s-KMV, as described in Croshie and Bohn 
(2003). It is simply the number of standard deviations that the firm is away from default (see 
Table 1 for more details). (2) Leverage is measured as the ratio of long-term debts in current 
liabilities plus one-half of long-term debt over the book value of total assets. (3) Financial 
constraints measured by a binary variable that takes the value of 1 when both leverage ratio 
and quick ratio are above and below the industry’s median and 0 otherwise, as in Dionne and 
Garand (2003). 
Recently, Morellec and Smith (2007) show that the firm’s hedging policy is derived not only by 
the underinvestment incentives arising from the shareholder-debtholder conflict but also by the 
overinvestment incentives arising from the shareholder-manager conflict. The overinvestment 
problem is due to managers’ tendency to overinvest because they derive private benefits from 
the investment (i.e., the agency cost of free cash flow as identified by Jensen, 1986). This 
problem is more observable in the case of firms with larger free cash flows and fewer 
investment opportunities. Morellec and Smith’s (2007) argument is consistent with the empirical 
evidence reported by Bartram et al (2009) that large profitable firms with fewer growth options 
tend to hedge more, which runs counter to the financial distress and underinvestment 
hypotheses. To reduce the costs of both overinvestment and underinvestment, Morellec and 
Smith (2007) suggest that the optimal hedging policy must reduce the free cash flow volatility. 
Hence the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5.b: Large profitable firms with fewer investment opportunities are more likely to 
use linear instruments because of their capability to decrease the free cash flow volatility to 
avoid the overinvestment problem. 
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The overinvestment problem is measured by a binary variable that takes the value of 1 when 
both the ratio of free cash flows scaled by book value of total assets, and investment 
opportunities are above and below the industry’s median and 0 otherwise.  
3.2.6 Tax incentives  
The tax argument for corporate hedging analyzed by Mayers and Smith (1982), Smith and Stulz 
(1985) and Graham and Smith (1999) shows that in the presence of a convex tax function, 
hedging reduces the variability of pre-tax firm values and reduces the expected corporate tax 
liability. Moreover, the presence of tax preference items (i.e., tax loss carryforwards, foreign tax 
credits and investment tax credits) extends the convex region. As for the choice of what 
derivative instruments to use, we expect firms facing convex tax function to use linear 
instruments because of their ability to eliminate the volatility of pre-tax incomes. Indeed, firms 
having more tax preference items -which increase the convexity of the tax function- have more 
incentives to use linear instruments to preserve the tax shields. 
Hypothesis 6.a: Firms in the convex tax region that have more tax preference items are more 
likely to use linear instruments.  
For this hypothesis, we use two measures for tax function convexity. Following Géczy, Minton 
and Schrand (1997), Gay and Nam (1998) and Graham and Rogers (2002), we use the book 
value of tax loss carryforwards scaled by the book value of total assets.  Because the sample 
consists of US firms, we employ the simulation procedure proposed by Graham and Smith 
(1999) to measure the expected percentage of tax savings arising from a 5% reduction in the 
volatility of pre-tax income. This measure is already used in some empirical research, as in 
Dionne and Triki (2013) and Campello et al (2011).  
Table II summarizes the definitions, construction and data sources of the variables. 
[Table II about here] 
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4. Dependent variables: construction and characteristics 
Table III breaks down the sample of 6,326 firm-quarters into observations with and without gas 
and/or oil hedging. Oil and gas producers report hedging activities for 3,489 firm-quarters, which 
represents almost 55% of the whole panel. Out of these 3,489 firm-quarters, 2,255 report 
hedging activities for both oil and gas; almost 64.63% of the hedging subsample. Firm-quarters 
with only gas hedging represent 25.27% of the hedging subsample with 882 observations. 
Finally, there are 352 firm-quarters with only oil hedging or 10% of the hedging subsample. 
[Table III about here] 
To analyze the hedging behavior of oil and gas producers in greater depth, we collected 
information about the nature of hedging instruments already in use. Essentially, the hedging 
instruments consist of swap contracts, put options, costless collars, forward or futures contracts 
and three-way collars. Table IV presents a breakdown of the frequency of use for each hedging 
instrument. The most common hedging vehicles used in the oil and gas industry are Swap 
contracts, with 45.58% (45.25%) of use in gas (oil) hedging. The second most frequently used 
instrument is costless collars, with 37.19% (37.11%) for gas (oil) hedging. Next are Put options, 
with 10.55% for gas hedging and 11.85% for oil hedging. The least used instruments are 
forward or Futures contracts, with only 3.25% (2.78%) for gas (oil) hedging and 3-way collars, 
with only 3.42% (3.02%) for gas (oil). These observations show that oil and gas producers adopt 
quite similar strategies in their hedging, and that they prefer linear instruments. 
[Table IV about here] 
We now analyze hedging strategies. To save space, we skip the observations related to 
Forward/Futures contracts because they contribute to only 3.25% of gas hedging activity and 
2.78% of oil hedging activity. We also omit observations related to three-way collars because 
they are used only in 3.42% of cases for gas hedging activity and 3.02% for oil hedging. Table V 
shows that there are two major hedging behaviors adopted by oil and gas hedgers: using only 
one hedging instrument and using more than one hedging instrument simultaneously to form 
hedging portfolios with different payoff structures. For the subsample of gas hedgers, Panel A of 
Table V illustrates that swap contracts are used separately 41.33% of the time (i.e., 932 out of 
2,255 firm-quarters), with put options 6.08% of the time, with costless collars 44.30% of the time 
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and with put options and costless collars simultaneously 8.29% of the time. Put options are 
used separately 24.14% of the time (i.e., 126 out of the 522 firm-quarters of use), with swap 
contracts 26.25% of the time, with costless collars for 13.79% of the time and simultaneously 
with swaps and collars 35.82% of the time. In addition, gas hedgers use costless collars only 
31.63% of the time (i.e., 582 out of the 1840 firm-quarters of use), with swaps 54.29% of the 
time, with put options for 3.91% of the time and simultaneously with swaps and puts 10.16% of 
the time. 
For the subsample of oil hedgers, Panel B of Table V indicates that swap contracts are used 
only 49.62% of the time (i.e., 849 out of 1,711 firm-quarters of use), with put options 5.79% of 
the time, with costless collars 36.65% of the time and with put options and costless collars 
7.95% of the time. Put options are used separately 33.48% of the time (i.e., 150 out of the 448 
firm-quarters), with swaps 22.10% of the time, with costless collars 14.06% of the time and 
simultaneously with swaps and collars 30.36% of the time. Costless collars are employed 
separately 41.13% of the time (i.e., 577 out of the 1403 firm-quarters), with swaps 44.69% of the 
time, with put options 4.49% of the time and with swaps and puts simultaneously 9.69% of the 
time. 
Overall, Table V shows that the most common hedging strategies are using swap contracts 
only, using costless collars only and using a portfolio formed by swaps and collars. Put options 
are used generally in association with the other two instruments. Turning to the distribution of 
the notional quantity for each hedging portfolio, Table VI indicates that on average oil and gas 
producers take quite similar notional positions for the instruments that they use simultaneously 
in their hedging portfolios. 
[Tables V and VI about here] 
5. Econometric methodologies 
The transition probabilities reported in Table VII show an extreme state dependence in the 
derivative choice for the sample hedgers. The elements of Table VII could be interpreted as 
conditional probabilities under the Markov model. The magnitude of the diagonal elements 
clearly shows the persistence or the state dependence in hedging strategy choice. The 
persistence in hedging behavior arises from two main sources. One possibility is that 
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persistence is caused by unobserved decision-maker-specific preferences for derivatives that 
are time-invariant, which creates unobserved time-invariant individual heterogeneity (i.e., 
spurious state dependence as stated by Heckman, 1981). Alternatively, persistence can be due 
to unobserved but time-variant characteristics of hedging strategies, which creates a true state 
dependence. These unobserved time-variant characteristics could be transaction costs 
associated with the different hedging strategies.  
[Table VII about here] 
To disentangle the effects of unobserved individual heterogeneity and state dependence, we 
employ several dynamic discrete choice frameworks with random effects, retaining a first-order 
Markov process (i.e., including the first lagged dependent variable) and accounting for the initial 
condition problem. We consider derivative choice as a multi-state process and examine the 
effects of investment opportunities, taxes, agency costs, distress costs, managerial risk 
aversion, overinvestment, production function characteristics and market conditions on the 
choice of hedging strategy. Estimating these econometric dynamic settings will allow us to 
distinguish the effects of past hedging strategy choice and observable and unobservable firm 
characteristics on current hedging behavior. 
To control for the possibility of sample selection bias, the estimation of all our models was 
derived in the context of the Two-Step Heckman Regression with Selection. This procedure 
captures the sequential decisions of oil and gas producers: a first decision to hedge or not and a 
second decision about the nature of the hedging strategy. In the first step, we follow the 
literature and model the existence of hedging activity as a function of variables that are 
conjectured to be determinants of the hedging decision: tax incentives, leverage, liquidity, cash 
costs, book value of convertible debt, firm size, sales, and oil and gas reserve quantities. 
Appendix A reports the estimation results of the first step, which allow us to obtain the estimated 
Inverse Mills Ratio that will be used in the second step. 
5.1 A dynamic probit specification for hedging strategy choice  
This model is used for hedging strategies based on one instrument only, as identified in Table 
IV (i.e., swap contracts only, put options only, and costless collars only). We will include the first 
lagged value of the dependent variable to account for this state dependence in hedging strategy 
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choice, which leads to a Dynamic Panel Random Effects Probit Model. The main focus of this 
model is to capture the derivative choice dynamics: how does the derivative choice in the 
previous period affect the choice in the current period? The model for hedging strategy choice is 
given by the following expression and is estimated for each hedging strategy separately: 
              , , , , , 1 , , , 0          1, , : 1, , ,  i j t i t i j t i j t i j iy I X y u i N t T  (1) 
where , ,i j ty  is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the hedging strategy J is used 
by the firm i at time t and 0 otherwise. 
,i tX  is a set of observed exogenous variables related to 
investment opportunities, taxes, agency costs, distress costs, managerial risk aversion, 
overinvestment problem, production function characteristics and market conditions, which may 
be associated with hedging strategy choice by the firm i at time t. 
,i tX  also includes the Inverse 
Mills Ratio coming from the first step of the Heckman regression with sample selection. , , 1i j ty  is 
the observation of the dummy variable in the previous period, which allows us to capture state 
dependence. ,i ju  is the firm i and hedging strategy j specific factors that are time invariant and 
thus represent the unobserved heterogeneity.  , ,i j t  is the idiosyncratic error term that is 
assumed to be strictly exogenous and is normally distributed and uncorrelated across firms and 
times. 
In this dynamic setting, lagged effects or persistence can arise from the unobserved individual 
heterogeneity, ui, (i.e. spurious state dependence; Heckman, 1981) or true state dependence 
through the term  , , 1i j ty . In addition, this dynamic specification raises the initial condition 
problem as identified by Heckman (1981).8 Because our focus is on true state dependence, we 
follow Wooldridge (2005) and model the distribution of the unobserved individual heterogeneity 
conditional on the initial values and the within-individual means of the exogenous variables. This 
is Mundlak’s (1978) device to project the unobserved heterogeneity into the means of the 
explanatory variable with the addition of a dummy variable reflecting the initial state. 
Accordingly, we parameterize the distribution of the unobserved individual heterogeneity ui as: 
          , 0 1 , ,0 2 ,           1, , ,  i j i j i i ju y X i N   (2) 
                                                          
8
 The initial condition problem arises whenever the sample period does not coincide with the starting of the stochastic 
process generating the individual’s choice dynamics (Heckman, 1981). 
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, ,0i jy  is the first observation or the starting observation of the hedging instrument choice. iX  is a 
set of means over the sample period of the exogenous variables of firm i.  ,i j  is assumed to be 
distributed   20, jN  and independent of the exogenous variables, the initial condition and the 
error term   , ,i j t . Substituting equation (2) for equation (1) produces an augmented random 
effects probit model that could be estimated by a Gauss-Hermite quadrature as in Butler and 
Moffitt (1982)9 or maximum simulated likelihood (see Wooldridge, 2005, or Greene, 2003 for 
more details). 
5.2 A dynamic generalized ordered specification for hedging strategy choice 
To further analyze the dynamics of hedging strategy choice, we implement a Dynamic Panel 
Generalized Random Effect Ordered Probit. This model is more flexible and relaxes the single 
index or parallel-line assumption (i.e., same coefficient vector   for all categories of the 
dependent variable) by making threshold parameters a linear function of the covariates 
(Maddala 1983, Terza 1985). We ordered hedging instruments in terms of their payoffs’ linearity 
as follows: (1) Put options only, (2) Costless collars only and (3) Swaps only. The starting point 
for the econometric model is an unobserved latent dependent variable *
( , )i th , which describes the 
choice of hedging instrument given that possible choices are  , 1, 2, 3i th . The reduced form of 
the estimated model is given by: 
           
*
, , , 1 ,      1, , : 1, , ,   i t i t i t i t i ih X h u i N t T  (3) 
,i tX , iu  and  ,i t  are, as in equation (1), in the dynamic random effect probit specification. , 1i th  is 
the observed instrument choice in the previous period that allows state dependence to be 
captured. To overcome the initial condition problem, we parameterize the unobserved 
heterogeneity iu as in Wooldridge (2005): 
                                                          
9
 The model is estimated by the command xtprobit.re implemented in STATA.SE (Release 11.0, Stata Corporation), 
after the inclusion of all means of exogenous variables and initial observations. 
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        1 ,0 2     1, , , i i i iu h X i N   (4) 
where 
,0ih  is the first observation of hedging strategy choice for firm i. iX     and i  are, as in 
equation (2), for dynamic probit specification. Because the latent outcome *,i th  is not observed, 
only an indicator of the hedging instrument, in which the latent variable falls, is observed ,i th
with: 
 
   
*
, 1 ,  if   ,i t j i t jh j h   (5) 
where  j  with   1, 2, 3j  are the threshold parameters. We allow these threshold parameters to 
be a linear function of observable characteristics 
,i tX , , 1i th , ,0ih  and iX  (Terza, 1985). The 
conditional probability of observing each category   1, 2, 3j  is then given by: 
 
   

      
 
          
    
             
, , , 1 ,0 1 2
, , 1 2, 1, ,0 1 1 , 1 , 1 2, 1 1, 1 ,0
| , , , , , , , ,i t i t i t i i i
j i j i t j i t j i j i j i j i t j i t j i j i
P h j X h X h
X h X h X h X h
(6) 
Where  ( ) denotes the cumulative density of the standard normal distribution. This formulation 
produces an augmented generalized ordered probit with random effects including the lagged 
dependent variable and the initial observation. This approach, as in Williams (2006), leads to 
the estimation of  1J  dynamic random effects probit models. The first model contrasts 
category 1 with categories 2, ,J ; the second model contrasts categories 1 and 2 with 
categories 3, ,J   The model  1J  does the same regarding categories  1, , 1J  versus 
category J. This model could be estimated by a Gauss-Hermite quadrature10 or maximum 
simulated likelihood (see Boes, 2007 for more details). 
5.3 A dynamic multinomial specification for hedging portfolio choice 
Here we focus our attention on hedging portfolio choice (i.e., using simultaneously more than 
one instrument). Table V reveals that these hedging portfolios are constructed mainly from 
                                                          
10
 The model is estimated using regoprob, a user-written program developed by Boes (2007) based on Gauss-
Hermite quadrature. We augment the model by including the lagged dependent variable, the means of the 
exogenous variable and the initial observation. 
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combinations of swap contracts with put options and/or costless collars. The transition 
probabilities reported in Table VI indicate higher persistence in these hedging portfolios, which 
motivates the use of a dynamic multinomial choice framework. Our econometric framework 
takes the form of a dynamic Mixed Multinomial Logit (MMNL) with random coefficients and 
correlated random effects. We allow random effects to be correlated with the firm’s time-variant 
characteristics. This specification is less restrictive than a standard random effects model 
because it does not exhibit the restrictive assumption of Independence from Irrelevant 
Alternatives (IIA) and is more consistent with the Random Utility Maximization (RUM) 
assumption, where each hedging portfolio is associated with a given level of utility. The Mixed 
Logit also effectively captures random taste variation and habit formation. 
The utility for the firm i from choosing hedging portfolio j at time t, , ,i j tU , is given by
11: 
             , , , , , 1 , , ,     1, , ; 1, , ; 1, , ,  i j t i t j i j t j i j t i j iU X L u i N t T j J   (7) 
where 
,i tX  is a set of observed exogenous variables related to hedging portfolio choice as in 
equation (1) with unknown weight  j . , , 1i j tL  is a binary dummy variable indicating lagged 
hedging portfolio choice with parameter  j , with  , , 1 1i j tL  if firm i chooses hedging portfolio j at 
time 1t , and  , , 1 0i j tL  otherwise. Oil and gas producers have a set of four alternative hedging 
portfolios: swap contracts only  1j , which is our base outcome in the model; swap contracts 
combined with put options   2j ; swap contracts combined with costless collars   3j ; swap 
contracts combined with put options and costless collars   4j . ,i ju  represents the firm i and 
alternative j specific factors that are time invariant (i.e. unobserved heterogeneity).  , ,i j t  is the 
idiosyncratic error term that is assumed to be independent from everything else in the model; it 
follows a Type I extreme value distribution. 
Assume that at each time period  1t  a firm chooses the hedging portfolio associated with the 
highest level of utility. Then, , , 1i j tL  if , , , , i j t i k tU U  for all    1, ,k j k J . Hence, the probability 
of making choice j at time 1t  conditional on ,i tX , , , 1i j tL  and ,i ju  takes the following logit form: 
                                                          
11
 The notation in this section is largely adapted from Zucchelli et al (2012). 
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  (8) 
For identification purposes, all coefficients for the first category  1j  and its unobserved 
heterogeneity are set to zero (i.e., hedging with swap contracts only is our base outcome for this 
model). We assume that the individual unobserved heterogeneity for the remaining three 
hedging portfolios follows a trivariate normal distribution with zero means and a variance-
covariance matrix with non-zero correlation across unobserved heterogeneity for alternative 
hedging portfolios. 
Train (2009) suggests approximating the sample likelihood (SL) for the multinomial logit with 
random effects using simulated maximum likelihood methods. The simulated sample likelihood 
(SLL) is then given by: 
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where R values represent the quasi-random draws from the distribution of the unobserved 
heterogeneity using the Halton sequence technique. After R repetitions the SLL values are 
averaged over the R draws and the simulation is repeated until convergence.12 To account for 
the initial condition problem, we parameterize the distribution of the individual unobserved 
heterogeneity for each firm as a function of the means of the exogenous variables over the 
sample period and the hedging portfolio choice in the initial period (see Train, 2009 for more 
details). 
6. Results and discussion 
6.1 Descriptive statistics: Independent variables 
Descriptive statistics are computed on the pooled dataset. Table VIII gives summary statistics 
about the financial and operational characteristics for the 150 U.S. oil and gas producers in the 
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 The model is estimated by the user-written Stata program mixlogit developed by Arne Risa Hole (2007), which 
performs simulations using Halton sequences. We use 200 Halton draws. 
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sample. The findings suggest that U.S oil and gas producers are not intensive hedgers. In fact, 
the hedging indicator variables show that gas hedging occurred in 49.58% of the firm-quarters in 
the sample and oil hedging occurred in 41.21% of the firm-quarters. Interest rate, foreign 
exchange and basis risk hedging occurred respectively in 17.18%, 4.5% and 9.48% of the firm-
quarters. 
[Table VIII about here] 
The measure of firms’ investment programs shows that oil and gas producers are intensive 
investors. On average, firms expend the equivalent of 22.37% of the book value of their net 
property, plant and equipment in exploration and reserve acquisition and development. The 
correlation between internal cash flows and investment opportunities has a mean (median) of 
0.055 (0.046), with one fourth of these firms having a correlation less than -0.18 and another 
fourth with a correlation greater than 0.30. The tax preference item, measured by the ratio of the 
book value of tax loss carryforwards scaled by the book value of total assets, has a mean 
(median) of 13.42% (0.00%). The expected tax saving benefits of hedging have a mean 
(median) of 5.24% (4.80%), which are quite close to the findings of Graham and Smith (1999). 
The Distance-to-Default of the sample has a mean (median) of 2.234 (2.052), which reflects 
little variation in the financial safety of the oil and gas producers in the sample. Those results 
are similar to statistics reported by Drucker and Puri (2009) and Campello et al (2011).13 Oil and 
gas producers maintain low leverage levels with a mean (median) of 15.8% (14.2%). Overall, oil 
and gas producers maintain relatively high levels of cash balances (quick ratio) and have quite 
similar cash costs (lifting cost per barrel of oil equivalent). Statistics also indicate that in 32% of 
the firm quarters in our sample, producers are in a situation of financial constraints with a 
leverage ratio and quick ratio that are both above and below the industry’s median. The 
manager’s stock and option ownership varies considerably, with a mean (median) of 28.983 
MM$ (1.125 MM$) for stockholding and 174,386 (0.000) options. Institutional ownership has a 
mean (median) of 37.17% (29.86%) and varies from no institutional ownership for the first 
quartile to higher than 74% for the top quartile of the firm-quarters in the panel. The market 
value of firms’ outstanding common shares shows that the oil and gas industry mainly 
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 Drucker and Puri examine the secondary market for loan sales in the USA over the period 1999-2004. Using a 
sample of 7261 loans, they find a mean (median) for the Distance-to-Default of 2.304 (1.929). Campello et al (2011) 
study the implications of hedging for corporate financing and investment. Using a dataset of 1185 firms over the 
period 1996-2002, they find a mean (median) for the Distance-to-Default of 2.464 (1.861). 
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comprises relatively small firms and a few large producers. In addition, this market value varies 
strongly within the sample with a mean (median) of $6,028 Million ($220 Million). The same 
conclusion is validated by the means and medians of oil and gas sales and reserve quantities. 
The two Herfindahl indices, measuring the geographical dispersion of daily production of oil and 
gas respectively, indicate that oil and gas producing activities are largely concentrated in the 
same region. The mean Herfindahl index is 0.06 for daily oil production and 0.10 for daily gas 
production. Results further show that oil and gas producers derive almost 87% of their total 
revenues from oil and gas production. On average, gas production contributes to 52% of total 
revenue and oil production to 32%. Production uncertainty, measured by the coefficient of 
variation in daily production, has a mean (median) of 0.41 (0.31) for oil and 0.41 (0.30) for gas 
production respectively. In addition, the coefficient of variation of the cash cost per barrel of oil 
equivalent has a mean (median) of 0.29 (0.25). This implies that oil and gas producers face 
higher additional risks related to input costs and output quantities.  
6.2 Multivariate Results14 
6.2.1 Hedging Instrument Choice 
Tables IX and X report the estimation results for many specifications of the Dynamic Panel 
Random Effect Probit Model in equation (1). The estimation was done for the subset of oil 
hedgers and gas hedgers separately and for each hedging instrument: swap contracts, put 
options and costless collars. The estimation results allow us to test the predictions concerning 
the incentives and rationales for derivative choices by oil and gas hedgers. The inspection of 
regressions reported in Tables IX and X clearly demonstrates the state dependence or state 
preference in derivative choice. Hence, the coefficients of the lagged dependent variables, for 
all the instruments, are significant at the 1% level. The investigation of the coefficients of the 
initial observations further shows that this state preference is more evident for swap contracts 
for the subset of oil hedgers and costless collars for the subset of gas hedgers with significant 
coefficients at conventional levels. These findings provide evidence of state dependence in 
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 Appendix B discusses the results of the univariate analysis we performed. Appendix C, D, E and F report 
descriptive statistics of the independent variables and tests of differences between means and medians of relevant 
variables for gas and oil hedgers separately. The univariate analysis is carried out by derivative instruments 
(Appendix C and D) and by hedging portfolios (Appendix E and F). 
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hedging behavior in terms of derivative choice, and suggest that recognizing the presence of 
this phenomenon could provide insight into management behavior. 
[Tables IX and X about here] 
Consistent with predictions, multivariate results show that put options are positively related to 
investment opportunities (INV_OPP) and swap contracts are significantly negatively related to 
investment opportunities15 for the subset of gas hedgers. However, for the subset of oil hedgers, 
put options and swaps have the predicted sign but with no significant economic impact. The 
relationship between investment opportunities and collar use is unclear and insignificant. 
Overall, these findings are consistent with the univariate results, and with Froot et al’s (1993) 
argument that firms with larger investment programs tend to use more non-linear instruments, 
along with the empirical findings of Gay and Nam (1999) and Adam (2002, 2003, 2009). Results 
related to undeveloped proved reserves suggest that oil reserves (UND_OIL) are significantly 
negatively related to collars, and particularly put options. One explanation could be that because 
oil producers already have larger undeveloped reserves, they face less pressure related to 
future development expenditures. Interestingly, for gas hedgers, the proxy CORR_1 for the 
correlation between free cash flows and the firm’s investment programs are significantly 
positively related to swaps and negatively related to the use of put options and costless collars, 
as predicted. For the subset of oil hedgers, CORR_1 is related positively to swaps and 
negatively to collars and has an unpredicted positive association with put options. Overall, this is 
an empirical validation of the theoretical prediction of Froot et al (1993) and Spano (2004) that 
firms with a higher correlation between internal cash flows and future investment opportunities 
are more likely to use linear instruments because they benefit from a natural hedge and linear 
strategies suffice to provide value-maximizing hedges. 
The multivariate results underline an evident impact of the economic conditions of the oil and 
gas markets on derivative choice. Consistent with the univariate results and our prediction, gas 
price volatility (VOL_GAS) is significantly positively associated with the use of put options and 
costless collars and significantly negatively related to swap contracts. Oil price volatility 
(VOL_OIL) has the predicted signs with swaps and collars, and unpredicted and insignificant 
signs with put options. This contradicts the prediction and the finding of Adam (2003) suggesting 
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 This last finding must be interpreted in light of the fact that swap users carry higher leverage ratios and that most of 
those loan agreements include investment restrictions, as evidenced by Campello et al (2011). 
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that gold price volatility has a negative impact on the decision to use non-linear strategies. The 
divergence could be explained mainly by the larger difference in the prices of the two 
commodities (natural gas and oil versus gold), hence the relative impact of their respective 
volatilities. Future prices (FUTURE_GAS and FUTURE_OIL) are significantly negatively related 
to the use of swaps and positively associated with the use of put options or collars. Consistent 
with our prediction, this finding means that when expected prices are higher, oil and gas 
producers are more interested in maintaining any potential upside than protecting the downside 
risk. In line with our expectations, spot prices (SPOT_OIL and SPOT_GAS) are significantly 
positively related to swap contracts and significantly negatively related to costless collars. 
Results related to put options are significant and mixed. Although put options are negatively 
related to oil spot prices as predicted, they are positively associated with gas spot prices. These 
findings imply that market conditions seem to be an important determinant in corporate hedging. 
The results also show that geographical diversification (HERF_GAS) has no significant impact 
on derivative choice by the subset of gas hedgers, as in Adam (2009). For the subset of oil 
hedgers, the impact of geographical diversification in oil production (HERF_OIL) is mixed. 
Although higher geographic flexibility in oil production seems to be significantly negatively 
related to the use of swaps and positively related to collars, as conjectured by Moschini and 
Lapan (1992), it is negatively related to put options. Firms primarily engaged in gas production 
(i.e., higher GAS_REV) tend to use more put options and collars and to use less swaps. In 
addition, firms primarily engaged in oil production (i.e., higher OIL_REV) tend to use more put 
options. This is consistent with the empirical finding of Adam (2009), who confirms that more 
focused gold mining firms are 30% more likely to use options strategies than are diversified 
firms. Tufano (1996) finds no differences in the level of diversification between option users and 
non-users. The results pertaining to production cost risk (COST_CV) are mixed. Although 
production cost risk is positively related to collars and negatively related to swaps for oil hedgers 
as predicted, it appears to be negatively related to the use of put options. The unexpected 
negative relation between production cost risk and put options might be explained by the fact 
that higher variations in cash cost induce variations in realized margins and hence more 
financial constraints, which could deter firms from using costly hedging strategies (i.e., premium 
of put options). Surprisingly, the cash cost risk has no significant impact on gas hedging 
strategy. The explanation could be that cash cost is expressed in terms of barrel of oil 
equivalent, which means that it is more influenced by fluctuations of costs related to oil 
production more than gas production.  
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Interestingly, gas production uncertainties or quantity risks (UNCER_GAS) are significantly 
negatively related to swaps and collars. Results related to oil production uncertainties 
(UNCER_OIL) are mixed. Although these uncertainties are significantly negatively associated 
with collar use as predicted, they appear to be positively related to swaps but with lower 
significance. Overall, these findings corroborate the theoretical conjectures of Moschini and 
Lapan (1995), Brown and Toft (2002) and Gay et al (2002, 2003) suggesting that when a firm is 
facing non-hedgeable risks, its total exposure becomes nonlinear and the optimal hedging 
should depart from strict linearity. However, the association between oil (gas) quantity risk and 
put options is positive as predicted, but with no economic significance, which corroborates the 
empirical findings of Adam (2009), who finds no evidence that uncertainty of gold production 
motivates the use of option strategies for gold mining producers.  
Results pertaining to the existence of additional hedged risks show that interest rate hedging 
(IR_HEDG) is negatively associated with the use of swaps, put options and collars. The raison 
for this intriguing finding comes from the costly external financing conjecture. Firms might 
consider the hedging of their core business risk or interest rate risk hedging as substitutes 
because both might alleviate the costly external capital problem. Foreign exchange risk hedging 
(FX_HEDG) is positively associated with the use of put options and negatively related to collars. 
Basis risk hedging (BASIS_HEDG) seems to be negatively associated with the use of swap 
contracts and collars.  Consistent with our expectation, these findings suggest that the existence 
of additional hedgeable risks adds more non-linearity to the firm’s global exposure, which 
requires more non-linear hedging strategies 
Interestingly, multivariate results pertaining to the quantity-price correlation indicate that when 
gas production quantities and spot prices are highly correlated (PQ_COR_GAS), gas producers 
tend to use more swaps and collars. This result is consistent with Brown and Toft (2002) and 
Gay et al (2002, 2003) conjectures that when production quantity and spot prices are positively 
correlated, over-hedging is less likely, and more linear instruments could achieve optimal 
hedging. The oil quantity-price correlation (PQ_COR_OIL) is strongly negatively related to 
collars. Although with similar production uncertainties, oil hedgers and gas hedgers react 
differently to the price-quantity correlation. A possible explanation of this result could be the 
differences in terms of unitary production costs, spot prices and price volatility of both 
commodities.  
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Regarding managerial risk aversion, particularly for gas hedgers, results show that a CEO with 
higher firm-specific wealth (MV_CS_CEO) tends to avoid put options, as predicted. However, 
we did not find a significant association between the CEO’s equity stake value and swap 
contracts. Consistent with our expectations, results also suggest that CEO optionholding 
(OPT_CEO) is negatively related to the use of swaps. Interestingly, we find that higher 
managerial stockholding and optionholding are strongly positively related to costless collars. A 
possible explanation for this surprising finding is linked to the payoff structure of costless collars 
(i.e., buying put options and selling call options). Overall, the latter findings are consistent with 
the literature (Smith and Stulz, 1985) that a risk-averse manager with a concave utility function 
(i.e., higher stockholding), tends to use linear instruments and to avoid non-linear ones. 
Managers with a convex utility function (i.e., higher optionholding) will do the inverse. The 
percentage of institutional shareholding (%_CS_INST) is significantly negatively related to the 
use of the three instruments. This could be explained by the fact that institutional investors are 
less interested in risk management because they are large and well diversified.  
Results pertaining to financial distress show that swap contracts are positively related to 
leverage ratio (LEV), negatively associated with financial constraints (CONSTRAINT) and 
negatively related to Distance-to-Default measure (DTD) in a statistically significant manner. 
This interesting finding reveals that oil and gas producers with higher leverage and lower 
Distance-to-Default but not yet in a financial distress situation (i.e., the negative association 
between swaps and CONSTRAINT) tend to use more swap contracts. In light of descriptive 
statistics, this latter finding corroborates theoretical predictions that linear instruments are 
optimal when there are average financial constraints (Adam, 2002). Surprisingly, results do not 
provide evidence of a relation between put options and firm’s debt levels and financial 
constraints proxy. Results further show, particularly for oil hedgers, that put options are 
negatively related to Distance-to-Default in a significant manner. Although contrary to the 
expectation that firms that are far from financial distress could use non-linear instruments 
(Adam, 2002), this latter finding corroborates the risk-shifting theory (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). To further test the non-monotonicity between financial distress proxies and non-linear 
instrument use, we re-estimate regressions using the leverage squared and the Distance-to-
Default squared and find no evidence of this non-monotonic relationship. The relationship 
between costless collar use and leverage ratio is mixed. Interestingly, oil hedgers that are far 
from financial distress use more costless collars. This finding appears to be consistent with 
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Detemple and Adler’s (1988) prediction that more linear instruments are optimal for firms with 
no financial constraints. 
Overinvestment (OVER_INV), a problem identified by Morellec and Smith (2007) and Bartram et 
al (2009), seems to be largely supported by the multivariate results. Overinvestment is more 
likely for large profitable firms that have fewer investment opportunities. Managers at these firms 
tend to overinvest because they derive private benefits from the investment. Interestingly, the 
overinvestment is significantly positively related to swap contracts and is significantly negatively 
related to put options and collars. Hence, when overinvestment is more likely to occur, firms 
tend to use more swap contracts to avoid it. To our knowledge, the overinvestment problem has 
not been empirically investigated in the corporate risk management context.16  
With regard to tax function convexity (TAX_SAVE), measured by the approach proposed by 
Graham and Smith (1999), results indicate that the convexity of the tax function is significantly 
negatively related to put options for the subsample of oil hedgers. Although we did not find a 
significant positive relation between TAX_SAVE and swaps or collars, this finding empirically 
confirms the conjecture of the tax incentive to hedge, namely that firms tend to avoid non-linear 
instruments to eliminate volatility in pre-tax incomes. The empirical implications with respect to 
the tax loss carryforwards (TLCF) are unclear. While TLCF have a significant negative impact 
on the use of swap contracts and a significant positive association with the use of costless 
collars, this finding contradicts the prediction that firms with more tax preference items are more 
likely to use linear instruments to preserve the tax benefits of hedging. Géczy, Minton, and 
Schrand (1997) find a positive but insignificant association between linear instruments (swaps 
and forwards contracts) and tax loss carryforwards when studying currency derivative use. An 
explanation for this finding was put forth by Graham and Rogers (2002), who suggest that tax 
loss carryforwards are uncorrelated with tax function convexity. They conclude that the 
existence of this item might measure financial distress or other corporate characteristics.  
6.2.2 Hedging Portfolio Choice 
Tables XI and XII report the estimation results of the determinants of hedging portfolio choice for 
many specifications of the Dynamic Mixed Multinomial Logit model with random effects (MMNL). 
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 As a robustness check, we proxy the overinvestment problem by creating a dummy variable that equals 1 for firms 
whose ratio of free cash flow to total assets are in the top quartile, and 0 otherwise, and interact this dummy variable 
with investment opportunities. We obtain the same results.  
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The estimation was done for the subset of oil hedgers and gas hedgers separately. Because the 
main focus here is on oil and gas producers’ rationales for choosing hedging portfolios with 
payoffs that depart from linearity to non-linearity by the combination of swap contracts with put 
options and/or costless collars, swap contracts are chosen as our base outcome and all the 
results must be interpreted relative to choosing swap contracts. However, the level of non-
linearity depends on the percentage of the notional hedged quantity of each instrument forming 
the portfolio. Table VI summarizes those hedging portfolios and breaks down the notional 
quantity hedged between the different instruments.  
[Tables XI and XII about here] 
Each table reports the estimated coefficients’ means for explanatory variables, as well as 
estimated means (uj), estimated standard deviations (Sigma_uj) and correlation coefficients 
(Rho_1_2, Rho_1_3 and Rho_2_3) of unobserved heterogeneity terms for the remaining three 
hedging portfolios: (1) swap contracts combined with put options, (2) swap contracts combined 
with costless collars and (3) swap contracts combined with put options and costless collars. 
Results (see lower parts of Tables XI and XII) show a statistically non-zero standard deviation of 
the unobserved heterogeneity effects justifying the random effects specification. They also 
indicate higher correlations between random effects of the three hedging portfolios for gas and 
oil hedgers respectively. This higher correlation of random effects across hedging portfolios 
implies that the firm-specific unobserved factors driving hedging portfolio choices overlap but 
are not the same. This appears to suggest that firm-specific random effects are a crucial 
element to take into account, and that our model should outperform other models without 
random effects.  
Lagged hedging portfolio choice exhibits a great degree of persistence in all hedging portfolios. 
In line with Froot et al (1993), results show that oil and gas producers with higher investment 
opportunities are more likely to use put options and collars in their hedging portfolios in addition 
to swap contracts. This confirms our findings in the Dynamic Probit model. Results further show 
that undeveloped oil and gas reserves have no significant impact on hedging portfolio choice. 
Contrary to predictions, the correlation between internal cash flows and investment 
opportunities is positively related to the use of put options and collars for gas hedgers.17 For the 
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 This unexpected result should be interpreted in light of the fraction of the notional quantity hedged by each 
instrument (Table VI). For hedging portfolios constituted by swap contracts combined with put options and costless 
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subset of oil hedgers, this correlation is negatively related to put options in a statistically 
significant manner. Higher gas future prices and higher gas price volatilities are significantly 
positively associated with costless collars. Furthermore, results show that put options are 
negatively related to higher oil spot prices and positively impacted by oil future prices. These 
findings, pertaining to market conditions, corroborate our predictions and are consistent with the 
Dynamic Probit model above. 
Results further indicate that oil hedgers with higher geographical diversification tend to include 
costless collars in their hedging portfolios. For gas hedgers, the geographic diversification has 
the predicted sign but no significant impact. Surprisingly, producers more engaged in natural 
gas production tend to use more put options or collars in addition to swaps. This result is 
consistent with the empirical finding of Adam (2009) for gold mining firms and our previous 
results. For the subset of gas hedgers, gas production uncertainty seems to be significantly 
positively related to the use of put options and collars, as predicted. Conversely, oil production 
uncertainty is negatively related to collars as in the Dynamic Probit model. However, production 
cost risk (i.e., cash cost variability) appears to be significantly negatively related to the use of 
put options for the subset of gas hedgers. The explanation for this might be that higher cash 
cost variability implies more financial constraints. Thus, firms tend to avoid costly put options, as 
Adam (2002) predicted. 
Results further show that the existence of additional hedgeable risk (i.e., FX and IR risks) is 
significantly positively related to the use of put options and/or collars in addition to swaps. This 
corroborates the theoretical predictions of Moschini and Lapan (1995), Brown and Toft (2002) 
and Gay et al (2002, 2003) that additional risks make total exposure non-linear and therefore 
the hedging strategy should also tend to be non-linear. Consistent with the theoretical 
predictions of Brown and Toft (2002) and Gay et al (2002, 2003), the price-quantity correlation, 
for gas hedgers, appears to have a significant negative impact on the use of put options and/or 
collars in combination with swaps. Hence, gas producers with a higher price-quantity correlation 
tend to use more swap contracts only to mitigate adverse movements in revenues because 
prices and quantities are moving in the same direction. However, there is no evidence of this 
relation for oil hedgers. 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
collars, the quantity of gas hedged by put options has a mean (median) of 19% (14%). These portfolios could thus be 
seen as having linear-like payoffs because almost 80% of the quantity is hedged by swaps and collars, which explains 
the positive sign for this variable. 
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Consistent with the literature, CEO optionholding is positively related to the use of put options in 
a statistically significant manner (in particular for oil hedgers). Consistent with our findings 
above, CEO’s equity stake value in the firm is positively related to the use of collars. Overall, 
these results are consistent with Smith and Stulz’s (1985) prediction. In addition, gas hedgers 
with higher percentages of institutional shareholding tend to use more collars in combination 
with swaps. Results also show, for gas hedgers in particular, that collars are negatively related 
to leverage in a statistically significant manner. This suggests that gas producers that are more 
leveraged, but not yet in financial distress, tend to lock-in predetermined revenues to satisfy 
their future commitments by resorting to swap contracts. The financial constraint proxy seems to 
be significantly related to the use of put options and/or collars. This corroborates the risk-shifting 
theory. Surprisingly, Distance-to-default appears to have no real impact on hedging portfolio 
choice. The impact of the overinvestment problem on hedging portfolio choice is unclear. 
Although overinvestment is significantly negatively associated with put options, as Morellec and 
Smith (2007) conclude for the subset of gas hedgers, it appears to be positively related to put 
options for oil hedgers. Contrary to expectations and our previous findings, tax function 
convexity is positively associated with the use of put options in addition to swaps for the subset 
of oil hedgers. Tax loss carryforwards appear to have no real impact on hedging portfolio 
choice.  
7. Robustness checks: An ordered specification for hedging instrument choice 
In this section, we examine the robustness of our results to an alternative econometric approach 
toward hedging instrument choice. In a previous section, we used a Dynamic Panel Random 
Effects Probit model, as in equation (1), to study the determinants of the use of each instrument 
separately (i.e., swaps only, put options only, costless collars only). In this section, we run a first 
robustness test on the determinants of the choice of linear or non-linear hedging instruments by 
employing an alternative econometric approach: a Dynamic Generalized Random Effects 
Ordered Probit, as in equation (3). This model relaxes the parallel-line assumption and permits 
estimated coefficients to vary across hedging instruments.  
The three hedging instruments are now classified in terms of their linearity as follows: 1) put 
options, 2) costless collars and 3) swap contracts. By nature, costless collars are situated 
between strict linear instruments (i.e., swap contracts) and strict non-linear instruments (i.e., put 
options). This flexible model allows us to refine the association between each hedging 
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instrument and observed firm characteristics. Tables XIII and XIV report the regression results 
of this model for four specifications for oil and gas hedgers separately. For each specification, 
we report the estimations EQ1 and EQ2. EQ1 estimates put options versus swap contracts and 
costless collars. EQ2 estimates swap contracts versus put options and costless collars.  
[Place Tables XIII and XIV about here] 
Again, results clearly show the state dependence in hedging instrument choice. The estimated 
coefficients of the lagged dependent variables range between 0.49 and 0.81 for oil hedgers and 
between 0.51 and 0.90 for gas hedgers and are highly significant. This shows that managers 
maintain almost invariable hedging strategies for long periods. Interestingly, results highlight 
that investment opportunities appear to be associated more with the use of costless collars. 
Further, undeveloped proved oil and gas reserves seem to be more related to the use of swap 
contracts and costless collars. Overall, these findings are as predicted and emphasize the role 
of costless collars, which was not as evident with our first model. Consistent with Froot et al 
(1993), the correlation between internally generated cash flows and investment programs is 
significantly positively related to the use of more linear instruments. Particularly for oil hedgers, 
the association between this correlation and swaps is now more evident compared with our first 
results. For gas hedgers, this correlation is positively related to swaps and collars. 
The results pertaining to the impact of market conditions are highly consistent with our 
predictions and the findings produced by the Dynamic Probit model. Accordingly, higher 
volatility and higher future prices are related to the use of put options and collars, and higher 
spot prices are associated more with the use of swap contracts. These findings highlight the 
significant role of market conditions in derivative choice, which might explain firms’ hedging 
behavior.  
In line with the production flexibility argument of Moschini and Lapan (1992), results further 
suggest that higher geographical diversification is associated more with the use of put options 
and costless collars. The ordered specification better distinguishes the association between 
production flexibility and the use of non-linear instruments than in our first model. Overall, 
producers deriving their revenues primarily from oil production tend to use more put options, 
and those specializing in gas production tend to use more collars, as determined in our previous 
regressions. However, in the second model for oil hedgers, there is a positive relationship 
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between oil revenues and swaps. Interestingly, the association between higher production 
uncertainty and the use of non-linear instruments is now as predicted, and is more apparent 
with the ordered specification. For gas hedgers, gas production uncertainty appears to be 
related to put options and costless collars. For oil hedgers, oil production uncertainty is 
associated more with put options.18  
Results related to production cost variability are significant and still mixed. Although higher 
production cost risk has a positive impact on costless collars as predicted, it is positively related 
to swaps for gas hedgers, which runs counter to the prediction that additional non-hedgeable 
risks make non-linear hedging more optimal. Results further show that when oil and gas 
producers hedge both commodities and basis risk, they tend to use more swaps and collars. A 
possible explanation for this interesting finding could be that hedging the primary source of 
business risk (i.e. oil (gas) price risk) attenuates the non-linearity of the firm’s total exposure, 
which makes more linear instruments optimal. Regarding IR risk, results are significant and still 
mixed. For oil hedgers, hedging FX risk is linked more to put options. The existence of foreign 
exchange risk thus makes firms’ total exposure more non-linear, which requires non-linear 
instruments to be hedged.  
For gas hedgers, the gas price-quantity correlation has the predicted sign, with a positive 
significant impact on the use of collars, as in our previous regressions. Surprisingly, for oil 
hedgers the oil price-quantity correlation has no significant impact on hedging instrument 
choice. Results related to managerial risk aversion indicate that CEO optionholding is more 
related to the use of put options and collars, as predicted. In addition, CEO stockholding is more 
associated with collars, particularly for gas hedgers. Overall, these findings are as predicted and 
corroborate our previous results.  
Consistent with the findings of the Dynamic Probit model, the ordered specification shows that 
more leveraged oil hedgers tend to use swaps, whereas more solvent oil and gas producers 
(i.e., higher Distance-to-Default) tend to use costless collars specifically. This indicates again 
that more leveraged firms tend to lock in predetermined revenues, while more solvent ones 
tolerate more variability in their future revenues by avoiding strict linear hedging positions. In 
line with risk-shifting theory, results show that gas hedgers close to financial distress use more 
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 Model 1, Table XIV, illustrates an unexpected positive coefficient for oil production uncertainty and swap use, albeit 
with a lower significance level.  
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put options. Interestingly, we find that when overinvestment is more likely, oil and gas producers 
tend to use more collars and swap contracts. This finding also confirms the overinvestment 
conjecture of Morellec and Smith (2007). Surprisingly, tax function convexity and tax loss 
carryforwards seem to be more closely related to the use of costless collars. This result 
corroborates our expectations and confirms the conjecture of the tax incentive to hedge, namely 
that firms tend to avoid non-linear instruments to eliminate volatility in pre-tax incomes. 
Table XV summarizes our predictions and findings arising from the three models used in the 
previous sections. 
[Table XV about here] 
8. A closer look at the economic effects of hedging strategy choice 
In this section, we extend the controversial existing literature that focuses on the relation 
between corporate hedging and firms’ risks and value. One strand of this empirical literature 
finds no support for the risk reduction argument and firm value maximization theory. Using a 
sample of 425 large US corporations from 1991 to 1993, Hentschel and Kothari (2001) find that 
derivative users display economically small difference in their stock return volatility compared 
with non-users, even for users with larger derivatives holdings. Guay and Kothari (2003) study 
the hedging practices of 234 large non-financial firms, and find that the magnitude of the 
derivative positions is economically small compared with firm-level risk exposures and 
movements in equity values. Jin and Jorion (2006) revisit the question of the hedging premium 
for a sample of 119 US oil and gas producers from 1998 to 2001. Although they find that oil and 
gas betas are negatively related to hedging extent, they show that hedging has no discernible 
effect on firm value. For a sample of gold producers, Jin and Jorion (2007) find no evidence of a 
positive association between hedging and firm value maximization. Recently, Fauver and 
Naranjo (2010) studied derivative usage by 1,746 US firms during 1991-2000, and assert that 
firms with greater agency and monitoring problems exhibit an economically significant negative 
association of -8.4% between firms’ Tobin’s Q and derivative usage.  
In contrast, Guay (1999) looks at a sample of 254 non-financial corporations that began using 
derivatives in the fiscal year 1991, and reports that new derivative users experience a 
statistically and economically significant 5% reduction in stock return volatility compared with a 
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control sample of non-users. Using a sample of S&P 500 non-financial firms for 1993, 
Allayannis and Ofek (2001) find strong evidence that foreign currency hedging reduces firms’ 
exchange-rate exposure. Allayannis and Weston (2001) give the first direct evidence of the 
positive relation between currency derivative usage and firm value (as defined by Tobin’s Q) 
and show that for a sample of 720 non-financial firms, the market value of foreign currency 
hedgers is 5% higher on average than non-hedgers. Graham and Rogers (2002) find that 
derivatives usage increases debt capacity and hence firm value by approximately 1.1%. Carter 
et al (2006) investigate jet fuel hedging behavior of firms in the US airline industry during 1993-
2003, and find an average hedging premium of 12%-16%. Adam and Fernando (2006) examine 
the outstanding gold derivative positions for a sample of 92 North American gold mining firms 
for the period 1989-1999 and find that firms’ derivatives transactions translate into increases in 
shareholder value. Bartram et al (2011) explore the effect of derivative use on firm risk and 
value for a large sample of 6,888 non-financial firms from 47 countries during 2000-2001. Their 
evidence suggests that using derivatives reduces both total risk and systematic risk, and is 
associated with higher firm value, abnormal returns and larger profits. Recently, Dionne et al 
(2012) studied a sample of gold mining firms during 1993-1999, and concluded that hedging is 
associated with a higher return on equity, return on assets and Tobin’s Q when controlling for 
corporate governance. Aretz and Bartram (2010) review all of the existing empirical literature on 
corporate hedging and shareholder value. 
We complement this empirical literature by going into further detail and investigating the real 
implications of hedging strategy choice on: (i) firms’ stock return sensitivity; (ii) firms’ stock 
volatility sensitivity; and, (iii) firms’ financial and operational performance (i.e., realized oil and 
gas prices, return on equity, return on assets, Tobin’s Q and earnings per share from 
operations). Because it is impossible to identify a single measure that fully captures the 
implications of hedging strategy choices, we examine the effects of hedging strategies relative 
to each of these measures. In addition, our study does not suffer from the endogeneity concern 
related to derivatives use as advanced by Jin and Jorion (2006) to explain the controversial 
results in the literature. This is because we select firms within the same industry; they have the 
same exposure to commodity risks and they vastly differ in terms of their hedging behaviors. 
Following Dionne et al (2012), we use a two-stage methodology based on instrumentation to 
mitigate the endogeneity issue. In the first stage, we estimate the predicted value of the hedging 
strategy using the dynamic probit model with random effects. In the second stage, we examine 
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the effects of the predicted values on firms’ performances. To our knowledge, no empirical study 
to date gives direct evidence of the effects of hedging strategy choice on firm performance.  
8.1 Effects of hedging strategy choice on stock return sensitivity 
Our tests expand on those of Rajgopal (1999) and Jorion and Jin (2006), who run pooled cross-
sectional time-series regressions of firms’ stock returns on the market, oil and gas price 
changes, and control for commodity risk hedging and proved oil and gas reserves. We then 
estimate the following models with interaction variables reflecting the impact of each hedging 
strategy in the oil (gas) beta: 
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where 
, i tR  is the total stock rate of return for firm i in quarter t, , m tR  is the quarterly rate of 
change in the S&P 500 index, , oil tR  is the quarterly rate of change in the price of the NYMEX 
crude oil three-month strip futures, , gas tR  is the quarterly rate of change in the price of the 
NYMEX Henry Hub natural gas three-month strip futures. , ,Predicted j i tHS  is the linear 
prediction of each hedging strategy j for firm i (i.e., swap contracts only, put options only, 
costless collars only, swaps and put options, swaps and costless collars, collars and put 
options, and swaps, put options and collars) in quarter t. These predictions come from the 
estimation of a dynamic probit with random effects for each strategy (see equation 1). The 
presented models in (10) and (11) allow us to detect which hedging strategy is associated with 
lower sensitivity of firms’ stock return to oil (gas) price fluctuations.  
Panel A of Table XVI reports the estimations of the models in (10) and (11) for oil hedgers and 
gas hedgers separately (models with interactions). Panel A also reports the estimation of the 
three-factor models (without interactions) including the stock market return, the rate of change in 
the NYMEX oil futures price and the rate of change in the NYMEX gas futures price observed at 
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the end of each quarter. We expect firms that hedge with derivatives to have relatively low 
sensitivity to oil and gas price fluctuations (i.e., lower oil and gas betas). Overall, regression 
results of the three-factor model (specifications 1, 2 and 3) show that oil and gas producers in 
the sample have exposures to oil (gas) price fluctuations that are positive and statistically 
significant. Results indicate that a 1% increase in the gas price leads to a 0.275% increase in 
the stock price for the entire sample (specification 1), a 0.345% increase in the stock price for 
the subsample of gas hedgers (specification 2), and a 0.155% increase in the stock return for 
the subsample of non-gas hedgers (not reported). Surprisingly, this latter finding shows that gas 
hedging increases firms’ stock sensitivity to gas price fluctuations rather than mitigates it. This 
finding could also mean that gas hedgers are speculating rather than effectively hedging gas 
price risk. This corroborates the conjecture that sometimes managers take a view of the 
movements of financial markets (spot and future prices, and volatility). 
Results reported in Panel A also show that a 1% increase in the oil price leads to a 0.704% 
increase in the stock return for the entire sample (specification 1), a 0.50% increase in the stock 
return for the subsample of oil hedgers (specification 3), and an increase of 0.865% in the stock 
return for the subsample of non-oil hedgers (not reported). Oil hedging appears to be associated 
with lower stock return sensitivity to oil price fluctuations, as expected. This implies that oil 
hedgers use derivatives to effectively hedge oil price risk rather than to speculate. Surprisingly, 
we find that the initiation of derivatives programs is not associated with a decrease in market 
risk. Hence, market beta increases from 0.823 for the entire sample to 1.108 for the subsample 
of gas hedgers and 1.136 for the subsample of oil hedgers. In unreported results, we find that 
derivatives users have significantly higher market risk than non-users (i.e., 1.05 versus 0.646). 
Although these findings are in line with those of Hentschel and Kothari (2001), who maintain 
that firms with derivatives have higher market betas than firms without derivatives, they 
contradict those of Bartram et al (2011), who observe that derivatives users have market betas 
that are on average 6% lower than those of non-users. In sum, the numbers reported in Panel A 
of Table XVI are higher than those reported in Rajgopal (1999) over the period 1993-1996, 
those of Jin and Jorion (2006) over the period 1999-2002 and those of Haushalter et al (2002) 
for a sample of U.S oil producers over the period 1992-1994.  
[Table XVI about here] 
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Next, we investigate whether hedging strategy choice affects oil and gas betas. Our aim is to 
see which hedging strategy is associated with lower sensitivity to oil (gas) price fluctuations and 
vice versa. For gas hedgers (specification 4), results confirm that hedging strategies constituted 
by swap contracts only or costless collars only are significantly related to higher stock price 
sensitivity to gas price fluctuations. This latter finding contradicts the expectation that more 
linear hedging strategies should be associated with lower uncertainty about firms’ revenues, and 
hence lower stock price sensitivity to gas price fluctuations. One explanation could be that linear 
strategies do not allow gas hedgers to profit from the upward potential, and hence accentuate 
the sensitivity of firms’ stocks to gas price fluctuations. This finding could explain why gas 
hedging increases stock price sensitivity (i.e., gas beta) because swaps only and collars only 
are used for more than 82% of the firm-quarters of gas hedging.  
Results also indicate that more complex hedging strategies based on a combination of different 
instruments seem to be associated more with lower stock price sensitivity to gas price 
fluctuations. Hence, swap contracts in combination with put options and swap contracts in 
combination with costless collars could mitigate the gas price risk with statistically negative 
coefficients. Interestingly, these hedging strategies have payoffs that depart from strict linearity. 
For oil hedgers (specification 5), results indicate that hedging strategies based on put options 
only reduce sensitivity, with a significantly negative coefficient, as expected. Overall, these 
findings strongly suggest that hedging strategies with non-linear payoffs reduce the stock price 
sensitivity to oil (gas) price fluctuations, and that more linear strategies based on one instrument 
only (i.e., swaps only and collars only) increase this sensitivity.  
8.2 Effects of hedging strategy choice on stock volatility sensitivity 
This sub-section provides detailed evidence of the relation of firms’ total risk measured by total 
stock return volatility, and firms’ hedging strategies. Our aim is to examine which hedging 
strategy better mitigates the effects of the exposure to oil (gas) price risks on firms’ total risk. 
We partition the total stock return volatility into market risk, oil and gas risks and firm-specific 
risk. We then estimate the following models with interaction variables: 
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where  , i t  is the annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns for firm i during quarter t to 
capture the aggregate firm risk,  ,m t  is the annualized standard deviation of daily S&P 500 index 
returns during quarter t,  ,oil t  is the annualized standard deviation of daily returns of the WTI 
crude oil spot prices during quarter t, and  ,gas t  is the annualized standard deviation of daily 
returns of the Henry Hub natural gas spot prices during quarter t. , ,Predicted j i tHS  is the linear 
prediction of each hedging strategy as previously defined. , , j i tControl  are a set of exogenous 
variables related to firms’ characteristics. We retain firm size, leverage and liquidity, which 
Bartram, Brown and Stulz (2012) find to be important determinants of both firm total risk and 
systematic risk. We also use Distance-to-Default, defined above, and the dividend yield. This 
specification partitions total stock return volatility into firm-specific exposures to oil and gas 
volatilities, global market index risk and firm-specific characteristics.  
Panel B of Table XVI reports the estimations of models in (12) and (13) for oil hedgers and gas 
hedgers separately (i.e., models with interactions). Panel B also reports the estimation of a 
regression of firm stock return volatility on market, oil and gas return volatilities and control 
variables (i.e., model without interactions). Results pertaining to the model without interactions 
show that oil return volatility has a significant positive effect on stock return volatility. Thus, a 1% 
increase in oil return volatility leads to a 0.275% increase in stock return volatility for the entire 
sample (specification 6), a 0.419% increase in stock return volatility for the subsample of oil 
hedgers, and an increase of 0.166% in stock return volatility for the subsample of non-oil 
hedgers (not reported). Surprisingly, results also show that gas return volatility has a negative 
but not significant impact on stock return volatility. In unreported results, we find that gas return 
volatility has a significant (i.e., at the level of 10%) negative impact on stock return volatility. 
Unexpectedly, these findings are inconsistent with firms that use derivatives to hedge (Guay, 
1999, Bartram et al, 2011). As predicted, we find that larger firms with higher Distance-to-
Default should have lower stock return volatility, and firms with higher financial leverage should 
have higher volatility. 
We now look at the effects of the hedging strategy choice on stock return volatility as tabulated 
in specifications 9 and 10 of Panel B of Table XVI. For gas hedgers, results indicate that 
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hedging strategies constituted by swap contracts only, costless collars only and collars in 
combination with put options are significantly related to higher stock return volatility. In contrast, 
put options only and put options in combination with swap contracts are significantly associated 
with a decline in stock return volatility. For oil hedgers, we find that collars only and put options 
in combination with swaps are significantly associated with higher stock return volatility. 
However, results also suggest that put options only, put options in combination with collars, 
swap contracts in combination with collars, and swaps in combination with collars and put 
options constitute hedging strategies that are negatively and significantly associated with stock 
return volatility. As shown above, larger firms that are far from financial distress have lower 
stock return volatility and firms with higher financial leverage have higher stock return volatility. 
8.3 Economic implications of hedging strategy choice 
In this sub-section, we look at the real implications of hedging strategy choice on financial and 
operational performance of oil and gas producers. To this end, we retain the following 
dependent variables: (1) realized oil and gas prices including the monetary effects of hedging 
activities as reported yearly by oil and gas producers; (2) return on equity; (3) return on assets; 
(4) earnings per share from operations; and (5) Tobin’s Q. Our study thus provides novel 
evidence of the real implications of hedging strategy choice on firms’ operational and financial 
performance. Table XVII reports the estimation results of the fixed effects regression of each 
dependent variable in the predicted value of each hedging strategy and other control variables 
related to firm characteristics (i.e., sales, market value, investment opportunities, leverage, cash 
costs, liquidity and daily production) and oil and gas spot prices and volatilities. These 
regressions are conducted separately for gas hedgers (Panel A) and oil hedgers (Panel B).  
[Place Table XVII about here] 
Results in Panel A of Table XVII show that realized gas prices are significantly and positively 
impacted by the use of three hedging strategies: costless collars only, costless collars in 
combination with swap contracts, and costless collars in combination with put options and swap 
contracts. Involving a short call and long put positions, costless collars allow managers to profit 
from any potential upside within a certain range with full protection of downside risk, with little or 
no upfront payment. Results further show that realized gas prices are negatively impacted by 
the use of the following three strategies: swap contracts only, put options only, and swaps in 
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combination with put options. Although hedging strategies based on swaps provide full 
protection from downside risk, they do not allow any upside potential. Unexpectedly, put options 
are associated with lower realized gas prices. One explanation could be that the options’ 
premiums might be higher than their monetary effects on gas prices. 
Surprisingly, hedging strategy choice seems to have no real impact on the return on equity for 
the subsample of gas hedgers. Results in Panel A also illustrate that return on assets is 
positively impacted by hedging strategies involving put options only, put options in combination 
with collars and swaps in combination with collars, and appear to be negatively impacted by 
using swaps only. Regarding operational performance of gas hedgers, we find that earnings per 
share from operations are positively related to put options in combination with collars and put 
options in combination with swaps, and they are negatively related to swap only and collars 
only. Further, market performance (i.e., Tobin’s Q) of gas hedgers is positively associated with 
the use of collars only, collars in combination with put options and swaps in combination with 
put options, and it is negatively impacted by put options only and swaps in combination with 
collars.  
Results in Panel B of Table XVII indicate that realized oil prices are positively impacted by the 
use of swaps in combination with put options and swaps in combination with collars and put 
options, and negatively related to the use of swaps only and put options only. Return on equity 
for oil hedgers seems to be negatively related to put options only. However, return on assets is 
positively related to put options only and swaps in combination with collars, and is negatively 
related to swaps only, collars only, swaps in combination with put options and collars in 
combination with put options. Concerning operational performance of oil hedgers, results show 
that earnings per share from operations are positively related to hedging strategies involving put 
options only and swap contracts in combination with collars, and are negatively impacted by 
swaps only, collars only, collars in combination with put options and swaps in combination with 
put options. Finally, the market performance of oil hedgers is positively associated with the use 
of put options only and is negatively impacted by swaps only and swaps in combination with 
collars and put options.  
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9. Conclusion 
A rich body of empirical literature on corporate risk management explores the incentives, 
determinants and virtues of hedging. While this empirical literature gives comprehensive 
answers to why firms hedge risks, and identifies the determinants of hedging extent and effects, 
the question of how firms hedge risks was of less concern. Using a unique and hand-collected 
dataset of detailed quarterly publicly available information on the risk management activity of 
150 US oil and gas producers during the period 1998-2010, we extended the existing empirical 
literature by answering the following questions: What are the determinants of derivative choice? 
What are the real implications of hedging strategy choice on firms’ stock return and volatility 
sensitivity to the underlying risk factor, and firms’ operational and financial performance?  
We employed dynamic panel discrete choice econometric settings that effectively capture 
hedging behavior. Besides the usual hypotheses already suggested in the empirical literature 
(underinvestment costs, tax incentives, financial distress, managerial risk aversion), we tested 
the empirical implications of theoretical predictions that had been explored little or not at all.  In 
particular, we examined the empirical relevance of the prediction of Froot et al (1993) and 
Spano (2004) pertaining to the correlation between internal cash flows and investment 
opportunities. We also looked at the implications of the overinvestment problem theorized by 
Morellec and Smith (2007). In addition, we investigated the empirical implications of the 
quantity-price correlation evidenced theoretically by Brown and Toft (2002) and Gay et al (2002 
and 2003). Moreover, we tested the effects of the existence of additional hedgeable and non-
hedgeable risks and the production flexibility theorized by Moschini and Lapan (1992) and 
subsequent papers. We also tested the impact of the market condition on derivative choice. 
Finally, we empirically investigated the real implications of hedging strategy choice. 
Overall, our results show the state dependence characteristic in hedging strategy choice. 
Managers seem to adopt a hedging strategy and maintain it for relatively longer periods. The 
state preference should be taken into account when explaining firms’ hedging behavior. In line 
with predictions, we find that oil and gas producers with larger investment programs tend to use 
more non-linear strategies: put options only or hedging portfolios with non-linear payoffs (i.e., 
swaps in combination with put options and/or collars). Oil and gas producers with larger 
undeveloped proved reserves tend to avoid non-linear instruments because they have no 
pressing development costs. We find also that higher correlation between internally generated 
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funds and investment expenditures motivates gas hedgers to use more swap contracts and to 
avoid put options, as theorized by Froot et al (1993) and Spano (2004). For oil hedgers, the 
impact of this correlation is unclear. However, our robustness check provides strong evidence of 
the relationship between this correlation and more linear strategies (i.e., swaps only, collars 
only). Further, we find that hedging strategy choice is strongly correlated to the economic 
conditions of the oil and gas market (i.e., spot prices, future expected prices and volatilities). 
Impacts of market conditions are as predicted. 
As theorized by Moschini and Lapan (1992), we observe that producers with higher 
geographical diversification, particularly in their oil production, tend to use more costless collars 
and to avoid swaps contracts. Consistent with Adam (2009), we find also that more focused 
firms generally use more put options only and collars only or hedging portfolios with non-linear 
payoffs (i.e., swaps in combination with put options and/or collars). As predicted, results 
pertaining to the impact of additional nonhedgeable risks show that higher gas production 
uncertainty is related to the use of non-linear hedging portfolios. However, the impact of oil 
production uncertainty is contrary to expectations. The ordered specification used as robustness 
checks makes the relationship between production uncertainty and the use of non-linear 
instruments more evident. Results pertaining to production cost risk are significant and mixed. 
With regard to additional hedgeable risks, results indicate that FX risk is significantly related to 
the use of put options only, and that basis risk is negatively related to swaps and collars. As 
predicted, the existence of FX and basis risks makes the firm’s total exposure more non-linear. 
The impact of IR risk is significant and mixed.  
Consistent with predictions, producers with higher gas price-quantity correlations tend to use 
more swaps contracts and costless collars, and to avoid hedging portfolios with non-linear 
payoffs. In contrast, the oil price-quantity correlation is negatively related to collars in a 
significant manner. In line with our predictions, we find that CEOs with higher shareholding use 
more swaps in combination with collars and tend to avoid put options. We find also that CEOs 
with higher optionholding tend to use more hedging portfolios with non-linear payoffs (i.e., put 
options in combination with swaps) and to avoid swaps only.  Interestingly, results show that 
CEOs with higher stockholding and optionholding tend to use collars only. Institutional 
shareholding is negatively related to the use of hedging strategies based on one instrument 
(i.e., swaps only, put options only and collars only) and has a positive impact on the use of 
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hedging portfolios with non-linear payoffs (i.e., swaps in combination with collars). The presence 
of institutional investors thus induces more elaborate hedging programs. 
Our results further indicate that oil and gas producers that are more leveraged but not yet in 
financial distress tend to use swap contracts more frequently because they are seeking 
predetermined revenues to satisfy their future debt commitments. More solvent oil and gas 
producers (i.e., with higher Distance-to-Default) tend to use collars only and to avoid swaps 
only. Consistent with the risk-shifting theory, we find that oil and gas producers close to financial 
distress use more hedging portfolios with non-linear payoffs (i.e., swaps in combination with put 
options and/or collars) and avoid using swaps only or collars only. The robustness checks also 
suggest a significant positive association between financial distress and the use of put options.  
Interestingly, overinvestment appears to be a real concern when choosing hedging strategies. 
Thus, we find that gas hedgers with a greater potential for overinvestment tend to use swaps 
only and avoid using hedging strategies departing from strict linearity, such as put options only, 
collars only and swaps in combination with put options. However, for oil hedgers, the impact of 
overinvestment is mixed. Altogether, we give the first direct evidence of the impact of the 
overinvestment problem on hedging portfolio choice. Tax function convexity appears to be 
negatively related to put options only and positively related to swaps in combination with put 
options. Tax function convexity thus motivates the use of more linear hedging strategies, as 
predicted. We also find an evident positive relation between the tax loss carryforward and the 
use of costless collars only and a negative relation with swaps only. Hence, tax loss 
carryforwards are uncorrelated with tax function convexity, as suggested by Graham and 
Rogers (2002). 
Finally, we provide novel evidence of the real implications of hedging strategy choice on stock 
price and risk sensitivity to oil and gas price fluctuations, realized oil and gas prices including 
the monetary effects of hedging positions, and the accounting, market and operating 
performance of oil and gas producers. Interestingly, we find that more complex hedging 
strategies, based on a combination of different derivatives, reduce the firm’s stock price and 
volatility sensitivity to oil (gas) price fluctuations. These complex hedging programs have payoffs 
departing from strict linearity. We also observe that linear strategies based on one instrument 
only (i.e., swaps only and collars only) increase this sensitivity, which contradicts the prediction 
that linear strategies eliminate risks. Surprisingly, hedgers using swaps only have lower realized 
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prices (i.e., prices including the monetary effects of the hedging), and poorer accounting, market 
and operating performance. Hedging strategies based on put options are negatively related to 
realized prices and return on equity, and are positively related to return on assets. However, 
results related to Tobin’s Q are mixed. Users of collars only have higher realized gas prices, 
lower returns on assets and lower operating income. We find that more complex hedging 
programs based on a combination of instruments have significant effects on realized oil and gas 
prices and on producers’ performance. However, these effects are mixed when comparing the 
results for the subsample of oil hedgers and gas hedgers respectively. This confirms that 
although they belong to the same industry, oil and gas have specific characteristics (price, 
volatility, production cost, production uncertainty, etc.) that cause their respective hedging 
programs to diverge.  
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Table I: Summary of theoretical predictions 
This table summarizes the theoretical predictions for each of the seven hedging strategies adopted by US oil and gas producers. 
Theoretical predictions Author(s) 
Swap 
contracts 
only 
Put 
options 
only 
Costless 
collars 
only 
Swaps and 
put 
options 
Swaps 
and 
collars 
Swaps, put 
options and 
collars 
Collars 
and put 
options 
Investment opportunities 
(expenditures) 
Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) - + -/+ + -/+ + + 
Correlation between internal funds 
and investment opportunities 
(expenditures) 
Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) + - -/+ - -/+ - - 
Market conditions: 
Spot prices 
Future prices 
Volatilities 
 
 
Adam (2003 and 2009) 
 
+ 
- 
- 
 
- 
+ 
+ 
 
- 
+ 
+ 
 
- 
+ 
+ 
 
- 
+ 
+ 
 
- 
+ 
+ 
 
- 
+ 
+ 
Production flexibility Moschini and Lapan (1992) - + + + + + + 
Existence of additional hedgeable 
and non-hedgeable risks 
Moschini and Lapan (1995), Franke, Stapleton and 
Subrahmanyam (1998), Brown and Toft (2002) and 
Gay et al (2002 and 2003). 
- + -/+ + -/+ + + 
Quantity-Price correlation Brown and Toft (2002) and Gay et al (2002 and 
2003). 
+ - -/+ - -/+ - - 
Managerial shareholding Smith and Stulz (1985) and Tufano (1996) + - -/+ - -/+ - - 
Managerial optionholding Smith and Stulz (1985) and Tufano (1996) - + -/+ + -/+ + + 
Financial constraints Adler and Detemple (1988) - + + + + + + 
Financial constraints Adam (2002) + - + + + + + 
Overinvestment  Morellec and Smith (2007); Bartram et al (2009) + - + - + - - 
Tax function convexity  Mayers and Smith (1982), Smith and Stulz (1985) + - -/+ - -/+ - - 
Table II: Variables’ definitions, construction and data sources 
Variable definition Variable name Construction Data source 
Variables that proxy for hedging activity 
Hedging dummy  GAS_HEDG, OIL_HEDG, 
IR_HEDG, FX_HEDG, 
BASIS_HEDG 
For CR (oil and gas), FX and IR hedging activities for a 
specified fiscal quarter. This variable is coded as follows: 0 
(no hedging), 1(hedging). 
 10-K and 10-Q reports 
Variables that proxy for tax advantage of hedging 
Tax Loss Carryforwards TLCF Book value of the Tax Loss Carryforward scaled by the 
book value of  total assets 
Compustat 
Tax save                                                     TAX_SAVE The tax liability saving arising from a reduction of 5% of the 
taxable income. Graham and Smith (1999). 
Compustat 
Variables that proxy for financial distress costs 
Leverage LEV The book value of the long-term debt in current liabilities + 
one half of the long-term debt scaled by the book value of 
total assets. 
Compustat 
Distance-to-Default DTD A market-based measure of the default risk based on 
Merton’s (1974) approach and used by Moodys-KMV.  DTD 
is equal to 


a
a a
V D
V
where D is defined as long-term debt in 
current liabilities plus one-half long-term debts.  
aV is the 
market value of assets and a  is one year asset volatility. 
aV and a  are unobservable and they are approximated 
from Merton’s (1974) model by using the market value and 
volatility of equity, the 3-month Treasury bill rate and debts 
(D). See Croshie and Bahn (2003) for more details on the 
construction of the DTD. 
Manually constructed 
Financial constraint CONSTRAINT Binary variable. It equals 1 when both leverage ratio and 
quick ratio are respectively above and below the industry’s 
median and 0 otherwise.  
Compustat 
Cash Cost CASH_COST Production cost of a Barrel of Oil Equivalent Bloomberg and 10-K reports 
Variables that proxy for underinvestment costs 
Investment opportunities 
 
INV_OPP Total costs incurred in oil and gas property acquisition, 
exploration and development, scaled by the net property, 
plan, and equipment at the beginning of the quarter. 
Bloomberg and 10-K reports 
Correlation FCF and IO CORR_1 The correlation coefficient between Free Cash Flow and 
investment opportunities. This coefficient is calculated, for 
each firm, in a rolling window by taking all the observations 
until the current quarter. 
Bloomberg and 10-K reports 
Undeveloped proved 
reserves (oil) 
UND_OIL Quantity of proved undeveloped oil reserves at the end of 
the quarter (In Millions of Barrels). 
Bloomberg and 10-K reports 
Undeveloped proved 
reserves (gas) 
UND_GAS Quantity of proved undeveloped gas reserves at the end of 
the quarter (In Billions of Cubic Feet). 
Bloomberg and 10-K reports 
Variables that proxy for overinvestment 
Overinvestment problem OVER_INV Binary variable. It equals 1 when both the ratio of free cash 
flows scaled by book value of total assets and investment 
opportunities are respectively above and below the 
industry’s median and 0 otherwise. 
Compustat 
Variables that proxy for production characteristics 
Fraction of revenues from 
oil production 
OIL_REV It equals the fraction of oil production (i.e., oil daily 
production in Barrel of Oil Equivalents, divided by daily oil 
and gas production in BOE) multiplied by the fraction of oil 
and gas revenues (oil and gas revenues divided by the 
firm’s total revenues). 
Bloomberg and 10-K reports 
Fraction of revenues from 
gas production 
GAS_REV It equals the fraction of gas production (i.e., gas daily 
production in Barrel of Oil Equivalents, divided by daily oil 
and gas production in BOE) multiplied by the fraction of oil 
and gas revenues (oil and gas revenues divided by the 
firm’s total revenues). 
Bloomberg and 10-K reports 
Herfindahl index ( oil 
production) 
HERF_OIL 
 It equals 1-

 
 
 

2
1
N
i
i
q
q
, where 
iq  is the daily oil production in 
the region (i) (Africa, Latin America, North America, Europe 
and Middle East). q  is the total daily oil production. 
Bloomberg and 10-K reports 
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  Table II-Continued 
 
 
Variable definition Variable name Construction Data source 
Herfindahl index ( gas 
production) 
HERF_GAS 
It equals 1-

 
 
 

2
1
N
i
i
g
g
, where 
ig  is the daily gas production 
in the region (i) (Africa, Latin America, North America, 
Europe and Middle East).
ig is the total daily gas 
production 
Bloomberg and 10-K reports 
Oil production  
uncertainty 
UNCER_OIL Coefficient of variation of daily oil production. This 
coefficient is calculated, for each firm, by taking all the 
observations of daily oil production until the current 
quarter.  
Bloomberg and 10-K reports 
Gas production 
uncertainty 
UNCER_GAS Coefficient of variation of daily gas production. This 
coefficient is calculated, for each firm, by taking all the 
observations of daily gas production until the current 
quarter. 
Bloomberg and 10-K reports 
Cash cost variability COST_CV Coefficient of variation of the cash (lifting) cost by Barrel 
of Oil Equivalent. This coefficient is calculated, for each 
firm, by taking all the observations of cash costs until the 
current quarter. 
Bloomberg and 10-K reports 
Price-Quantity correlation 
(oil) 
PQ_COR_OIL Correlation coefficient between daily oil productions and 
oil spot prices.   
Bloomberg and 10-K reports 
Price-Quantity correlation 
(gas) 
PQ_COR_GAS Correlation coefficient between daily gas productions and 
gas spot prices.   
Bloomberg and 10-K reports 
Variables that proxy for firm size 
Sales  SALES Total revenues from oil and gas sales (In Millions of $) Compustat 
Market Value MKT_VALUE Number of common shares outstanding * the end-of-
quarter per share price (In Millions of $). 
Compustat 
Oil Reserves RES_OIL Quantity of the total proved developed and undeveloped 
oil reserves (In Millions of Barrels). 
Bloomberg and 10-K reports 
Gas Reserves RES_GAS Quantity of the total proved developed and undeveloped 
gas reserves (In Billions of Cubic Feet). 
Bloomberg and 10-K reports 
Variables that proxy for managerial risk aversion 
Market value of CEO 
shareholding 
MV_CS_CEO Measured by the logarithm of 1 plus the market value of 
common shares held by the CEO at the end of each 
quarter. 
Thomson Reuters 
# CEOs’ stock options  OPT_CEO Number of CEOs’ stock options (in 000). Thomson Reuters 
Variables that proxy for information asymmetry 
% Institutions CS %_CS_INST Percentage of institutions’ common shares held. Thomson Reuters 
Variables that proxy for Market conditions 
Oil Future price FUTURE_OIL The average oil future prices for exchange-traded Futures 
for the next 12 months. 
Bloomberg 
Oil Spot price SPOT_OIL Oil spot price represented by the WTI in the NYMEX Bloomberg 
Gas Future price  FUTURE_GAS The average gas future prices for exchange-traded 
Futures for the next 12 months. 
Bloomberg 
Gas Spot price SPOT_GAS Constructed as an average index established from 
principal locations’ indices in the USA (Gulf Coast, Henry 
Hub, etc.) 
Bloomberg 
Oil price volatility  VOL_OIL Historical volatility (standard deviation) using the spot 
price of the previous 60 days. 
Bloomberg 
Gas price volatility  VOL_GAS Historical volatility (standard deviation) using the spot 
price of the previous 60 days. 
Bloomberg 
Variables that proxy for hedging substitutes 
Quick ratio Q_RATIO Cash and cash equivalents scaled by current liabilities. Compustat 
BVCD BVCD Book value of convertible debts scaled by the book value 
of total assets. 
Compustat 
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Table III: Distribution of hedging decisions by firm-quarter 
This table breaks down the total sample of 6,326 firm-quarters into observations with and 
without oil hedging and with and without gas hedging.  
 
Hedging activity: firm-quarter 
 
Oil hedgers Non-oil hedgers Total 
Gas hedgers 2,255 882 3,137 
Non-gas hedgers 352 2,837 3,189 
Total 2,607 3,719 6,326 
 
 
Table IV: Hedging instruments used by oil and gas producers 
This table reports the different types of financial instruments used by the sample firms that 
report some oil and gas hedging activities in a given firm-quarter observation. The values for 
each instrument indicate the number of firm-quarters and the fraction (in percentage) of use. 
 
Gas hedging Oil hedging 
Financial instrument 
Number of 
firm-quarters 
Percentage of 
use 
Number of 
firm -quarters 
Percentage of 
use 
Swap contracts 2,255 45.58% 1,711 45.25% 
Put options 522 10.55% 448 11.85% 
Costless collars 1,840 37.19% 1,403 37.11% 
Forwards or Futures 161 3.25% 105 2.78% 
Three-way collars 169 3.42% 114 3.02% 
Total 4,947 100% 3,781 100% 
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Table V: Hedging strategies adopted by oil and gas producers 
This table reports the hedging strategies adopted by the sample firms. An oil and gas producer 
can use one or more instruments simultaneously. Overall, we distinguish seven hedging 
strategies: swap contracts only, put options only, costless collars only, swaps and puts, swaps 
and collars, puts and collars, swaps, put and collars for oil hedgers and gas hedgers respectively. 
The value for each strategy represents the number of firm-quarter observations in which a firm 
reports the use of that strategy. The percentage of use for each instrument represents the 
number of firm-quarters of use of a given strategy scaled by the total number of firm-quarters of 
use of that instrument as given in Table III.  
Panel A: Gas hedging strategies 
 
Swap only Put only Collar only Swap+put Swap+collar Put+collar Swap+put+collar 
Number of firm-quarters  932 126 582 137 999 72 187 
Percentage of use 
Swap contracts 41.33% 
  
6.08% 44.30% 
 
8.29% 
Put options 
 
24.14% 
 
26.25% 
 
13.79% 35.82% 
Costless collars 
  
31.63% 
 
54.29% 3.91% 10.16% 
Panel B: Oil hedging strategies 
 
Swap only Put only Collar only Swap+put Swap+collar Put+collar Swap+put+collar 
Number of firm-quarters 849 150 577 99 627 63 136 
Percentage of use 
Swap contracts 49.62% 
  
5.79% 36.65% 
 
7.95% 
Put options 
 
33.48% 
 
22.10% 
 
14.06% 30.36% 
Costless collars 
  
41.13% 
 
44.69% 4.49% 9.69% 
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Table VI: Fraction of the notional position by instrument 
For a given hedging strategy, this table gives summary statistics of the fraction of notional 
position hedged by each instrument.  
Panel A: Gas hedging (%) 
Strategy Swap+put Swap+collar Collar+put Swap+put+collar 
Instrument Swap Put Swap      Collar Collar     Put Swap    Put        Collar 
Mean 59.3 40.7 53.1        46.9 58.2   41.8 33.1   19.3         47.7 
Median 64.9 35.1 55        45 60   40 30.6   13.8         46.5 
SD 26.3 26.3 30        30 20.8   20.8 24.2    15.9         .25.3 
Min 7.2 0.5 0.2        0 2.6   1.1 0.1     0.4          3.1 
Max 99.5 92.8 100        99.8 98.9   97.4 91.7 66.4         96.9 
Panel B: Oil hedging (%) 
Strategy Swap+put Swap+collar Collar+put Swap+put+collar 
Instrument Swap Put Swap     Collar Collar   Put Swap  Put Collar 
Mean 48.7 51.3 50.7     49.3 62.3  37.7    36.5 17.9 45.6 
Median 49.2 50.8 51.6     48.4 66.6   33.4    30.3 15.8 48.6 
SD 25.2 25.2 28.1      28.1 27   27     26.2 12.8 26.5 
Min 4.4 2.3 0.02     1.3 0.5   2.1      1.4 0.5 0.8 
Max 97.7 95.6 98.7     99.8 97.9   99.5 93 62.9 93.6 
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Table VII: Transition probabilities matrix for oil and gas hedging strategies 
 
Put only Put+collar Put+swap Collar only Collar+put+swap Collar+swap Swap only Total 
Panel A: Gas hedging strategies (%) 
Put only 85.45 3.64 4.55 2.73 0.91 1.82 0.91 100  
Put+collar 8.57 71.43 0.00 11.43 5.71 2.86 0.00 100  
Put+swap 3.76 0.00 84.96 0.75 3.76 0.75 6.02 100  
Collar only 0.73 1.81 0.00 87.84 0.73 7.62 1.27 100  
Collar+put+swap 1.10 2.20 0.55 1.10 79.67 14.29 1.10 100  
Collar+swap 0.00 0.10 0.10 4.29 1.99 88.28 5.23 100  
Swap only 0.11 0.21 0.54 0.86 0.11 5.91 92.27 100  
Panel B: Oil hedging strategies (%) 
Put only 89.76 3.94 2.36 0.00 0.79 0.79 2.36 100  
Put+collar 5.17 72.41 1.72 13.79 6.90 0.00 0.00 100  
Put+swap 3.13 0.00 87.50 0.00 6.25 0.00 3.13 100  
Collar only 0.18 1.10 0.00 90.83 0.73 6.42 0.73 100  
Collar+put+swap 0.00 3.91 2.34 0.78 79.69 12.50 0.78 100  
Collar+swap 0.17 0.00 0.17 6.35 1.67 85.45 6.19 100  
Swap only 0.24 0.00 0.48 1.19 0.36 4.30 93.44 100  
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Table VIII: Summary statistics for firm financial and operational characteristics 
This table provides financial and operational statistics for the 150 US oil and gas producers for the period 1998-2010. 
GAS_HEDG, OIL_HEDG, IR_HEDG, FX_HEDG and BASIS_HEDG are dummy variables for the gas, oil, interest rate, 
foreign exchange and basis risk hedging. TLCF for tax loss carryforwards scaled by the book value of total assets, 
TAX_SAVE for the expected percentage of tax saving, LEV for the leverage ratio, DTD for distance-to-default, 
CASH_COST for production cost per barrel of oil equivalent, INV_OPP for investment opportunities, CORR_1 for the 
correlation between free cash flows and investment opportunities, UND_OIL and UND_GAS for the undeveloped proved 
oil (in MM of barrel) and gas (in billion cubic feet) reserves respectively, OVER_INV for the overinvestment problem, 
OIL_REV and GAS_REV for fractions of revenues from oil (gas) production, HERF_OIL and HERF_GAS indices that 
measure the geographical dispersion of oil (gas) production, UNCER_OIL and UNCER_GAS measure the production 
uncertainty for oil and gas respectively, PQ_COR_OIL and PQ_COR_GAS measure the quantity-price correlation for oil 
and gas respectively, SALES for sales, MKT_VALUE for the common shares market value (in MM$), RES_OIL and 
RES_GAS for the total reserves for oil and gas respectively, MV_CS_CEO for the market value of common shares held 
by firm’s CEO (in MM$), OPT_CEO for the number of stock options held by firm’s CEO (in 000), %_CS_INST  for the 
percentage of common shares held by institutional investors, FUTURE_OIL, SPOT_OIL and VOL_OIL for oil future and 
spot prices and volatility, FUTURE_GAS, SPOT_GAS and VOL_GAS for gas future and spot prices and volatility, 
Q_RATIO for the quick ratio and BVCD for the book value of convertible debts scaled by the book value of total assets. 
COST_CV is the coefficient of variation of the cash cost per barrel of oil equivalent. 
Variable Obs Mean Median 1
st
 quartile 3
rd
 quartile STD 
Variables that proxy for hedging activity 
GAS_HEDG 6,326 0.496 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.500 
OIL_HEDG 6,326 0.412 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.492 
BASIS_HEDG 6,326 0.095 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.293 
IR_HEDG 6,326 0.172 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.377 
FX_HEDG 6,326 0.045 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.207 
Variables that proxy for underinvestment costs 
INV_OPP 6,006 0.224 0.075 0.041 0.129 3.619 
UND_OIL 6,326 95.153 2.109 0.118 19.106 450.444 
UND_GAS 6,326 503.631 31.799 2.742 193.048 2028.157 
CORR_1 6,196 0.055 0.046 -0.179 0.305 0.383 
Variables that proxy for overinvestment 
OVER_INV 5,855 0.259 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.438 
Variables that proxy for tax advantage  
TLCF 6,066 0.134 0.000 0.000 0.064 0.438 
TAX_SAVE 6,160 0.052 0.048 0.029 0.070 0.051 
Variables that proxy for financial distress costs 
DTD 5,686 2.234 2.052 1.323 2.862 1.361 
LEV 6,063 0.158 0.142 0.053 0.220 0.153 
CONSTRAINT 6060 0.321 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.467 
CASH_COST 6,241 9.860 7.527 4.684 12.230 8.441 
Variables that proxy for managerial risk aversion 
MV_CS_CEO 6,326 28.983 1.125 0.000 11.563 152.159 
OPT_CEO 6,326 174.386 0.000 0.000 120.000 681.760 
 
Continued 
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Table VIII-Continued 
 
Variable Obs Mean Median 1
st
 quartile 3
rd
 quartile STD 
Variables that proxy for information asymmetry 
%_CS_INST 6,326 0.372 0.299 0.000 0.742 0.353 
Variables that proxy for production characteristics 
UNCER_OIL 6,058 0.416 0.313 0.141 0.587 0.388 
PQ_COR_OIL 6,119 0.229 0.455 -0.287 0.723 0.587 
UNCER_GAS 6,078 0.408 0.303 0.146 0.582 0.359 
COST_CV 6,167 0.292 0.252 0.148 0.396 0.556 
PQ_COR_GAS 6,112 0.154 0.230 -0.174 0.504 0.419 
OIL_REV 6,204 0.351 0.273 0.107 0.526 0.350 
GAS_REV 6,204 0.519 0.566 0.242 0.785 0.311 
HERF_GAS 6,180 0.063 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.183 
HERF_OIL 6,178 0.100 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.233 
Variables that proxy for firm size 
MKT_VALUE 6,326 6,027.862 220.008 31.993 1,412.968 3,2010.780 
SALES 6,326 1,379.558 22.071 2.762 162.717 7,771.860 
RES_OIL 6,326 276.710 8.010 0.948 53.352 1,277.726 
RES_GAS 6,326 1,504.194 99.463 13.711 571.699 5,888.217 
Variables that proxy for hedging substitutes 
BVCD 6,065 0.025 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.102 
Q_RATIO 6,069 1.555 0.275 0.079 0.850 5.334 
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Table IX: Hedging instrument choice by gas hedgers 
This table reports the coefficient estimates of the Dynamic Panel Random Effects Probit Model for the hedging instrument choice for the subsample of gas hedgers. For each 
instrument, the dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the instrument (Swap contracts, Put options, Costless collars) is used and 0 otherwise. LAG_SWAP, 
LAG_PUT, LAG_COLLAR are the lagged dependent dummy variables. SWAP_0, PUT_0, COLLAR_0 are the initial conditions (the first observation for each instrument). OIL_HEDG, 
IR_HEDG, FX_HEDG and BASIS_HEDG are dummy variables for oil, interest rate, foreign exchange and basis risk hedging. TLCF for tax loss carryforwards scaled by the book value 
of total assets, TAX_SAVE for the expected percentage of tax saving, LEV for the leverage ratio, DTD for distance to default, CONSTRAINT for financial constraint, INV_OPP for 
investment opportunities, CORR_1 for the correlation between free cash flows and investment opportunities, UND_GAS for undeveloped proved reserves for gas, GAS_REV for 
revenues from gas production, HERF_GAS measures the geographical dispersion of gas production, UNCER_GAS measures gas production uncertainty, PQ_COR_GAS measures 
the quantity-price correlation for gas, MV_CS_CEO for the market value of common shares held by the CEO, OPT_CEO for the number of stock options held by the CEO, 
%_CS_INST  for the percentage of common shares held by institutional investors, FUTURE_GAS, SPOT_GAS and VOL_GAS for gas future and spot prices and volatility. COST_CV 
for the coefficient of variation of the cash cost per barrel of oil equivalent, OVER_INV measures overinvestment. IMR_GAS is the Inverse Mills Ratio from the first-step Heckman 
regression (Appendix A). Coefficients of the exogenous variables’ means are not reported for conciseness. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***Significant at the 1% level, ** 
Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Variable Swap Swap Swap Swap Put Put Put Put Collar Collar Collar Collar 
             
CONSTANT 1.4679 0.8105 -0.3889 -0.3242 -4.0789** -5.7321** -3.8333** -6.9740*** -1.5281 -5.8847*** -0.5455 -7.0967*** 
 (1.573) (1.993) (1.413) (1.927) (1.946) (2.396) (1.653) (2.276) (1.773) (2.226) (1.521) (2.110) 
INV_OPP -1.0854*** -0.5866   0.9633** 1.1227**   0.0174 -0.1490   
 (0.369) (0.396)   (0.462) (0.539)   (0.274) (0.256)   
UND_GAS   -0.0041 -0.0382   -0.2390 0.0226   0.1379 0.0979 
   (0.058) (0.061)   (0.503) (0.440)   (0.095) (0.091) 
CORR_1 0.4680*** 0.2273* 0.3677*** 0.2344* -0.8728** -0.8760*** -0.7570** -0.7833** -0.0487 -0.2355 -0.0044 -0.2385 
 (0.133) (0.129) (0.127) (0.127) (0.339) (0.331) (0.325) (0.331) (0.176) (0.179) (0.175) (0.179) 
VOL_GAS -0.2168***  -0.2489***  0.3533***  0.3156**  0.1165  0.1218*  
 (0.062)  (0.062)  (0.137)  (0.133)  (0.071)  (0.072)  
FUTURE_GAS  -0.1918***  -0.1919***  -0.1178  -0.0756  0.1030**  0.0849*  
  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.087)  (0.085)  (0.043)  (0.044)  
SPOT_GAS  0.0911***  0.0846***  0.1463**  0.1160*  -0.0690*  -0.0694*  
  (0.033)  (0.033)  (0.069)  (0.068)  (0.037)  (0.038)  
HERF_GAS 0.0427  -0.0211  -0.7928  -0.9635  -0.6264  -0.8546  
 (0.633)  (0.635)  (0.807)  (0.779)  (0.672)  (0.685)  
GAS_REV -1.6987***  -1.6748***  1.5441**  0.9107  1.0976**  1.2957***   
 (0.363)  (0.375)  (0.771)  (0.748)  (0.445)  (0.450)   
COST_CV  0.1630 -0.1000 0.1128  -0.0604 -0.5828 -0.2593  -0.2343 -0.0074 -0.1451 
  (0.138) (0.262) (0.120)  (0.572) (0.424) (0.471)  (0.311) (0.162) (0.314) 
UNCER_GAS -1.8510***  -2.0391***  0.3975  0.6549  -1.5775***  -1.5663***  
 (0.261)  (0.308)  (0.744)  (0.759)  (0.319)  (0.343)  
OIL_HEDG -0.2277**    -0.8895***    -0.2931**    
 (0.097)    (0.215)    (0.120)    
IR_HEDG  -0.3739***    -0.1170    -0.2410**   
  (0.094)    (0.264)    (0.116)   
FX_HEDG   -0.1160    1.6753**    -0.2883  
   (0.203)    (0.762)    (0.426)  
BASIS_HEDG    -0.2025*    -0.3124    -0.7884*** 
 
 
   (0.117)    (0.410)    (0.172) 
Continued 
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Table IX-Continued 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Variable Swap Swap Swap Swap Put Put Put Put Collar Collar Collar Collar 
             
PQ_COR_GAS  0.1759  0.2393*  -0.1206  -0.1167  0.5179***  0.6118*** 
  (0.140)  (0.142)  (0.315)  (0.316)  (0.191)  (0.196) 
OPT_CEO -0.0020** -0.0023** -0.0019** -0.0026*** 0.0043 0.0028 0.0034 0.0024 0.0052*** 0.0042** 0.0034 0.0042** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
MV_CS_CEO -0.5599 -0.3885 -0.5638 0.0170 -20.3546** -12.8546 -15.0856* -12.1550 1.8033*** 1.2405** 1.5883*** 1.6220*** 
 (0.437) (0.470) (0.439) (0.483) (9.543) (8.285) (8.584) (7.852) (0.564) (0.575) (0.586) (0.582) 
%_CS_INST  -1.2378***  -1.1857***  -0.9514  -0.9467*  -0.2165  -0.0891 
  (0.214)  (0.217)  (0.584)  (0.569)  (0.268)  (0.268) 
LEV  0.8857**  0.8727**  -0.1875  -0.3945  0.9969*  0.9548* 
  (0.398)  (0.398)  (1.079)  (1.081)  (0.520)  (0.517) 
CONSTRAINT  -0.1890**  -0.1983**  -0.0494  -0.0267  0.0076  -0.0440 
  (0.082)  (0.082)  (0.203)  (0.201)  (0.100)  (0.101) 
DTD -0.0855**  -0.0955***  -0.0138  -0.0031  0.0189  0.0167  
 (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.097)  (0.095)  (0.044)  (0.044)  
OVER_INV  0.1429  0.1745*  -0.4372**  -0.5306**  -0.1961*  -0.1836* 
  (0.094)  (0.092)  (0.218)  (0.214)  (0.106)  (0.106) 
TAX_SAVE  -1.4106  -1.4424  1.6713  1.4518  2.1223  2.1628 
  (0.884)  (0.877)  (1.706)  (1.851)  (1.298)  (1.339) 
TLCF -0.9751***  -1.0150***  0.0618  0.5620  0.4713  0.4939  
 (0.371)  (0.367)  (0.500)  (0.533)  (0.318)  (0.321)  
IMR_GAS 0.7884*** 0.4948** 0.5998*** 0.5214** 0.9499** 0.5084 0.8784*** 0.6314 0.0179 0.4179 0.0106 0.3873 
 (0.193) (0.210) (0.152) (0.216) (0.417) (0.456) (0.300) (0.445) (0.214) (0.256) (0.180) (0.257) 
LAG_SWAP 1.0217*** 0.9619*** 0.9982*** 0.9748***         
 (0.105) (0.104) (0.103) (0.104)         
SWAP_0 0.3181 0.0749 0.2547 0.1421         
 (0.445) (0.427) (0.425) (0.444)         
LAG_PUT     2.2322*** 2.2389*** 2.1345*** 2.1698***     
     (0.206) (0.200) (0.194) (0.195)     
PUT_0     -0.0112 -1.0045* -0.1124 -0.8876     
     (0.595) (0.576) (0.571) (0.575)     
LAG_COLLAR         1.3995*** 1.3361*** 1.4165*** 1.3567*** 
         (0.107) (0.109) (0.107) (0.109) 
COLLAR_0         0.7508 0.9140* 0.8174 1.2346** 
         (0.507) (0.524) (0.504) (0.525) 
Observations 2,905 2,873 2,851 2,873 2,905 2,873 2,851 2,873 2,905 2,873 2,851 2,873 
Number of firms 108 105 105 105 108 105 105 105 108 105 105 105 
Log  Likelihood -1167.8846 -1147.2939 -1173.8810 -1156.9260 -213.4431 -213.6897 -217.1877 -216.8524 -838.0898 -812.4556 -815.5129 -799.5815 
Wald Stat 257.4978 281.2807 250.9606 266.9531 144.0724 148.3352 150.6652 147.7882 216.5522 207.3950 221.1073 222.8399 
Significance 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Rho 0.6669 0.6526 0.6437 0.6608 0.4985 0.4448 0.4481 0.4611 0.6765 0.6762 0.6609 0.6675 
Panel-level standard deviation 1.4151 1.3705 1.3441 1.3958 0.9971 0.8951 0.9011 0.9249 1.4461 1.4450 1.3960 1.4169 
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Table X: Hedging instrument choice by oil hedgers 
This table reports the coefficient estimates of the Dynamic Panel Random Effects Probit Model for the hedging instrument choice for the subsample of oil hedgers. For each 
instrument, the dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the instrument (Swap contracts, Put options, Costless collars) is used and 0 otherwise. LAG_SWAP, 
LAG_PUT and LAG_COLLAR are the lagged dependent dummy variables. SWAP_0, PUT_0, COLLAR_0 are the initial conditions (the first observation for each instrument). 
GAS_HEDG, IR_HEDG, FX_HEDG and BASIS_HEDG are dummy variables for gas, interest rate, foreign exchange and basis risk hedging. TLCF for tax loss carryforwards scaled by 
the book value of total assets, TAX_SAVE for the expected percentage of tax saving, LEV for the leverage ratio, DTD for distance to default, CONSTRAINT for financial constraints, 
INV_OPP for investment opportunities, CORR_1 for the correlation between free cash flows and investment opportunities, UND_OIL for the undeveloped proved reserves of oil, and 
OIL_REV revenues from oil production, HERF_OIL measures the geographical dispersion of oil production, UNCER_OIL measures oil production uncertainty, PQ_COR_OIL 
measures the quantity-price correlation for oil, MV_CS_CEO for the market value of common shares held by the CEO, OPT_CEO for the number of stock options held by the CEO, 
%_CS_INST  for the percentage of common shares held by institutional investors, FUTURE_OIL, SPOT_OIL and VOL_OIL for oil future and spot prices and volatility. COST_CV for 
the coefficient of variation of the cash cost per barrel of oil equivalent, OVER_INV measures the overinvestment problem. IMR_OIL is the Inverse Mills Ratio from the first-step 
Heckman regression (Appendix A). Coefficients of the exogenous variables’ means are not reported for conciseness. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***Significant at the 1% level, 
** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Variable Swap Swap Swap Swap Put Put Put Put Collar Collar Collar Collar 
             
CONSTANT 4.7882** -3.7389 -0.5819 -4.8180* -8.7859*** -3.6228 -6.6588** -5.3129 -0.6477 -5.9331*** -1.9168 -6.1695*** 
 (1.884) (2.786) (1.543) (2.840) (3.355) (4.037) (2.782) (3.993) (1.922) (2.258) (1.443) (2.293) 
INV_OPP -0.5259 -0.2887   0.9153 0.3572   -0.0767 0.0347   
 (0.326) (0.314)   (0.648) (0.820)   (0.281) (0.233)   
UND_OIL   -0.0518 -0.5013   -8.6283* -6.0433   -2.4315* -0.8710 
   (1.355) (1.360)   (4.475) (3.899)   (1.281) (1.330) 
CORR_1 0.0334 0.2889* -0.0350 0.2448 0.7236** 0.0342 0.6866* 0.2411 -0.1328 -0.3130 -0.2062 -0.3854* 
 (0.168) (0.166) (0.166) (0.165) (0.350) (0.359) (0.354) (0.355) (0.192) (0.199) (0.189) (0.199) 
VOL_OIL -0.0555***  -0.0422**  -0.0408  -0.0316  0.0291*  0.0322*  
 (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.036)  (0.039)  (0.016)  (0.017)  
FUTURE_OIL  -0.0508***  -0.0526***  0.0855**  0.0936**  0.0383**  0.0535*** 
  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.015)  (0.016) 
SPOT_OIL  0.0413***  0.0429***  -0.0846**  -0.0904**  -0.0358**  -0.0485*** 
  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.036)  (0.036)  (0.015)  (0.016) 
HERF_OIL -1.7915***  -1.8719***  -1.2180  -2.9419*  0.8046*  0.7722  
 (0.408)  (0.420)  (1.623)  (1.773)  (0.460)  (0.471)  
OIL_REV -0.3076  0.1319  0.9129  1.9694**  -0.8129  -0.6863  
 (0.435)  (0.427)  (0.901)  (0.931)  (0.505)  (0.496)  
COST_CV  0.0926 -1.4119*** 0.0637  -2.5530** -2.3783** -2.0884*  0.1552 0.2640** 0.1088 
  (0.191) (0.399) (0.193)  (1.256) (1.034) (1.235)  (0.184) (0.126) (0.214) 
UNCER_OIL 0.2130  0.6573*  0.1882  1.2106  -2.0438***  -2.1054***  
 (0.325)  (0.351)  (0.990)  (1.031)  (0.340)  (0.348)  
GAS_HEDG -0.3417*    -1.1378***    -0.6163***    
 (0.184)    (0.305)    (0.182)    
IR_HEDG  -0.1372    -0.8188**    -0.1520   
  (0.116)    (0.339)    (0.125)   
FX_HEDG   -0.2215    1.4545**    -1.0206***  
   (0.276)    (0.664)    (0.330)  
BASIS_HEDG    0.1938    -0.3791    -0.7243*** 
    (0.144)    (0.347)    (0.158) 
             
Continued 
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Table X-Continued 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Variable Swap Swap Swap Swap Put Put Put Put Collar Collar Collar Collar 
             
PQ_COR_OIL  -0.1702  -0.1387  0.4081  0.5262  -0.7748***  -0.7293*** 
  (0.127)  (0.129)  (0.409)  (0.407)  (0.149)  (0.152) 
OPT_CEO 0.0002 -0.0017 -0.0003 -0.0018 0.0052 -0.0002 -0.0028 -0.0020 -0.0024 -0.0009 -0.0014 -0.0009 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
MV_CS_CEO -0.5533 0.0994 -0.7896 0.0746 -8.5490* -4.6368 -1.6199 -2.8492 0.1608 -0.6164 0.2451 -0.2322 
 (0.618) (0.633) (0.619) (0.638) (4.645) (3.749) (3.463) (3.718) (0.475) (0.506) (0.486) (0.499) 
%_CS_INST  -0.2860  -0.2394  -1.7309**  -1.4452**  -0.7092**  -0.7154** 
  (0.274)  (0.276)  (0.708)  (0.687)  (0.345)  (0.344) 
LEV  1.6201**  1.7125***  -2.8448  -1.8156  -1.1950*  -1.1470* 
  (0.650)  (0.654)  (1.935)  (1.828)  (0.623)  (0.629) 
CONSTRAINT  -0.0797  -0.0874  0.2778  0.2751  -0.3806***  -0.3531*** 
  (0.102)  (0.102)  (0.245)  (0.244)  (0.110)  (0.111) 
DTD -0.1117**  -0.1105**  -0.2068**  -0.1333  0.1362***  0.1506***  
 (0.046)  (0.047)  (0.098)  (0.107)  (0.049)  (0.051)  
OVER_INV  -0.0473  -0.0315  -0.6594***  -0.6140**  0.0081  0.0149 
  (0.112)  (0.111)  (0.248)  (0.245)  (0.113)  (0.113) 
TAX_SAVE  -1.3269  -1.2898  -11.6435**  -11.5699**  1.2068  1.2311 
  (0.929)  (0.914)  (5.306)  (5.047)  (1.661)  (1.698) 
TLCF -1.8248***  -1.7878***  -0.4893  -0.1843  1.2475***  1.0732***  
 (0.492)  (0.507)  (1.103)  (1.133)  (0.337)  (0.305)  
IMR_OIL 1.1019*** 0.4478 0.7931*** 0.4954* 1.5474** 0.2971 0.9632* 0.8807 0.0808 -0.2248 0.0268 -0.1904 
 (0.224) (0.279) (0.220) (0.281) (0.609) (0.839) (0.500) (0.777) (0.215) (0.302) (0.212) (0.305) 
LAG_SWAP 1.4070*** 1.3954*** 1.3766*** 1.3639***         
 (0.115) (0.114) (0.114) (0.115)         
SWAP_0 1.0895** 1.5019** 1.5047*** 1.7065***         
 (0.505) (0.616) (0.539) (0.625)         
LAG_PUT     2.1863*** 2.2099*** 2.1889*** 2.2230***     
     (0.203) (0.207) (0.209) (0.208)     
PUT_0     1.5434 1.5512 1.5467 1.8568     
     (1.006) (1.071) (1.123) (1.150)     
LAG_COLLAR         1.2600*** 1.2661*** 1.2585*** 1.2185*** 
         (0.108) (0.109) (0.111) (0.109) 
COLLAR_0         0.1769 0.3743 0.0143 0.2600 
         (1.004) (0.950) (1.064) (0.972) 
Observations 2,402 2,409 2,375 2,409 2,402 2,409 2,375 2,409 2,402 2,409 2,375 2,409 
Number of firms 101 99 99 99 101 99 99 99 101 99 99 99 
Log Likelihood -828.2913 -821.5812 -810.4447 -821.1071 -192.2647 -186.8094 -192.6126 -189.9448 -741.3202 -719.4538 -718.3412 -709.1148 
Wald Stat 249.7851 247.9265 247.7702 246.1133 137.6785 133.3503 126.5703 132.2096 213.2022 200.8963 203.3644 215.5304 
Significance 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Rho 0.7082 0.7599 0.7329 0.7610 0.7306 0.7255 0.7717 0.7538 0.7130 0.6744 0.7373 0.6841 
Panel-level standard deviation 1.5578 1.7790 1.6564 1.7843 1.6469 1.6258 1.8386 1.7499 1.5761 1.4391 1.6754 1.4715 
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Table XI: Hedging portfolio choice by gas hedgers 
This table reports means of coefficient estimates of the Dynamic Random Effects Multinomial Mixed Logit to select one of the following three hedging portfolios: (1) Swap and put 
options, (2) Swaps and Collars and (3) Swaps, Put options and Costless collars for the subsample of gas hedgers. The base case is using swap contracts only. OIL_HEDG, IR_HEDG, 
FX_HEDG and BASIS_HEDG are dummy variables for oil, interest rate, foreign exchange and basis risk hedging. TLCF for tax loss carryforwards scaled by the book value of total 
assets, TAX_SAVE for the expected percentage of tax saving, LEV for the leverage ratio, DTD for distance to default, CONSTRAINT for financial constraints, INV_OPP for investment 
opportunities, CORR_1 for the correlation between free cash flows and investment opportunities, UND_GAS for the undeveloped proved reserves of gas,  GAS_REV for revenues 
from gas production, HERF_GAS measures the geographical dispersion of gas production, UNCER_GAS measures gas production uncertainty, PQ_COR_GAS measures the 
quantity-price correlation for gas, MV_CS_CEO for the market value of common shares held by the CEO, OPT_CEO for the number of stock options held by the CEO, %_CS_INST  
for the percentage of common shares held by institutional investors, FUTURE_GAS, SPOT_GAS and VOL_GAS for gas future and spot prices and volatility. COST_CV for the 
coefficient of variation of the cash cost per barrel of oil equivalent, OVER_INV measures the overinvestment problem. IMR_GAS is the Inverse Mills Ratio from the first step Heckman 
regression (Appendix A). LAG is the lagged dependent variable. LAG_0 is the first observation. Coefficients of the exogenous variables’ means are not reported for conciseness. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. ***Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Variable 
Swaps + 
Put options 
Swaps + 
Collars 
Swaps + 
Collars + 
Put options 
Swaps + 
Put options 
Swaps + 
Collars 
Swaps + 
Collars + 
Put options 
Swaps + 
Put options 
Swaps + 
Collars 
Swaps + 
Collars + 
Put options 
Swaps + 
Put options 
Swaps + 
Collars 
Swaps + 
Collars + 
Put options 
             
INV_OPP 2.2211** 1.8193** 2.1679* 1.6198 1.9128 0.8811       
 (1.112) (0.788) (1.136) (1.380) (1.173) (0.930)       
UND_GAS       -1.3290 0.0593 -0.1530 -1.2261 0.0909 0.1699 
       (1.271) (0.153) (0.341) (1.952) (0.164) (0.340) 
CORR_1 0.1587 -0.4873 0.5000 0.4293 -0.2054 1.4151** 0.2622 -0.3965 0.6820 0.3626 -0.1519 1.3159** 
 (0.798) (0.353) (0.659) (0.846) (0.353) (0.665) (0.807) (0.346) (0.636) (0.872) (0.350) (0.657) 
VOL_GAS 0.4982 0.2629* 0.3655    0.5271 0.3138** 0.3294    
 (0.387) (0.157) (0.298)    (0.395) (0.159) (0.300)    
FUTURE_GAS    0.0064 0.2581** 0.2822    -0.0390 0.2500** 0.2701 
    (0.299) (0.104) (0.198)    (0.316) (0.104) (0.191) 
SPOT_GAS    -0.0106 -0.1080 -0.1661    0.0384 -0.0983 -0.1576 
    (0.244) (0.088) (0.183)    (0.256) (0.088) (0.175) 
HERF_GAS 5.6000 0.6124 3.8470    6.6783 0.3125 3.7546    
 (5.830) (1.491) (3.026)    (5.612) (1.498) (3.056)    
GAS_REV 7.1128*** 1.9334* 1.7740    9.0750*** 1.5953 2.7445    
 (2.496) (0.987) (2.037)    (3.066) (1.058) (2.125)    
COST_CV    -3.9733* -0.7083 0.8668 -2.2789 -0.1849 1.2712 -2.7916 -0.4681 1.2027 
    (2.095) (0.757) (0.993) (1.586) (0.721) (0.991) (1.816) (0.720) (0.939) 
UNCER_GAS 1.1570 1.8972*** 5.5793***    0.8685 2.0719*** 4.9724***    
 (1.776) (0.682) (1.406)    (1.911) (0.756) (1.648)    
OIL_HEDG -0.1000 0.4263 1.2311**          
 (0.590) (0.273) (0.562)          
IR_HEDG    1.1310 0.3743 1.1073**       
    (0.915) (0.247) (0.478)       
FX_HEDG       0.3080 0.4211 1.0414    
       (2.064) (0.498) (0.863)    
BASIS_HEDG          -2.1393 0.0652 0.0929 
          (1.422) (0.295) (0.586) 
Continued 
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Table XI-Continued 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Variable 
Swaps + 
Put options 
Swaps + 
Collars 
Swaps + 
Collars + 
Put options 
Swaps  + 
Put options 
Swaps + 
Collars 
Swaps + 
Collars + 
Put options 
Swaps + 
Put options 
Swaps + 
Collars 
Swaps + 
Collars + 
Put options 
Swaps + 
Put options 
Swaps + 
Collars 
Swaps + 
Collars + 
Put options 
             
PQ_COR_GAS    -0.2411 -0.6961* -1.4700**    -0.2072 -0.7796** -1.5082** 
    (0.819) (0.392) (0.716)    (0.854) (0.396) (0.728) 
OPT_CEO -0.0117 0.0009 0.0065* -0.0140 0.0028 0.0003 -0.0128 0.0004 0.0051 -0.0141 0.0031 0.0002 
 (0.012) (0.002) (0.004) (0.013) (0.002) (0.002) (0.013) (0.002) (0.004) (0.013) (0.002) (0.002) 
MV_CS_CEO -4.0146 1.0181 -0.0421 -7.2996 1.3072 1.5108 -5.2502 1.0619 0.2951 -9.9613 0.9361 0.7024 
 (7.073) (1.086) (3.629) (9.097) (1.259) (3.059) (8.163) (1.104) (3.310) (11.096) (1.264) (3.270) 
%_CS_INST    0.5147 1.4699** -0.1865    0.5325 1.3982** -0.3489 
    (1.583) (0.591) (1.018)    (1.630) (0.600) (1.013) 
LEV    -0.7111 -3.2276** -0.8418    -1.0500 -3.2655** -1.5442 
    (1.735) (1.350) (2.114)    (1.789) (1.346) (2.243) 
CONSTRAINT    0.0067 0.6903*** -0.6279    0.0198 0.6756*** -0.5603 
    (0.566) (0.228) (0.389)    (0.593) (0.230) (0.383) 
DTD -0.2966 0.0443 -0.1564    -0.3682 0.0544 -0.0632    
 (0.207) (0.089) (0.168)    (0.231) (0.089) (0.166)    
OVER_INV    -1.5085** 0.0040 0.6479    -1.6354** -0.0560 0.4625 
    (0.690) (0.251) (0.480)    (0.737) (0.248) (0.472) 
TAX_SAVE    -11.3358 2.0227 -8.8088    -11.8664 2.0916 -7.6186 
    (13.873) (1.387) (10.348)    (14.014) (1.409) (9.719) 
TLCF 0.5614 0.3886 0.9566    1.0216 0.3481 1.6292    
 (1.739) (0.954) (1.851)    (1.919) (0.971) (1.739)    
IMR_GAS 0.8591 -0.8247 -0.6898 0.2746 -0.6466 -1.3389 0.4013 -1.1196** -0.2771 0.1380 -0.6983 -1.6001 
 (1.098) (0.514) (1.000) (1.173) (0.610) (1.112) (1.141) (0.568) (1.077) (1.240) (0.651) (1.139) 
LAG 4.8491*** 3.8356*** 3.1484*** 4.2207*** 3.8633*** 3.2324*** 4.6935*** 3.8528*** 3.0547*** 4.1282*** 3.8411*** 3.2357*** 
 (0.525) (0.180) (0.388) (0.557) (0.189) (0.387) (0.650) (0.183) (0.371) (0.682) (0.189) (0.373) 
LAG_0 -0.1002 0.2200 2.3247** 2.9400* -0.4745 3.1734*** 0.0418 0.6110 2.2957** 3.2006 0.2136 2.8169*** 
 (1.005) (0.765) (0.926) (1.669) (1.143) (0.980) (1.275) (1.018) (0.929) (2.300) (1.031) (0.889) 
uj -8.0634* -8.1426*** -4.0618 -10.7790 -4.0450* -6.1800 -5.1669 -4.7398*** -0.6227 -7.3354 -1.9742 -4.3276 
 (4.719) (2.061) (4.035) (6.655) (2.333) (4.841) (4.489) (1.801) (3.562) (7.457) (2.346) (3.998) 
Sigma_uj 1.9645***   1.3458*** 2.4797*** 2.2569*** 1.4661*** 2.0832*** 2.3419*** 1.3438*** 1.9622*** 3.0565** 1.5299*** 1.9774*** 
 (0.456) (0.202) (0.450) (0.649) (0.221) (0.432) (0.707) (0.202) (0.439) (1.262) (0.239) (0.399) 
Rho_1_2 0.935 
 
0.993 
 
0.897 
0.154 
 
0.793 
 
0.705 
0.735 
 
0.999 
 
0.734 
0.410 
 
0.929 
 
0.715 
 
Rho_1_3 
 
Rho_2_3 
Observations 2,188 
-889.3674 
-945.7635 
112.7922 
0.0000 
2,168 
-860.5163 
-910.7239 
100.4151 
0.0000 
2,134 
-875.4408 
-920.7931 
90.7046 
0.0000 
2,168 
-870.0853 
-920.4412 
100.7117 
0.0000 
Log Likelihood 
LL Constant only 
Wald Stat 
Significance 
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Table XII: Hedging portfolio choice by oil hedgers  
This table reports means of coefficient estimates of the Dynamic Random Effects Multinomial Mixed Logit to select one of these three hedging portfolios: (1)  Swap and put options, (2) 
Swaps and Collars and (3) Swaps, Put options and Costless Collars for the subsample of oil hedgers. The base case is using swap contracts only. GAS_HEDG, IR_HEDG, FX_HEDG 
and BASIS_HEDG are dummy variables for oil, interest rate, foreign exchange and basis risk hedging. TLCF for tax loss carryforwards scaled by the book value of total assets, 
TAX_SAVE for the expected percentage of tax saving, LEV for the leverage ratio, DTD for distance to default, CONSTRAINT for financial constraints, INV_OPP for investment 
opportunities, CORR_1 for the correlation between free cash flows and investment opportunities, UND_OIL for the undeveloped proved oil reserves, OIL_REV for revenues from oil 
production, HERF_OIL measures the geographical dispersion of oil production, UNCER_OIL measures oil production uncertainty, PQ_COR_OIL measures the oil quantity-price 
correlation, MV_CS_CEO for the market value of common shares held by the CEO, OPT_CEO for the number of stock options held by the CEO, %_CS_INST for the percentage of 
common shares held by institutional investors, FUTURE_OIL, SPOT_OIL and VOL_OIL for oil future and spot prices and volatility. COST_CV for the coefficient of variation of the cash 
cost per barrel of oil equivalent, OVER_INV measures the overinvestment problem. IMR_OIL is the Inverse Mills Ratio from the first step Heckman regression (Appendix A). LAG is the 
lagged dependent variable. LAG_0 is the first observation. Coefficients of the exogenous variables’ means are not reported for conciseness. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
***Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Variable 
Swaps + 
Put options 
Swaps + 
Collars 
Swaps + 
Collars + 
Put options 
Swaps  + 
Put options 
Swaps + 
Collars 
Swaps + 
Collars + 
Put options 
Swaps + 
Put options 
Swaps + 
Collars 
Swaps + 
Collars + 
Put options 
Swaps + 
Put options 
Swaps + 
Collars 
Swaps + 
Collars + 
Put options 
             
INV_OPP 1.2251 1.3159* 1.7185* 0.3801 0.8754 1.0355       
 (1.463) (0.712) (0.895) (1.800) (0.742) (0.824)       
UND_OIL       11.4982 0.7859 2.0579 6.3964 1.7266 4.5504 
       (23.887) (3.407) (5.484) (15.515) (3.483) (5.058) 
CORR_1 -2.7309 -0.0486 0.0425 -4.2599** -0.1835 -0.4804 -2.7180 0.1298 0.2752 -2.8437* 0.0247 -0.3498 
 (1.850) (0.431) (0.746) (1.688) (0.436) (0.707) (1.910) (0.429) (0.752) (1.511) (0.435) (0.699) 
VOL_OIL 0.1668 -0.0308 0.0071    0.2411 -0.0416 -0.0356    
 (0.135) (0.042) (0.083)    (0.167) (0.045) (0.082)    
FUTURE_OIL    0.3404* -0.0169 0.0927    0.2288* -0.0142 0.0749 
    (0.177) (0.038) (0.074)    (0.127) (0.038) (0.071) 
SPOT_OIL    -0.2962* 0.0299 -0.0789    -0.2091* 0.0297 -0.0630 
    (0.162) (0.038) (0.073)    (0.122) (0.038) (0.070) 
HERF_OIL -0.9574 2.7762*** 0.9429    -1.2176 3.0714*** 1.5233    
 (3.814) (1.045) (1.827)    (3.727) (1.063) (1.807)    
OIL_REV 2.2294 0.7476 3.1159    0.7369 0.5417 1.1714    
 (4.157) (1.303) (2.416)    (4.063) (1.284) (1.993)    
COST_CV    -7.5344 0.0743 -0.7213 -4.3151 1.5133 1.3351    
    (5.694) (0.337) (1.109) (4.412) (0.996) (1.027)    
UNCER_OIL -0.8425 -1.3400 -0.4906    0.7025 -2.3167** -0.3717    
 (2.567) (0.819) (1.399)    (2.413) (0.922) (1.408)    
GAS_HEDG -0.3332 0.4399 2.9815**          
 (1.382) (0.557) (1.451)          
IR_HEDG    -0.4810 0.1372 0.7083       
    (1.132) (0.304) (0.517)       
FX_HEDG       -3.2237 1.3204** 0.5769    
       (4.656) (0.672) (1.107)    
BASIS_HEDG          -1.8850 -0.5905 -0.4051 
          (1.690) (0.363) (0.710) 
Continued 
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 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Variable 
Swaps + 
Put options 
Swaps + 
Collars 
Swaps + 
Collars + 
Put options 
Swaps  + 
Put options 
Swaps + 
Collars 
Swaps + 
Collars + 
Put options 
Swaps + 
Put options 
Swaps + 
Collars 
Swaps + 
Collars + 
Put options 
Swaps + 
Put options 
Swaps + 
Collars 
Swaps + 
Collars + 
Put options 
             
PQ_COR_OIL    -1.8948 0.2817 0.2435    -1.8978 0.2664 -0.0109 
    (1.661) (0.328) (0.700)    (1.485) (0.328) (0.661) 
OPT_CEO 0.0501** -0.0022 0.0043 0.0400* 0.0012 0.0015 0.0592*** -0.0040 0.0050    
 (0.020) (0.005) (0.014) (0.021) (0.003) (0.003) (0.021) (0.005) (0.013)    
MV_CS_CEO -8.0300 2.2892* 0.2434 -7.7560 1.4191 0.0496 -8.0806 2.6113** 1.0862    
 (16.948) (1.331) (5.148) (16.331) (1.392) (4.682) (18.848) (1.327) (4.826)    
%_CS_INST    2.8521 0.0920 -0.2079       
    (2.903) (0.712) (1.330)       
LEV    -8.0969 0.0268 1.4242    -7.2524 -0.1088 0.7652 
    (7.121) (1.632) (2.607)    (6.500) (1.568) (2.440) 
CONSTRAINT    0.6528 -0.0117 0.8732*    0.3328 -0.0198 0.9003** 
    (0.897) (0.274) (0.447)    (0.840) (0.271) (0.433) 
DTD -0.1652 -0.0162 0.1090    -0.0758 -0.0232 0.0347    
 (0.411) (0.120) (0.227)    (0.439) (0.122) (0.229)    
OVER_INV    2.3335* 0.2800 -0.6270    2.4165** 0.2073 -0.5909 
    (1.192) (0.299) (0.545)    (1.149) (0.293) (0.542) 
TAX_SAVE    17.8661** 1.9370 -4.4769    16.8294* 1.7214 -1.7231 
    (8.191) (2.306) (12.410)    (9.588) (2.381) (11.280) 
TLCF -0.1810 1.3681 -0.5394    0.8270 1.5653 -0.3020    
 (4.333) (1.346) (2.631)    (5.048) (1.305) (2.595)    
IMR_OIL 0.2289 -1.1030* -1.8762 1.6797 0.2603 0.4796 -0.2946 -0.7839 -1.8701 0.3296 0.3457 0.2947 
 (1.817) (0.659) (1.238) (2.578) (0.772) (1.110) (1.939) (0.705) (1.208) (2.019) (0.730) (1.082) 
LAG 4.6163*** 3.6750*** 3.2885*** 4.1698*** 3.6499*** 3.3325*** 4.3804*** 3.6805*** 3.3783*** 3.6572*** 3.6687*** 3.3198*** 
 (0.932) (0.225) (0.449) (0.837) (0.232) (0.431) (0.940) (0.228) (0.441) (0.696) (0.226) (0.429) 
LAG_0 (X) (X) -0.1268 (X) (X) 1.6318 (X) (X) -0.0691 (X) (X) 0.2900 
   (1.513)   (1.380)   (1.372)   (1.632) 
uj -3.3900 -10.3039*** -8.4440** -22.7548 0.6415 3.2016 2.9837 -5.2764** -2.5449 1.0114 1.2818 2.2034 
 (8.459) (2.883) (4.183) (16.762) (4.123) (5.998) (9.226) (2.270) (3.115) (14.282) (3.290) (4.274) 
Sigma_uj 3.2093** 2.0000*** 2.3607*** 6.2914** 2.3399*** 2.9545*** 3.8441** 1.9688*** 2.1166*** 7.1710** 2.4725*** 3.0574*** 
 (1.634) (0.322) (0.559) (2.586) (0.381) (0.578) (1.933) (0.327) (0.487) (3.266) (0.393) (0.614) 
Rho_1_2 0.498 0.312 
0.786 
0.832 
0.237 
0.652 
0.891 
0.484 
0.855 
0.867 
Rho_1_3 0.862 
Rho_2_3 0.860 
 
Observations 1,632 
-619.8875 
-668.3723 
96.9697 
0.0000 
1,650 
-628.8506 
-705.3281 
152.9549 
0.0000 
1,605 
-615.5335 
-670.4718 
109.8766 
0.0000 
1,678 
-653.7601 
-740.2093 
172.8985 
0.0000 
Log Likelihood 
LL Constant-only 
Wald Stat 
Significance 
         (X) This variable was omitted by Stata software because of collinearity.
73 
Table XIII: Hedging instrument choice by gas hedgers 
This table reports the coefficient estimates of the Dynamic Generalized Random Effects Ordered Probit Model for the hedging instrument choice for the subsample of gas 
hedgers. The dependent variables are the hedging instruments classified in terms of the linearity of their final payoffs (1) Put options only, (2) Costless collars only, (3) Swap 
contracts only. LAG_LINEARTY is the lagged dependent variables, LINEARTY_0 is the initial condition. OIL_HEDG, IR_HEDG, FX_HEDG and BASIS_HEDG are dummy 
variables for oil, interest rate, foreign exchange and basis risk hedging. TLCF for tax loss carryforwards scaled by the book value of total assets, TAX_SAVE for the expected 
percentage of tax saving, LEV for the leverage ratio, DTD for distance to default, CONSTRAINT for financial constraints, INV_OPP for investment opportunities, CORR_1 for 
the correlation between free cash flows and investment opportunities, UND_GAS for undeveloped proved gas reserves, GAS_REV for revenues from gas production, 
HERF_GAS measures the geographical dispersion of gas production, UNCER_GAS measures gas production uncertainty, PQ_COR_GAS measures the gas quantity-price 
correlation, MV_CS_CEO for the market value of common shares held by the CEO, OPT_CEO for the number of stock options held by the CEO, %_CS_INST  for the 
percentage of common shares held by institutional investors, FUTURE_GAS, SPOT_GAS and VOL_GAS for gas future and spot prices and volatility, COST_CV for the 
coefficient of variation of the cash cost per barrel of oil equivalent,  OVER_INV measures overinvestment. IMR_GAS is the Inverse Mills Ratio from the first step Heckman 
regression (Appendix A).  Coefficients of the exogenous variables’ means are not reported for conciseness. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***Significant at the 1% level, 
** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level. EQ1 estimates Put options versus collars and swaps. EQ2 estimates swaps versus put options and collars.  
 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variable EQ1 EQ2 EQ1 EQ2 EQ1 EQ2 EQ1 EQ2 
         
CONSTANT -1.2893 -1.8507** 2.5375* -3.4419*** 1.7583* -1.3599** 4.6938*** -0.9407 
 (1.461) (0.796) (1.325) (0.852) (1.036) (0.676) (1.124) (0.834) 
LAG_LINEARTY 0.9050*** 0.5171*** 0.7999*** 0.5536*** 0.8237*** 0.5241*** 0.8176*** 0.5656*** 
 (0.098) (0.047) (0.095) (0.050) (0.096) (0.049) (0.092) (0.049) 
LINEARTY_0 0.4744*** 0.3447*** 0.2875*** 0.2460*** 0.2316 0.1781* 0.3004*** 0.2747*** 
 (0.132) (0.070) (0.104) (0.061) (0.168) (0.105) (0.105) (0.067) 
INV_OPP 0.1880 -1.7308*** -0.2869 -1.7637***     
 (0.642) (0.528) (0.708) (0.618)     
UND_GAS     0.1043 -0.1332 1.2887** -0.0904 
     (0.254) (0.115) (0.518) (0.111) 
CORR_1 0.8547** 0.3906* 0.4023 0.5527*** 0.9114*** 0.2810 0.4913* 0.3787* 
 (0.341) (0.203) (0.354) (0.205) (0.339) (0.214) (0.283) (0.194) 
VOL_GAS -0.4262*** -0.2158**   -0.3275** -0.2768***   
 (0.140) (0.098)   (0.128) (0.100)   
FUTURE_GAS   0.0257 -0.3946***   0.0513 -0.4428*** 
   (0.085) (0.062)   (0.081) (0.062) 
SPOT_GAS   0.0003 0.1799***   -0.0116 0.1992*** 
   (0.065) (0.052)   (0.064) (0.051) 
HERF_GAS -1.5110* -1.2259   -1.1656 -1.5755   
 (0.845) (1.209)   (0.880) (1.473)   
GAS_REV   -0.9040 -1.9288***   0.2793 -2.1248*** 
   (0.759) (0.573)   (0.717) (0.567) 
COST_CV   1.5396* 1.1404** 1.3530* 1.3005*** 1.4621* 1.0445** 
   (0.786) (0.462) (0.766) (0.488) (0.760) (0.478) 
UNCER_GAS -2.8398*** -0.9969**   -3.2470*** -1.7510***   
 (0.807) (0.419)   (0.848) (0.519)   
OIL_HEDG 0.8111*** 0.0291       
 (0.208) (0.139)       
IR_HEDG   -0.8117*** -0.0132     
   (0.252) (0.167)     
FX_HEDG     -0.5379 0.2274   
     (0.792) (0.565)   
BASIS_HEDG       -0.1312 0.2792 
       (0.454) (0.255) 
PQ_COR_GAS   0.4927* 0.1033   0.3515 0.2871 
   (0.298) (0.213)   (0.284) (0.211) 
OPT_CEO -0.0019 -0.0070*** -0.0078** -0.0056*** -0.0046 -0.0053*** -0.0070** -0.0051*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
MV_CS_CEO 7.6396* 0.0335 14.2617** 0.7586 15.7783** 0.2278 13.4854** 1.3690 
 (4.556) (0.816) (7.154) (0.907) (7.945) (0.890) (6.313) (0.958) 
%_CS_INST 2.4206*** -0.2793   2.5528*** -0.1002   
 (0.578) (0.336)   (0.629) (0.360)   
LEV   0.6896 0.0879   1.5010 -0.1194 
   (0.974) (0.488)   (0.969) (0.487) 
CONSTRAINT   -0.2590 -0.1184   -0.3311* -0.0560 
   (0.207) (0.132)   (0.190) (0.125) 
DTD -0.1458 -0.1894***   -0.1075 -0.1983***   
 (0.104) (0.059)   (0.105) (0.062)   
OVER_INV 0.3928* 0.1315   0.1286 0.1932   
 (0.238) (0.148)   (0.228) (0.147)   
TAX_SAVE   2.7050 -3.9638**   4.4549 -3.9816*** 
   (4.009) (2.002)   (3.688) (1.480) 
TLCF -0.3503 -1.2245**   -0.0821 -1.1772**   
 (0.408) (0.542)   (0.375) (0.541)   
IMR_GAS -0.3785 0.7645*** -0.2795 0.1406 -0.3495 0.7458** 0.0165 0.1285 
 (0.450) (0.276) (0.411) (0.271) (0.410) (0.296) (0.384) (0.203) 
Rho 0.7364*** 
(0.028) 
0.8564*** 
(0.017) 
0.7452*** 
(0.027) 
0.8092*** 
(0.019)  
Observations 1,630 
-691.9547 
-938.0734 
492.2374 
0.0000 
1,601 
-642.5038 
-948.0657 
611.1238 
0.0000 
1,597 
-673.5852 
-897.5861 
448.0017 
0.0000 
1,615 
-663.3446 
-963.1919 
599.6946 
0.0000 
Log Likelihood 
LL constant-only 
Wald Stat 
Significance 
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Table XIV: Hedging instrument choice by oil hedgers 
This table reports the coefficient estimates of the Dynamic Generalized Random Effects Ordered Probit Model for the hedging instrument choice for the subsample of oil 
hedgers. The dependent variables are the hedging instruments classified in terms of the linearity of their final payoffs (1) Put options only, (2) Costless collars only, (3) Swap 
contracts only. LAG_LINEARTY is the lagged dependent variables, LINEARTY_0 is the initial condition. GAS_HEDG, IR_HEDG, FX_HEDG and BASIS_HEDG dummy 
variable for gas, oil, interest rate, foreign exchange and basis risk hedging. TLCF for tax loss carryforwards scaled by the book value of total assets, TAX_SAVE for the 
expected percentage of tax saving, LEV for the leverage ratio, DTD for distance to default, CONSTRAINT for financial constraints, INV_OPP for investment opportunities, 
CORR_1 for the correlation between free cash flows and investment opportunities, UND_OIL for undeveloped proved oil reserves, OIL_REV for revenues from oil production, 
HERF_OIL measures the geographical dispersion of oil production, UNCER_OIL measures oil production uncertainty, PQ_COR_OIL measures the oil quantity-price 
correlation, MV_CS_CEO for the market value of common shares held by the CEO, OPT_CEO for the number of stock options held by the CEO, %_CS_INST  for the 
percentage of common shares held by institutional investors, FUTURE_OIL, SPOT_OIL and VOL_OIL for oil future and spot prices and volatility. COST_CV for the coefficient 
of variation of the cash cost per barrel of oil equivalent, OVER_INV measures the overinvestment problem. IMR_OIL is the Inverse Mills Ratio from the first step Heckman 
regression (Appendix A). Coefficients of the exogenous variables’ means are not reported for conciseness. Standard errors are in parentheses.  ***Significant at the 1% level, 
** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level. EQ1 estimates put options versus collars and swaps. EQ2 estimates swaps versus put options and collars.  
 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variable EQ1 EQ2 EQ1 EQ2 EQ1 EQ2 EQ1 EQ2 
         
CONSTANT 1.5749 1.6030* -1.8533 -0.3196 0.2078 0.8690 -2.2690* -0.7764 
 (1.120) (0.958) (1.193) (0.896) (0.813) (0.630) (1.255) (0.863) 
LAG_LINEARTY 0.8105*** 0.4950*** 0.7590*** 0.5549*** 0.7930*** 0.5448*** 0.8104*** 0.5218*** 
 (0.084) (0.049) (0.084) (0.049) (0.084) (0.049) (0.083) (0.049) 
LINEARTY_0 -0.0451 0.1490** -0.0091 0.2210*** 0.3347*** 0.6320*** 0.0037 0.1660** 
 (0.087) (0.067) (0.100) (0.077) (0.090) (0.080) (0.097) (0.070) 
INV_OPP 0.1216 -1.2814*** 0.1710 -1.3633***     
 (0.579) (0.451) (0.536) (0.442)     
UND_OIL     1.0730 3.3914* 4.8559** 1.3811 
     (2.690) (1.925) (2.373) (1.858) 
CORR_1 -0.4057 0.5639** -0.3155 0.9665*** -0.2421 0.5257** -0.3260 0.6227*** 
 (0.284) (0.249) (0.291) (0.240) (0.286) (0.248) (0.271) (0.226) 
VOL_OIL -0.0250 -0.0522**   -0.0303 -0.0237   
 (0.031) (0.022)   (0.032) (0.024)   
FUTURE_OIL   -0.1159*** -0.0149   -0.1175*** -0.0571** 
   (0.033) (0.023)   (0.032) (0.023) 
SPOT_OIL   0.1097*** 0.0148   0.1094*** 0.0504** 
   (0.033) (0.022)   (0.031) (0.022) 
HERF_OIL -1.9644** -1.8431***   -1.5977 -2.0155***   
 (0.844) (0.546)   (1.041) (0.606)   
OIL_REV   -1.7321** 1.3136**   -2.0957** 0.6999 
   (0.784) (0.586)   (0.819) (0.580) 
COST_CV   3.1899*** -1.1992* 1.0124 -1.5153*** 3.1940*** -0.2282 
   (0.936) (0.646) (0.848) (0.523) (0.876) (0.637) 
UNCER_OIL -1.5136** 0.6957*   -2.3282*** 0.5672   
 (0.637) (0.380)   (0.663) (0.408)   
GAS_HEDG 0.8166*** 0.1904       
 (0.252) (0.190)       
IR_HEDG   0.8970*** 0.3789**     
   (0.270) (0.162)     
FX_HEDG     -1.1081*** 0.5099   
     (0.413) (0.371)   
BASIS_HEDG       0.0767 1.0981*** 
       (0.333) (0.195) 
PQ_COR_OIL   -0.2065 0.1530   -0.4315 0.0947 
   (0.289) (0.182)   (0.274) (0.181) 
OPT_CEO 0.0066 0.0027 0.0061 -0.0004 0.0099** 0.0006 0.0068 -0.0012 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
MV_CS_CEO -0.0796 -0.5522 4.0040* 0.0796 -0.2164 -0.6244 2.3725 -0.0503 
 (1.784) (0.802) (2.312) (0.846) (2.010) (0.853) (1.960) (0.832) 
%_CS_INST 0.1454 -0.1763   0.2683 -0.1662   
 (0.522) (0.366)   (0.541) (0.396)   
LEV   0.3348 2.0412**   -0.4624 2.5572*** 
   (1.211) (0.808)   (1.171) (0.784) 
CONSTRAINT   -0.2526 0.1381   -0.2456 0.0197 
   (0.214) (0.135)   (0.203) (0.134) 
DTD 0.2232** -0.2352***   0.2040** -0.2818***   
 (0.096) (0.066)   (0.098) (0.071)   
OVER_INV 0.4060** 0.0342   0.5614*** 0.1129   
 (0.202) (0.151)   (0.207) (0.153)   
TAX_SAVE   16.3462*** -2.4470   14.6409*** -2.1517 
   (4.821) (1.505)   (4.681) (1.618) 
TLCF -0.6855 -2.8766***   -0.8622 -2.2270***   
 (0.490) (0.683)   (0.547) (0.711)   
IMR_OIL -1.1546** 0.2843 -0.5734 1.1021*** -0.8629 0.3470 -1.0220** 0.8544*** 
 (0.512) (0.307) (0.576) (0.367) (0.541) (0.342) (0.404) (0.293) 
Rho 0.7852*** 
(0.021) 
0.7754*** 
(0.027) 
0.7775*** 
(0.024) 
0.7747*** 
(0.024)  
Observations 1,572 
-685.9948 
-945.5503 
519.1109 
0.0000 
1,547 
-659.9249 
-878.7359 
437.6220 
0.0000 
1,550 
-654.5332 
-884.8251 
460.5838 
0.0000 
1,564 
-660.7962 
-894.4599 
467.3274 
0.0000 
Log Likelihood 
LL constant-only 
Wald Stat 
Significance 
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Table XV: Summary of our predictions and findings 
This table presents a summary of our predictions and findings pertaining to the hypotheses tested in our models. (***), (**) and (*) mean that the sign is significant at the 1% level, 5% level and 
10% level respectively. (?) means that we are unable to make a prediction about the sign associated with the hedging strategy (in particular for costless collars only). (-/+) means that the given 
variable takes the sign (-) in some specifications and (+) in others but with no significant effects. 
 
 
 Hedging strategies based on one instrument only Hedging portfolios 
Dynamic Discrete Choice Models Dynamic RE Probit Dynamic RE Generalized Ordered Probit Dynamic RE Mixed Multinomial Logit 
 
Hedging strategies 
Swap 
contracts 
only 
Put 
options  
only 
Costless 
Collars 
only 
Swap 
contracts 
only 
Put options  
only 
Costless 
Collars only 
Swaps 
and put 
options 
Swaps 
and 
collars 
Swaps, put 
options and 
collars 
Investment programs and real options 
Investment 
opportunities 
 
Predicted - + ? - + ? + + + 
Gas Hedgers -*** +** -/+ -*** -/+ +*** +** +** +* 
Oil Hedgers - + -/+ -*** - +*** + +* +* 
Undeveloped 
reserves 
  
Predicted - + ? - + ? + -/+ + 
Gas Hedgers - -/+ + - -** +** - + -/+ 
Oil Hedgers - -* -* +* -** +** + + + 
Correlation between 
internal funds and 
Investment programs 
Predicted + - ? + - ? - - - 
Gas Hedgers +*** -*** - +*** -*** +*** + - +** 
Oil Hedgers +* +** -* +*** + -*** -** -/+ -/+ 
Oil and Gas market conditions 
Spot price Predicted + - - + - - - - - 
Gas Hedgers +*** +** -* +*** -/+ -*** -/+ - - 
Oil Hedgers +*** -** -*** +*** -*** +*** -* + - 
Future price Predicted - + + - + + + + + 
Gas Hedgers -*** - +** -*** - +*** -/+ +** + 
Oil Hedgers -*** +** +*** -** +*** +** +* - + 
Price Volatility Predicted - + + - + + + + + 
Gas Hedgers -*** +*** +* -*** +*** +*** + +** + 
Oil Hedgers -*** - +* -** + +** + - -/+ 
Oil and Gas Production function characteristics 
Geographic 
diversification 
Predicted - + ? - + ? + + + 
Gas Hedgers -/+ - - -* +* - + + + 
Oil Hedgers -*** -* +* -*** +** +*** - +*** + 
Industrial diversification Predicted - + ? - + ? + + + 
Gas Hedgers -*** +** +*** -*** -/+ +*** +*** +* + 
Oil Hedgers -/+ +** - +** +** -** + + + 
Production uncertainty Predicted - + ? - + ? + + + 
Gas Hedgers -*** + -*** -*** +*** +*** + +*** +*** 
Oil Hedgers +* + -*** +* +*** -*** -/+ -** - 
Production cost 
variability 
Predicted - + ? - + ? + + + 
Gas Hedgers -/+ - - +*** -* -*** -* - + 
Oil Hedgers -*** -** +** -*** -*** +*** - + -/+ 
           
Continued 
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Table XV-Continued 
   
   
 Hedging strategies based on one instrument only Hedging portfolios 
Dynamic Discrete Choice Models Dynamic RE Probit Dynamic RE Generalized Ordered Probit Dynamic RE Mixed Multinomial Logit 
 
Hedging strategies 
Swap 
contracts 
only 
Put 
options  
only 
Costless 
Collars 
only 
Swap 
contracts 
only 
Put options  
only 
Costless 
Collars only 
Swaps 
and put 
options 
Swaps 
and 
collars 
Swaps, put 
options and 
collars 
Price-Quantity 
correlation 
Predicted + - ? + - ? - - - 
Gas Hedgers +* - +*** +* - +* - -** -** 
Oil Hedgers - + -*** + + - - + -/+ 
Financial distress 
Leverage Predicted + - ? + - ? - - - 
Gas Hedgers +** - +* -/+ - + - -** - 
Oil Hedgers +*** - -* +*** -/+ -*** - -/+ + 
Distance to default Predicted - + ? - + ? + + + 
Gas Hedgers -*** - + -*** + +*** - + - 
Oil Hedgers -** -** +*** -*** -** +*** - - + 
Financial constraint Predicted - + ? - + ? + + + 
Gas Hedgers -** - -/+ - +* -* + +*** - 
Oil Hedgers - + -*** + + - + - +** 
Overinvestment problem 
Overinvestment Predicted +  - ? +  - ? - - - 
Gas Hedgers +* -** -* +* -* +* -** -/+ + 
Oil Hedgers - -*** + +*** -*** +*** +** + - 
Tax incentives 
Tax loss carryforward Predicted + - ? + - ? - - - 
Gas Hedgers -*** + + -** + +** + + + 
Oil Hedgers -*** - +*** -*** + +*** -/+ + - 
Tax save Predicted + - ? + - ? - - - 
Gas Hedgers - + + -*** - +*** - + - 
Oil Hedgers - -** + - -*** +*** +** + - 
Compensation policy 
Managerial 
shareholding  
Predicted + - ? + - ? - - - 
Gas Hedgers -/+ -** +*** + -** +** - + -/+ 
Oil Hedgers -/+ -* -/+ -/+ -* +* - +** + 
Managerial option 
holding 
Predicted - + ? - + ? + + + 
Gas Hedgers -*** + +*** -*** +** +*** - + +* 
Oil Hedgers -/+ -/+ - -/+ -** +** +*** -/+ + 
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Table XVI: Effect of hedging strategy choice on stock return and volatility sensitivity 
This table reports the coefficient estimates of the fixed effects regressions of the effect of hedging strategy choice on oil and gas Betas. The dependent 
variables are (i) the total stock rate of return for firm i in quarter t (Panel A), and (ii) the total stock risk measured by the annualized standard deviation of 
stock daily returns for firm i during quarter t (Panel B). R_MKT is the quarterly rate of change in the stock market index, taken here to be the S&P 500 
index. R_OIL is the quarterly rate of change of the NYMEX three-month futures contract for oil. R_GAS is the quarterly rate of change of the NYMEX 
three-month futures contract for natural gas. SIG_MKT is the annualized standard deviation of the market index daily returns during the current quarter. 
SIG_OIL and SIG_GAS are the annualized standard deviations of the oil (gas) daily returns during the current quarter (these daily returns are calculated 
from the oil (gas) spot prices). SWAP, PUT, COLLAR, COLLAR_PUT, SWAP_PUT, SWAP_COLLAR and SWAP_COLLAR_PUT are the predicted 
values, coming from the dynamic random effects probit model, of the seven hedging strategies used by oil and gas producers. MKT_VALUE measured 
by the logarithm of the market value of common shares outstanding (i.e., closing price at the end of the quarter multiplied by the number of common 
shares outstanding). LEV for the leverage ratio measured by the book value of long-term debt in current liabilities plus one-half long-term debt scaled by 
the book value of total assets; Q_RATIO for the quick ratio measured by the book value of cash and equivalent of cash scaled by the book value of 
current liabilities; DTD for distance to default; DVD_YIELD for the dividend yield measured by the declared dividend (per share) scaled by the close price 
at the end of each quarter. Standard errors are in parentheses.  ***Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level.  
 
 Panel A 
Return sensitivity 
Panel B 
Volatility sensitivity 
 Model without interactions Model with interactions Model without interactions Model with interactions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Variable 
All  
sample 
Gas  
hedgers 
Oil 
hedgers  
Gas 
hedgers 
Oil 
hedgers 
All 
sample 
Gas 
hedgers 
Oil 
hedgers 
Gas 
hedgers 
Oil 
hedgers 
           
R_MKT 0.8228*** 1.1082*** 1.1359*** 1.1090*** 1.0739***      
 (0.222) (0.175) (0.210) (0.175) (0.217)      
R_OIL 0.7044*** 0.4251*** 0.5004*** 0.4647***       
 (0.133) (0.103) (0.121) (0.103)       
R_GAS 0.2750*** 0.3450*** 0.3291***  0.3376***      
 (0.083) (0.065) (0.075)  (0.077)      
SIG_MKT      0.4746*** 0.6280*** 0.6191*** 0.6412*** 0.6410*** 
      (0.043) (0.053) (0.056) (0.053) (0.053) 
SIG_OIL      0.2756*** 0.3342*** 0.4196*** 0.3169***  
      (0.030) (0.037) (0.040) (0.037)  
SIG_GAS      -0.0047 -0.0046 -0.0104  -0.0063 
      (0.006) (0.008) (0.008)  (0.008) 
SWAP  x     0.1536** -0.0769    0.0088* -0.0065 
(R/SIG)_(OIL/GAS)    (0.060) (0.061)    (0.005) (0.009) 
PUT  x     -0.0273 -0.0986**    -0.0121*** -0.0690*** 
(R/SIG)_(OIL/GAS)    (0.048) (0.050)    (0.004) (0.007) 
COLLAR  x     0.1199* -0.0363    0.0115** 0.0308*** 
(R/SIG)_(OIL/GAS)    (0.064) (0.075)    (0.005) (0.011) 
COLLAR_PUT  x      -0.0685 0.0152    0.0181*** -0.0275** 
(R/SIG)_(OIL/GAS)    (0.073) (0.099)    (0.005) (0.013) 
SWAP_PUT  x      -0.0610* 0.0234    -0.0103*** 0.0373*** 
(R/SIG)_(OIL/GAS)    (0.035) (0.057)    (0.003) (0.009) 
SWAP_COLLAR_PUT  x    -0.0293 -0.0054    0.0004 -0.0463*** 
(R/SIG)_(OIL/GAS)    (0.067) (0.115)    (0.005) (0.015) 
SWAP_COLLAR  x      -0.0841* -0.0401    0.0022 -0.0322*** 
(R/SIG)_(OIL/GAS)    (0.051) (0.093)    (0.004) (0.010) 
           
MKT_VALUE      -0.1017*** -0.0422*** -0.0555*** -0.0536*** -0.0742*** 
      (0.007) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) 
LEV      0.2086*** 0.4849*** 0.3557*** 0.4633*** 0.3641*** 
      (0.031) (0.041) (0.050) (0.041) (0.055) 
DTD      -0.1621*** -0.1472*** -0.1406*** -0.1486*** -0.1459*** 
      (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Q_RATIO      -0.0012* 0.0073 0.0019 0.0024 -0.0130** 
      (0.001) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) 
DVD_YIELD      0.1442 0.2983 0.0701 0.3268 -0.0152 
      (0.242) (0.246) (0.244) (0.245) (0.261) 
CONSTANT 0.0730*** 0.0452*** 0.0543*** 0.0377** 0.0552*** 1.0024*** 0.6717*** 0.7016*** 0.7082*** 0.8103*** 
 (0.021) (0.016) (0.019) (0.016) (0.020) (0.025) (0.037) (0.042) (0.041) (0.050) 
Observations 5,777 3,023 2,525 2,962 2,413 5,595 2,999 2,506 2,946 2,399 
R-squared 0.0148 0.0442 0.0440 0.0480 0.0464 0.5084 0.6102 0.6464 0.6192 0.6610 
Number of firms 150 108 102 108 99 149 108 102 108 99 
F statistic 28.2195 44.8641 37.1270 15.9365 12.4612 702.8765 564.2264 547.5260 328.0454 318.4403 
Rho 0.0585 0.2883 0.2282 0.2901 0.2360 0.3591 0.3736 0.6249 0.3982 0.6383 
Sigma_U 0.3840 0.5510 0.5006 0.5467 0.5121 0.1650 0.1464 0.2275 0.1531 0.2303 
Sigma_E 1.5410 0.8657 0.9207 0.8552 0.9215 0.2204 0.1895 0.1763 0.1883 0.1734 
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Table XVII: Economic implications of the hedging strategy choice 
This table reports the coefficient estimates of the fixed effects regressions of the impact of hedging strategy choice on financial and 
operational performances of oil and gas producers. The dependent variables are: (1) oil and gas realized prices including the monetary 
effects of the hedging positions. Those realized prices are reported by oil and gas producers on an annual basis; (2) ROA is the Return 
On Assets; (3) ROE is the Return On Equity; (4) EPS_OP is the earnings per share from operations; (5) TOBIN Q is measured as the 
sum of market value of common shares plus book value of total liabilities plus book value of preferred shares scaled by book value of 
total assets. The independent variables SWAP, PUT, COLLAR, COLLAR_PUT, SWAP_PUT, SWAP_COLLAR and 
SWAP_COLLAR_PUT are the predicted values, coming from the dynamic random effects probit model, of the seven hedging strategies 
used by oil and gas producers; LEVERAGE is the leverage ratio measured by the book value of long-term debt scaled by the book 
value of total assets; CASH_COST is the production cost per Barrel of Oil Equivalent (BOE); Q_RATIO is the quick ratio measured by 
the book value of cash and equivalent of cash scaled by the book value of current liabilities; MKT_VALUE measured by the logarithm of 
the market value of common shares outstanding (i.e., closing price at the end of the quarter multiplied by the number of common shares 
outstanding); SALES measured by the logarithm of sales at the end of the quarter; SPOT (OIL/GAS) are oil (gas) spot prices at the end 
of each quarter; VOL (OIL/GAS) are oil (gas) prices volatilities measured as the standard deviations over the last 60 days; INV_OPP 
are investment opportunities; DAILY_PROD (OIL/GAS) are the daily oil (gas) production. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
***Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level.  
 
 Panel A 
Gas hedgers  
Panel B 
Oil hedgers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variable 
Realized 
prices ROA ROE EPS_OP TOBIN Q 
Realized 
prices ROA ROE EPS_OP TOBIN Q 
           
SWAP -0.5573*** -0.0138*** 0.0291 -0.2060** 0.0157 -1.7950*** -0.0158*** 0.0513 -0.1723*** -0.0765*** 
 (0.037) (0.003) (0.062) (0.090) (0.018) (0.269) (0.002) (0.038) (0.050) (0.013) 
PUT -0.0921*** 0.0067*** -0.0125 0.0625 -0.0530*** -1.1229*** 0.0098*** -0.0488* 0.1728*** 0.0409*** 
 (0.031) (0.002) (0.040) (0.062) (0.014) (0.233) (0.002) (0.030) (0.040) (0.011) 
COLLAR 0.1790*** -0.0048 -0.0625 -0.1633* 0.0337* -0.1553 -0.0156*** -0.0131 -0.1392** 0.0024 
 (0.040) (0.003) (0.057) (0.087) (0.018) (0.328) (0.003) (0.044) (0.057) (0.015) 
COLLAR_PUT 0.0415 0.0084** 0.0503 0.2328** 0.0620*** 0.2024 -0.0132*** 0.0269 -0.1981*** 0.0110 
 (0.047) (0.004) (0.079) (0.111) (0.022) (0.353) (0.003) (0.058) (0.061) (0.016) 
SWAP_PUT -0.4764*** 0.0051 -0.0079 0.2104*** 0.0320* 1.0189*** -0.0079*** -0.0259 -0.2477*** -0.0130 
 (0.044) (0.003) (0.038) (0.073) (0.019) (0.353) (0.003) (0.032) (0.058) (0.015) 
SWAP_COLLAR_PUT 0.2994*** -0.0030 0.0259 -0.0568 -0.0279 1.1177*** 0.0025 -0.0039 -0.0629 -0.0667*** 
 (0.039) (0.003) (0.064) (0.087) (0.018) (0.416) (0.003) (0.067) (0.072) (0.019) 
SWAP_COLLAR 0.1130*** 0.0035* -0.0560 0.0926 -0.0550*** -0.0194 0.0112*** -0.0332 0.1098** 0.0108 
 (0.026) (0.002) (0.047) (0.062) (0.012) (0.251) (0.002) (0.044) (0.043) (0.011) 
SALES  -0.0007 0.1120* 0.0624 -0.2916***  0.0074** 0.0462 0.3857*** -0.2577*** 
  (0.003) (0.063) (0.090) (0.019)  (0.003) (0.063) (0.066) (0.017) 
INV_OPP  0.0019 0.4813 0.0115 0.6050***  -0.0109 0.0823 0.0137 0.5035*** 
  (0.013) (0.339) (0.392) (0.072)  (0.009) (0.240) (0.188) (0.050) 
MKT_VALUE  0.0119* -0.2463* 0.0751 0.8493***  0.0021 -0.2129 -0.2401* 0.8697*** 
  (0.006) (0.144) (0.185) (0.036)  (0.006) (0.148) (0.138) (0.036) 
SPOT  (OIL/GAS) 0.2191*** 0.0000 0.0463** 0.0139 0.0581*** 0.3915*** 0.0004*** 0.0019 0.0082*** 0.0011* 
 (0.011) (0.001) (0.022) (0.026) (0.005) (0.011) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
VOL  (OIL/GAS) 0.2381*** 0.0051 -0.2396** 0.1708 -0.0032 1.7371*** -0.0062*** 0.0087 -0.0622*** -0.0161*** 
 (0.045) (0.003) (0.094) (0.107) (0.020) (0.078) (0.001) (0.017) (0.013) (0.004) 
LEV  -0.1023*** -0.5794** -3.6781*** 0.0380  -0.0637*** -0.3214 -1.2047*** 0.1466** 
  (0.011) (0.256) (0.334) (0.064)  (0.012) (0.305) (0.271) (0.071) 
CASH_COST 0.0986*** -0.0016*** 0.0118 -0.0152 -0.0186*** 0.9264*** -0.0013*** 0.0062 -0.0193** -0.0145*** 
 (0.006) (0.000) (0.009) (0.014) (0.003) (0.057) (0.000) (0.010) (0.009) (0.002) 
Q_RATIO  0.0033 -0.0598 -0.0189 0.0036  0.0008 -0.0336 0.0263 -0.0250* 
  (0.003) (0.063) (0.081) (0.015)  (0.002) (0.062) (0.052) (0.014) 
DAILY_PROD  (OIL/GAS) 0.0005***     0.0844***     
 (0.000)     (0.012)     
CONSTANT 1.3237*** 0.0573** 0.2295 1.9697*** 0.2488* 8.9921*** -0.0576** 0.1168 -1.8917*** 0.1262 
 (0.240) (0.025) (0.474) (0.693) (0.142) (2.717) (0.029) (0.465) (0.623) (0.164) 
Observations 2,880 2,918 2,912 2,917 2,918 2,356 2,382 2,375 2,381 2,382 
R-squared 0.6307 0.0748 0.0132 0.1821 0.3357 0.7881 0.1523 0.0515 0.0919 0.3852 
Number of firms 108 108 108 108 108 99 99 99 99 99 
Rho 0.6348 0.1482 0.0356 0.3177 0.5640 0.5567 0.3034 0.0236 0.2375 0.5829 
Sigma_U 1.3472 0.0327 0.4301 1.6904 0.5141 9.9061 0.0447 0.3251 0.8239 0.4605 
Sigma_E 1.0219 0.0785 2.2383 2.4772 0.4520 8.8393 0.0677 2.0929 1.4762 0.3895 
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APPENDIX A: First Step of the Two-Step Heckman regressions with sample selection: 
Determinants of the oil or gas hedging decision 
This table reports the coefficients estimates of the Probit model. The dependent variable is the hedging 
decision dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the oil and gas producer have any oil and gas hedging 
position for the quarter and 0 otherwise. The independent variables are: TAX_SAVE for the expected 
percentage of tax saving; LEVERAGE for the leverage ratio measured by the book value of long-term debt 
scaled by the book value of total assets; CASH_COST is the production cost per Barrel of Oil Equivalent 
(BOE); BVCD for the book value of convertible debts scaled by the book value of total assets. Q_RATIO for 
the quick ratio measured by the book value of cash and equivalent of cash scaled by the book value of 
current liabilities; RESERVE are the quantities of proved reserves for oil (for oil hedgers) and gas (for gas 
hedgers); MKT_VALUE measured by the logarithm of the market value of common shares outstanding (i.e., 
closing price at the end of the quarter multiplied by the number of common shares outstanding); SALES 
measured by the logarithm of sales at the end of the quarter. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
***Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level.  
 
 (1) (2) 
Variable Oil hedge  Gas hedge  
   
TAX_SAVE 0.9005** 0.1232 
 (0.366) (0.428) 
LEVERAGE 1.5843*** 1.9170*** 
 (0.091) (0.096) 
CASH_COST 0.0398*** 0.0605*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) 
BVCD -1.2947*** -1.2417*** 
 (0.246) (0.214) 
Q_RATIO -0.1056*** -0.1288*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) 
RESERVE -0.0009*** -0.0001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
MKT_VALUE 0.3924*** 0.5700*** 
 (0.043) (0.043) 
SALES 0.1994*** 0.0894*** 
 (0.019) (0.017) 
CONSTANT -2.2678*** -2.1663*** 
 (0.088) (0.089) 
Observations 5,798 5,798 
Pseudo-R squared 0.3025 0.3129 
Chi-squared 2399.4838 2512.4946 
Significance 0.0000 0.0000 
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APPENDIX B: Univariate analysis 
Appendix C and D report descriptive statistics of the independent variables and tests of differences between 
means and medians of relevant variables by derivative instrument for gas and oil hedgers separately. 
Comparison of means is constructed using a t-test assuming unequal variances; comparison of medians is 
constructed using a non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum Z-test and two-sided p-values are used. As 
suggested above, we retain only the major three derivative instruments used: Put options, costless collars 
and swap contracts (the three instruments used more than 93% of the time for oil and gas hedging). These 
major instruments could be classified according to their payoffs’ linearity. Put options are the most non-linear 
instruments, swap contracts are the most linear and costless collars fall in between. Overall, the univariate 
results support the premise that firms with greater investment opportunities tend to use more non-linear 
instruments (i.e., put options and costless collars) than linear instruments (i.e. swap contracts). Unexpectedly, 
higher undeveloped proved oil and gas reserves appear to be associated more with the use of swap 
contracts. On average, firms using more swap contracts and costless collars seem to have a higher 
correlation between internal cash flows and investment opportunities than those using put options as 
predicted. Interestingly, the univariate results support the prediction that large profitable oil and gas producers 
with fewer growth options tend to use more linear instruments to avoid the overinvestment problem, as 
suggested by Morellec and Smith (2007) and Bartram et al (2009). The results related to tax incentives are 
mixed. Although tax function convexity and tax preference items (i.e., tax loss carryforwards) tend to be more 
related to the use of swaps for the subsample of oil hedgers as predicted, they are unpredictably more 
associated with put options and costless collars for the subsample of gas hedgers. On average, users of put 
options have relatively lower Distance-to-Default and lower leverage ratios. Interestingly, these findings 
suggest that there is a non-monotonic relationship between the use of put options and firms’ financial health. 
Hence, firms either close to or far from financial distress tend to use more non-linear hedging strategies. In 
contrast, swap contracts are associated more with relatively higher Distance-to-Default, and higher leverage 
ratios.  
On average, swap contracts are associated with higher CEO’s equity stake value in the firm, as predicted. 
Unexpectedly, put options are associated with less CEO’s option holding, in particular for the subsample of oil 
hedgers. Results also show that a higher percentage of institutional shareholding is more related to the use of 
put options and costless collars. Results of the comparison of means concerning the impact of additional non-
hedgeable risks (i.e., production uncertainty, cash cost risk) are mixed. Although higher cash cost risk is more 
related to the use of costless collars and put options as predicted, oil and gas production uncertainties seem 
to be more associated with the use of swaps.  Results for the price-quantity correlation and the geographical 
and industrial diversification are mixed. However, the use of put options is more closely related to lower price-
quantity correlation and higher geographical for the subsample of gas hedgers as predicted. The use of put 
options by oil hedgers is more strongly associated with a higher price-quantity correlation and lower 
geographical. Tests further show that firms operating primarily in gas production use more collars and those 
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operating primarily in oil production use more put options. Surprisingly, results show no significant differences 
in the economic conditions of the oil and gas markets between swap contracts and put options. In fact, higher 
volatility, higher spot prices and higher future prices are largely associated with the use of costless collars. 
We now analyze financial and operational characteristics by hedging portfolios when oil and gas hedgers use 
more than one instrument simultaneously. Appendix E and F report univariate results related to those 
portfolios. We retain comparisons involving the next two hedging portfolios: Swaps combined with put options 
versus swaps combined with costless collars. The first portfolio is supposed to have a more non-linear payoff. 
As predicted, results show that users of swap and collar portfolios have lower investment opportunities and 
larger undeveloped proved oil and gas reserves. Unexpectedly, swap and collar portfolios are associated with 
a lower correlation between internal cash flows and investment opportunities, lower expected tax saving and 
lower tax preference items (tax loss carryforwards). In addition, users of swap and collar portfolios have fewer 
financial constraints coupled with higher Distance-to-Default and lower leverage ratios. Consistent with the 
predictions, swap and collar portfolios are associated with higher CEO equity stake value in the firm. Counter 
to predictions, these portfolios seem to be associated with higher stock optionholding. As predicted, results 
indicate that swap and collar portfolios are related to lower production uncertainty and higher price-quantity 
correlation. Nonetheless, swaps and collars portfolios’ users have higher cash cost variability and higher 
geographical diversification contradicting the conjecture. For the subsample of gas hedgers, the univariate 
results show, unexpectedly, that swaps and collars portfolios are associated with higher gas price volatility 
and with higher gas future prices. As predicted, they are related to higher gas spot prices. 
 
APPENDIX C: Financial and operational characteristics of gas hedgers by hedging instrument 
This table reports univariate analysis for the independent variables proposed to explain the use of the hedging instrument by gas hedgers. OIL_HEDG, IR_HEDG, FX_HEDG 
and BASIS_HEDG are dummy variable for gas, oil, interest rate, foreign exchange and basis risk hedging. TLCF for tax loss carryforwards scaled by the book value of total 
assets, TAX_SAVE for the expected percentage of tax saving, LEV for the leverage ratio, DTD for distance to default, CONSTRAINT for financial constraints, INV_OPP for 
investment opportunities, CORR_1 for the correlation between free cash flows and investment opportunities, UND_OIL and UND_GAS for the undeveloped proved reserves of 
oil and gas respectively, OVER_INV for overinvestment, OIL_REV and GAS_REV measure the fraction of revenues from oil (gas) production, HERF_OIL and HERF_GAS 
indices that measure the geographical dispersion of oil and gas production, UNCER_OIL and UNCER_GAS measure the production uncertainty for oil and gas respectively, 
COST_CV is the coefficient of variation of the cash cost per barrel of oil equivalent, PQ_COR_OIL and PQ_COR_GAS measure the quantity-price correlation for oil and gas 
respectively, MV_CS_CEO for the market value of common shares held by CEO, OPT_CEO for the number of stock options held by CEO, %_CS_INST  for the percentage of 
common shares held by institutional investors, FUTURE_OIL, SPOT_OIL and VOL_OIL for  oil future and spot prices and volatility, FUTURE_GAS, SPOT_GAS and VOL_GAS 
for gas future and spot prices and volatility. Comparison of means is constructed using a t-test assuming unequal variances; comparison of medians is constructed by using the 
non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sum Z-score. Two sided p-values are reported. 
Gas hedging instruments firm-quarter 
 
Swap Put Collar Swap vs put  Swap vs collar Collar vs put 
Variable Obs Mean Median Obs Mean Median Obs Mean Median t-Stat p-Value Z-Score p-Value t-Stat p-Value Z-Score p-Value t-Stat p-Value Z-Score p-Value 
Variables that proxy for hedging activity 
OIL_HEDG 932 0.630 1.000 126 0.540 1.000 582 0.741 1.000 1.906 0.059 -1.955 0.051 -4.593 0.000 4.464 0.000 -4.172 0.000 -4.479 0.000 
BASIS_HEDG 932 0.152 0.000 126 0.063 0.000 582 0.060 0.000 3.585 0.000 -2.683 0.007 6.003 0.000 -5.431 0.000 0.140 0.889 0.143 0.886 
IR_HEDG 932 0.276 0.000 126 0.159 0.000 582 0.196 0.000 3.267 0.001 -2.803 0.005 3.625 0.000 -3.514 0.000 -1.015 0.311 -0.964 0.335 
FX_HEDG 932 0.065 0.000 126 0.040 0.000 582 0.003 0.000 1.339 0.182 -1.122 0.262 7.329 0.000 -5.876 0.000 2.056 0.042 3.726 0.000 
Variables that proxy for underinvestment costs 
INV_OPP 927 0.092 0.068 126 0.129 0.086 555 0.116 0.086 -2.101 0.038 3.401 0.001 -2.974 0.003 4.841 0.000 0.679 0.498 0.207 0.836 
UND_OIL 932 40.745 4.170 126 26.793 17.597 582 19.549 4.569 2.648 0.009 2.394 0.017 5.535 0.000 0.522 0.602 1.494 0.137 3.042 0.002 
UND_GAS 932 371.744 89.290 126 228.131 124.412 582 193.096 46.350 2.827 0.005 -1.433 0.152 5.204 0.000 -5.830 0.000 0.677 0.499 2.540 0.011 
CORR_1 932 0.146 0.154 126 -0.026 0.018 582 0.087 0.086 5.188 0.000 4.860 0.000 3.114 0.001 3.063 0.002 -3.435 0.000 -3.743 0.000 
Variables that proxy for overinvestment 
OVER_INV 932 0.328 0.000 126 0.230 0.000 552 0.225 0.000 2.411 0.017 2.221 0.026 4.402 0.000 4.249 0.000 0.132 0.895 0.134 0.894 
Variables that proxy for the tax advantage of hedging 
TLCF 928 0.044 0.000 126 0.092 0.000 571 0.085 0.000 -3.087 0.002 3.737 0.000 -3.547 0.000 4.563 0.000 0.343 0.732 1.143 0.253 
TAX_SAVE 928 0.047 0.044 126 0.052 0.052 573 0.054 0.050 -1.733 0.084 3.266 0.001 -2.790 0.005 5.011 0.000 -0.551 0.582 0.305 0.761 
Continued 
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APPENDIX C-Continued 
 
 
Swap Put Collar Swap vs put  Swap vs collar Collar vs put 
Variable Obs Mean Median Obs Mean Median Obs Mean Median t-Stat p-Value Z-Score p-Value t-Stat p-Value Z-Score p-Value t-Stat p-Value Z-Score p-Value 
Variables that proxy for financial distress costs 
DTD 915 2,338 2,206 126 2,148 2,105 564 2,150 2,123 2.1573 0.0321 0.929 0.353 2.930 0.003 1.910 0.056 -0.027 0.978 0.098 0.922 
DISTRESS 928 0.471 0.000 126 0.405 0.000 571 0.375 0.000 1.411 0.160 1.397 0.162 3.686 0.000 3.645 0.000 0.620 0.536 0.627 0.531 
LEV 928 0.207 0.185 126 0.163 0.180 571 0.209 0.170 4.491 0.000 2.514 0.012 -0.248 0.804 1.454 0.146 -4.155 0.000 -1.360 0.174 
Variables that proxy for managerial risk aversion 
MV_CS_CEO 932 42.241 4.151 126 6.578 4.007 582 44.470 3.394 5.800 0.000 1.635 0.102 -0.214 0.830 2.561 0.010 -4.469 0.000 -0.095 0.924 
OPT_CEO 932 229952 5000 126 173357 22500 582 197251 0.000 1.406 0.161 0.026 0.979 0.805 0.420 2.209 0.027 -0.457 0.647 1.382 0.167 
Variables that proxy for information asymmetry 
%_CS_INST 932 0.451 0.475 126 0.557 0.663 582 0.493 0.543 -3.227 0.002 3.440 0.001 -2.294 0.022 2.228 0.026 1.868 0.063 2.003 0.045 
Variables that proxy for production characteristics 
UNCER_OIL 887 0.409 0.286 126 0.365 0.358 562 0.435 0.374 1.768 0.079 0.138 0.890 -1.558 0.120 3.620 0.000 -2.802 0.006 -2.327 0.020 
PQ_COR_OIL 900 0.213 0.450 126 0.330 0.579 562 0.375 0.565 -2.172 0.031 2.516 0.012 -5.520 0.000 5.637 0.000 -0.815 0.417 -0.660 0.509 
UNCER_GAS 932 0.409 0.308 126 0.335 0.224 582 0.379 0.294 2.493 0.014 -2.714 0.007 1.781 0.075 -0.767 0.443 -1.445 0.150 -2.470 0.014 
PQ_COR_GAS 932 0.225 0.312 126 0.024 0.027 582 0.249 0.374 5.232 0.000 -5.039 0.000 -1.187 0.235 2.192 0.028 -5.651 0.000 -5.449 0.000 
COST_CV 913 0.243 0.194 126 0.260 0.217 568 0.275 0.262 -0.955 0.341 0.737 0.461 -3.856 0.000 4.167 0.000 -0.865 0.388 -1.443 0.149 
OIL_REV 926 0.254 0.204 126 0.391 0.416 582 0.324 0.299 -6.245 0.000 -6.180 0.000 -6.183 0.000 -6.776 0.000 2.995 0.003 3.137 0.001 
GAS_REV 926 0.587 0.656 126 0.562 0.541 582 0.638 0.638 1.139 0.255 1.702 0.088 -3.852 0.000 -1.885 0.059 -3.535 0.000 -3.693 0.000 
HERF_GAS 932 0.044 0.000 126 0.142 0.000 582 0.028 0.000 -4.598 0.000 -5.443 0.000 2.735 0.006 4.623 0.000 5.407 0.000 8.358 0.000 
HERF_OIL 897 0.100 0.000 126 0.140 0.000 567 0.085 0.000 -1.707 0.089 -2.584 0.009 1.324 0.186 2.498 0.012 2.302 0.022 4.245 0.000 
Variables that proxy for market conditions 
VOL_OIL 929 3.200 2.371 126 3.123 2.233 581 3.520 2.674 0.306 0.760 -0.070 0.944 -2.117 0.035 3.147 0.002 -1.490 0.138 -1.896 0.058 
SPOT_OIL 929 49.140 35.760 126 47.959 32.520 581 54.813 56.500 0.450 0.654 -0.428 0.669 -3.816 0.000 4.139 0.000 -2.531 0.012 -2.912 0.004 
FUTURE_OIL 929 49.212 33.311 126 47.983 30.298 581 54.985 58.710 0.454 0.651 -0.227 0.821 -3.785 0.000 4.068 0.000 -2.512 0.013 -2.758 0.006 
VOL_GAS 929 0.687 0.456 126 0.784 0.543 581 0.828 0.695 -1.840 0.068 2.277 0.023 -4.766 0.000 5.532 0.000 -0.796 0.427 -0.850 0.395 
SPOT_GAS 929 4.833 4.602 126 5.139 4.830 581 5.674 5.700 -1.256 0.211 1.326 0.185 -6.302 0.000 7.163 0.000 -2.116 0.036 -2.555 0.011 
FUTURE_GAS 929 5.340 5.070 126 5.677 5.149 581 6.467 6.213 -1.441 0.152 1.704 0.088 -8.443 0.000 8.888 0.000 -3.242 0.001 -3.259 0.001 
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APPENDIX D: Financial and operational characteristics of oil hedgers by hedging instrument 
This table reports univariate analysis for the independent variables proposed to explain the use of the hedging instrument by oil hedgers. GAS_HEDG, IR_HEDG, FX_HEDG 
and BASIS_HEDG are dummy variables for gas, oil, interest rate, foreign exchange and basis risk hedging. TLCF for tax loss carryforwards scaled by the book value of total 
assets, TAX_SAVE for the expected percentage of tax saving, LEV for the leverage ratio, DTD for distance to default, CONSTRAINT for financial constraints, INV_OPP for 
investment opportunities, CORR_1 for the correlation between free cash flows and investment opportunities, UND_OIL and UND_GAS for the undeveloped proved reserves of 
oil and gas respectively, OVER_INV for overinvestment, COST_CV is the coefficient of variation of the cash cost per barrel of oil equivalent, OIL_REV and GAS_REV for the 
fraction of revenues from oil (gas) production, HERF_OIL and HERF_GAS the indices that measure the geographical dispersion of oil and gas production, UNCER_OIL and 
UNCER_GAS measure the production uncertainty for oil and gas respectively, PQ_COR_OIL and  PQ_COR_GAS measure the quantity-price correlation for oil and gas 
respectively, MV_CS_CEO for the market value of common shares held by the CEO, OPT_CEO for the number of stock options held by the CEO, %_CS_INST  for the 
percentage of common shares held by institutional investors, FUTURE_OIL, SPOT_OIL and VOL_OIL for  oil future and spot prices and volatility, FUTURE_GAS, SPOT_GAS 
and VOL_GAS for gas future and spot prices and volatility. Comparison of means is constructed using a t-test assuming unequal variances; comparison of medians is 
constructed by using the non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sum Z-score. Two sided p-values are reported. 
Oil hedging instruments firm-quarter 
 
Swap Put Collars Swap vs put  Swap vs collar Collar vs put  
Variable Obs Mean Median Obs Mean Median Obs Mean Median t-Stat p-Value Z-Score p-Value t-Stat p-Value Z-Score p-Value t-Stat p-Value Z-Score p-Value 
Variables that proxy for hedging activity 
GAS_HEDG 849 0.826 1.000 150 0.787 1.000 577 0.818 1.000 1.084 0.280 -1.145 0.252 0.370 0.712 -0.371 0.711 -0.843 0.400 -0.874 0.382 
BASIS_HEDG 849 0.221 0.000 150 0.060 0.000 577 0.045 0.000 6.693 0.000 -4.579 0.000 10.578 0.000 -9.150 0.000 0.702 0.484 0.761 0.447 
IR_HEDG 849 0.335 0.000 150 0.080 0.000 577 0.243 0.000 9.254 0.000 -6.290 0.000 3.810 0.000 -3.724 0.000 -5.704 0.000 -4.361 0.000 
FX_HEDG 849 0.121 0.000 150 0.093 0.000 577 0.012 0.000 1.063 0.289 -0.982 0.326 9.021 0.000 -7.582 0.000 3.347 0.001 5.286 0.000 
Variables that proxy for underinvestment costs 
INV_OPP 842 0.105 0.073 146 0.118 0.070 560 0.130 0.080 -0.767 0.444 0.333 0.739 -1.979 0.048 1.724 0.085 -0.617 0.538 -0.868 0.385 
UND_OIL 849 43.351 6.178 150 44.958 12.545 577 46.770 6.332 -0.250 0.803 1.161 0.246 -0.604 0.546 -2.189 0.029 -0.239 0.812 2.388 0.017 
UND_GAS 849 441.004 112.765 150 344.652 57.215 577 362.649 56.098 1.503 0.134 -3.289 0.001 1.615 0.107 -5.990 0.000 -0.256 0.798 0.413 0.680 
CORR_1 849 0.125 0.095 150 0.072 0.041 577 0.042 0.058 1.838 0.067 1.589 0.112 4.192 0.000 3.477 0.000 1.014 0.311 0.488 0.625 
Variables that proxy for overinvestment 
OVER_INV 838 0.285 0.000 146 0.226 0.000 558 0.339 0.000 1.554 0.122 1.475 0.140 -2.106 0.035 -2.123 0.034 -2.809 0.005 -2.607 0.009 
Variables that proxy for the tax advantage of hedging 
TLCF 844 0.077 0.000 146 0.045 0.000 577 0.101 0.000 2.762 0.006 -5.196 0.000 -1.794 0.073 0.119 0.905 -3.491 0.001 -5.390 0.000 
TAX_SAVE 845 0.052 0.048 146 0.046 0.047 577 0.045 0.044 2.298 0.022 -1.871 0.061 3.689 0.000 -3.825 0.000 0.373 0.710 0.372 0.710 
Continued 
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Swap Put Collars Swap vs put  Swap vs collar Collar vs put  
Variable Obs Mean Median Obs Mean Median Obs Mean Median t-Stat p-Value Z-Score p-Value t-Stat p-Value Z-Score p-Value t-Stat p-Value Z-Score p-Value 
Variables that proxy for financial distress costs 
DTD 819 2.390 2.530 146 2.127 2.048 576 2.276 2.214 2.893 0.004 2.159 0.031 1.748 0.080 1.250 0.211 -1.604 0.109 -1.393 0.164 
DISTRESS 844 0.515 1.000 146 0.301 0.000 577 0.310 0.000 5.118 0.000 4.776 0.000 7.939 0.000 7.665 0.000 -0.207 0.836 -0.207 0.836 
LEV 844 0.214 0.191 146 0.136 0.134 577 0.184 0.154 8.539 0.000 7.166 0.000 3.776 0.000 6.904 0.000 -4.699 0.000 -2.818 0.005 
Variables that proxy for managerial risk aversion 
MV_CS_CEO 849 68.804 4.661 150 11.598 3.572 577 53.203 3.731 5.402 0.000 2.819 0.005 1.163 0.245   2.773 0.005 -4.847 0.000 -0.996 0.319 
OPT_CEO 849 230427 75000 150 98734 0.000 577 99958 0.000 5.855 0.000 4.976 0.000 8.080 0.000 7.221 0.000 -0.065 0.948 -0.533 0.594 
Variables that proxy for information asymmetry 
%_CS_INST 849 0.505 0.602 150 0.519 0.672 577 0.559 0.668 -0.452 0.652 1.016 0.310 -2.974 0.003 4.146 0.000 -1.220 0.224 -1.536 0.125 
Variables that proxy for production characteristics 
UNCER_OIL 846 0.408 0.288 150 0.332 0.259 577 0.460 0.448 2.821 0.005 -1.670 0.095 -2.972 0.003 5.176 0.000 -4.743 0.000 -5.824 0.000 
PQ_COR_OIL 849 0.237 0.459 150 0.363 0.638 577 0.416 0.589 -2.461 0.015 3.912 0.000 -6.420 0.000 6.331 0.000 -1.039 0.300 0.419 0.675 
UNCER_GAS 840 0.413 0.260 150 0.354 0.335 570 0.408 0.322 2.266 0.024 -0.618 0.537 0.282 0.778 2.552 0.011 -2.092 0.037 -1.836 0.066 
PQ_COR_GAS 849 0.203 0.287 150 0.127 0.214 577 0.257 0.363 1.932 0.055 -1.531 0.126 -2.675 0.008 2.974 0.003 -3.252 0.001 -2.866 0.004 
COST_CV 844 0.191 0.220 150 0.263 0.216 560 0.310 0.300 -1.629 0.104 0.791 0.429 -2.812 0.005 7.862 0.000 -2.790 0.006 -3.606 0.000 
OIL_REV 842 0.311 0.250 145 0.459 0.519 577 0.387 0.320 -7.388 0.000 -7.340 0.000 -5.435 0.000 -5.751 0.000 3.389 0.008 4.215 0.000 
GAS_REV 842 0.520 0.573 145 0.454 0.454 577 0.561 0.612 3.599 0.000 3.511 0.000 -2.715 0.006 -2.475 0.013 -5.554 0.000 -5.602 0.000 
HERF_GAS 845 0.080 0.000 150 0.098 0.000 570 0.039 0.000 -1.013 0.312 -0.429 0.668 4.781 0.000 5.839 0.000 3.362 0.000 4.401 0.000 
HERF_OIL 849 0.110 0.000 150 0.129 0.000 577 0.089 0.000 -0.822 0.412 -1.050   0.2936 1.785 0.074 2.253 0.024 1.745 0.082 2.547 0.011 
Variables that proxy for Market conditions 
VOL_OIL 849 3.272 2.371 150 3.469 2.445 576 3.864 3.271 -0.764 0.446 0.785 0.433 -3.741 0.000 6.566 0.000 -1.475 0.141 -2.804 0.005 
SPOT_OIL 849 47.999 32.520 150 51.612 44.600 576 59.790 61.050 -1.366 0.174 0.527 0.598 -8.101 0.000 8.483 0.000 -3.022 0.003 -3.788 0.000 
FUTURE_OIL 849 47.768 30.298 150 51.797 46.388 576 60.371 64.847 -1.496 0.136 0.763 0.445 -8.410 0.000 8.366 0.000 -3.115 0.002 -3.642 0.000 
VOL_GAS 849 0.710 0.458 150 0.747 0.526 576 0.857 0.760 -0.795 0.428 1.181 0.238 -4.972 0.000 6.216 0.000 -2.257 0.025 -2.386 0.017 
SPOT_GAS 849 4.945 4.740 150 5.194 5.050 576 5.852 5.771 -1.042 0.299 0.720 0.471 -6.735 0.000 7.199 0.000 -2.639 0.009 -3.189 0.001 
FUTURE_GAS 849 5.443 5.106 150 5.804 5.388 576 6.654 6.280 -1.557 0.121 1.581 0.114 -9.217 0.000 9.483 0.000 -3.520 0.001 -3.621 0.000 
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APPENDIX E: Financial and operational characteristics of gas hedgers by hedging portfolio 
This table reports univariate analysis for the independent variables proposed to explain the hedging portfolio choice by gas hedgers. OIL_HEDG, IR_HEDG, FX_HEDG and 
BASIS_HEDG are dummy variables for gas, oil, interest rate, foreign exchange and basis risk hedging. TLCF for tax loss carryforwards scaled by the book value of total assets, 
TAX_SAVE for the expected percentage of tax saving, LEV for the leverage ratio, DTD for the distance to default, CONSTRAINT for financial constraints, INV_OPP for the 
investment opportunities, CORR_1 for the correlation between free cash flows and investment opportunities, UND_OIL and UND_GAS for the undeveloped proved reserves of 
oil and gas respectively, OVER_INV for overinvestment, COST_CV is the coefficient of variation of the cash cost per barrel of oil equivalent, OIL_REV and GAS_REV for the 
fraction of revenues from oil (gas) production, HERF_OIL and HERF_GAS the indices that measure the geographical dispersion of oil and gas production, UNCER_OIL and 
UNCER_GAS measure the production uncertainty for oil and gas respectively, PQ_COR_OIL and PQ_COR_GAS measure the quantity-price correlation for oil and gas 
respectively, MV_CS_CEO for the market value of common shares held by the CEO, OPT_CEO for the number of stock options held by the CEO, %_CS_INST for the 
percentage of common shares held by institutional investors, FUTURE_OIL, SPOT_OIL and VOL_OIL for  oil future and spot prices and volatility, FUTURE_GAS, SPOT_GAS 
and VOL_GAS for gas future and spot prices and volatility. Comparison of means is constructed using a t-test assuming unequal variances; comparison of medians is 
constructed by using the non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sum Z-score. Two sided p-values are reported. 
Gas hedging strategies firm-quarter 
 
Swap+Put Swap+Collar Put+Collar Swap+Put+Collar Swap+Put vs Swap+Collar Swap+Put vs Put+Collar Swap+Collar vs Put+Collar 
Variable Obs Mean Median Obs Mean Median Obs Mean Median Obs Mean Median t-Stat p-Value Z-Score p-Value t-Stat p-Value Z-Score p-Value t-Stat p-Value Z-Score p-Value 
Variables that proxy for hedging activity 
OIL_HEDG 137 0.810 1.000 999 0.792 1.000 72 0.806 1.000 187 0.802 1.000 0.512 0.609 0.500 0.617 0.081 0.936 0.081 0.935 -0.283 0.778 0.278 0.781 
BASIS_HEDG 137 0.153 0.000 999 0.284 0.000 72 0.069 0.000 187 0.299 0.000 -3.849 0.000 -3.243 0.001 1.942 0.054 1.741 0.082 6.437 0.000 -3.965 0.000 
IR_HEDG 137 0.358 0.000 999 0.401 0.000 72 0.361 0.000 187 0.358 0.000 -0.996 0.321 -0.981 0.327 -0.049 0.961 -0.049 0.961 0.682 0.497 -0.674 0.500 
FX_HEDG 137 0.007 0.000 999 0.063 0.000 72 0.000 0.000 187 0.107 0.000 -5.258 0.000 -2.653 0.008 1.000 0.319 0.725 0.469 8.196 0.000 -2.195 0.028 
Variables that proxy for underinvestment costs 
INV_OPP 137 0.141 0.077 982 0.109 0.077 72 0.106 0.077 184 0.132 0.091 1.841 0.068 0.547 0.585 1.642 0.102 0.537 0.592 0.202 0.841 -0.186 0.853 
UND_OIL 137 21.872 11.089 999 54.792 6.983 72 10.047 6.748 187 28.092 6.711 -7.587 0.000 -0.852 0.395 3.950 0.000 1.256 0.209 12.537 0.000 -1.111 0.267 
UND_GAS 137 180.869 71.715 999 593.408 209.100 72 80.778 45.638 187 474.645 124.706 -9.142 0.000 -6.339 0.000 2.985 0.003 2.275 0.023 15.422 0.000 -6.703 0.000 
CORR_1 137 0.116 0.030 999 0.074 0.053 72 0.056 0.055 187 0.138 0.123 1.254 0.211 0.754 0.450 1.333 0.183 0.585 0.558 0.540 0.590 0.292 0.770 
Variables that proxy for overinvestment 
OVER_INV 137 0.212 0.000 973 0.319 0.000 72 0.222 0.000 183 0.197 0.000 2.807 0.005 -2.543 0.011 -0.174 0.862 -0.176 0.860 1.869 0.065 1.702 0.088 
Variables that proxy for the tax advantage of hedging 
TLCF 137 0.095 0.000 989 0.050 0.000 72 0.028 0.000 184 0.073 0.000 2.385 0.018 -3.009 0.003 3.357 0.001 0.361 0.718 2.677 0.009 -2.680 0.007 
TAX_SAVE 137 0.044 0.041 994 0.049 0.046 72 0.054 0.052 187 0.055 0.049 -2.025 0.044 -1.429 0.153 -2.271 0.025 -2.953 0.003 -1.224 0.224 2.306 0.021 
Continued 
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APPENDIX E-Continued 
                         
 
Swap + Put Swap + Collar Put + Collar Swap + Put + Collar Swap + Put  versus Swap + Collar Swap + Put  versus Put + Collar Swap + Collar versus Put + Collar 
Variables Obs Mean Median Obs Mean Median Obs Mean Median Obs Mean Median t-Stat p-Value Z-Score p-Value t-Stat p-Value Z-Score p-Value t-Stat p-Value Z-Score p-Value 
Variables that proxy for financial distress costs 
DTD 130 2,680 2,609 955 2,567 2,451 72 2,147 2,090 174 2,431 2,264 0.981 0.327 1.091 0.275 3.687 0.000 3.051 0.002 4.135 0.000 3.007 0.002 
DISTRESS 137 0.577 1.000 988 0.424 0.000 72 0.500 0.500 184 0.554 1.000 3.375 0.000 3.367 0.000 1.051 0.295 1.056 0.291 -1.236 0.219 -1.256 0.209 
LEV 137 0.210 0.190 989 0.173 0.158 72 0.216 0.195 184 0.211 0.179 4.603 0.000 5.395 0.000 -0.353 0.724 0.024 0.981 -2.762 0.007 -2.630 0.008 
Variables that proxy for managerial risk aversion 
MV_CS_CEO 137 23.560 8.370 999 50.261 6.496 72 49.032 13.645 187 40.922 8.725 -4.061 0.000 -1.381 0.167 -1.912 0.059 -2.478 0.013 0.086 0.930 -2.679 0.007 
OPT_CEO 137 78611 42563 999 262719 40000 72 55811 0.000 187 224892 25050 -4.587 0.000 -1.050 0.294 1.227 0.221 2.618 0.008 4.963 0.000 3.214 0.001 
Variables that proxy for information asymmetry 
%_CS_INST 137 0.579 0.668 999 0.629 0.760 72 0.550 0.562 187 0.563 0.684 -1.889 0.060 -2.728 0.006 0.743 0.458 1.112 0.266 2.514 0.014 -3.114 0.002 
Variables that proxy for production characteristics 
UNCER_OIL 117 0.384 0.349 982 0.429 0.373 72 0.560 0.497 179 0.530 0.313 -1.862 0.064 -1.156 0.248 -4.256 0.000 -4.507 0.000 -3.628 0.001 3.617 0.000 
PQ_COR_OIL 117 0.318 0.578 982 0.352 0.563 72 0.626 0.699 179 0.286 0.621 -0.618 0.538 -1.053 0.293 -4.935 0.000 -4.158 0.000 -7.206 0.000 4.310 0.000 
UNCER_GAS 137 0.504 0.601 999 0.468 0.339 72 0.391 0.441 187 0.509 0.328 1.171 0.243 2.317 0.021 3.047 0.003 2.778 0.006 2.747 0.007 -0.055 0.956 
PQ_COR_GAS 137 0.240 0.316 999 0.314 0.413 72 0.235 0.263 187 0.232 0.273 -2.072 0.040 -1.639 0.101 0.099 0.921 0.341 0.733 1.752 0.084 -1.600 0.110 
COST_CV 137 0.179 0.174 988 0.285 0.254 72 0.309 0.245 159 0.255 0.267 -3.553 0.001 -6.368 0.000 -3.681 0.000 -5.237 0.000 -1.152 0.252 1.035 0.301 
OIL_REV 129 0.355 0.326 993 0.246 0.245 72 0.410 0.480 184 0.246 0.232 4.983 0.000 4.557 0.000 -1.623 0.106 -1.505 0.132 -6.050 0.000 -6.177 0.000 
GAS_REV 129 0.533 0.583 993 0.653 0.673 72 0.510 0.489 184 0.645 0.714 -5.188 0.000 -4.786 0.000 0.762 0.447 1.437 0.151 6.659 0.000 5.996 0.000 
HERF_GAS 137 0.011 0.000 999 0.051 0.000 72 0.024 0.000 187 0.035 0.000 -5.889 0.000 -3.634 0.000 -1.029 0.305 -0.591 0.554 2.166 0.032 2.169 0.030 
HERF_OIL 137 0.016 0.000 986 0.122 0.000 72 0.026 0.000 187 0.093 0.000 -9.625 0.000 -5.180 0.000 -0.685 0.494 -1.276 0.202 6.942 0.000   3.128 0.002 
Variables that proxy for Market conditions 
VOL_OIL 137 3.389 2.371 999 4.115 3.271 72 3.470 3.271 187 4.044 2.808 -2.630 0.009 -3.792 0.000 -0.217 0.829 -2.076 0.038 2.215 0.029 -0.668 0.504 
SPOT_OIL 137 48.449 35.760 999 59.514 61.040 72 58.030 61.980 187 57.435 56.500 -4.249 0.000 -4.887 0.000 -2.896 0.004 -3.521 0.000 0.619 0.537 0.258 0.797 
FUTURE_OIL 137 48.458 33.311 999 59.994 63.099 72 59.094 65.784 187 58.090 58.710 -4.331 0.000 -4.880 0.000 -3.061 0.003 -3.468 0.001 0.349 0.728 0.205 0.837 
VOL_GAS 137 0.725 0.500 999 0.836 0.760 72 0.862 0.760 187 0.781 0.508 -2.276 0.024 -2.602 0.009 -1.706 0.090 -1.942 0.052 -0.379 0.706 0.415 0.678 
SPOT_GAS 137 5.047 4.830 999 5.779 5.700 72 5.783 5.780 187 5.427 4.895 -3.097 0.002 -3.454 0.001 -2.060 0.041 -2.571 0.010 -0.011 0.991 0.396 0.692 
FUTURE_GAS 137 5.617 5.264 999 6.507 6.072 72 6.709 6.304 187 6.170 5.872 -3.876 0.000 -3.927 0.000 -3.254 0.001 -3.331 0.001 -0.755 0.453 1.070 0.285 
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APPENDIX F: Financial and operational characteristics of oil hedgers by hedging portfolio 
This table reports univariate analysis for the independent variables proposed to explain the hedging portfolio choice by oil hedgers. GAS_HEDG, IR_HEDG, FX_HEDG and 
BASIS_HEDG are dummy variables for gas, oil, interest rate, foreign exchange and basis risk hedging. TLCF for tax loss carryforwards scaled by the book value of total assets, 
TAX_SAVE for the expected percentage of tax saving, LEV for the leverage ratio, DTD for the distance to default, CONSTRAINT for financial constraints, INV_OPP for 
investment opportunities, CORR_1 for the correlation between free cash flows and investment opportunities, UND_OIL and UND_GAS for the undeveloped proved reserves for 
oil and gas respectively, OVER_INV for overinvestment, COST_CV is the coefficient of variation of the cash cost per barrel of oil equivalent, OIL_REV and GAS_REV for the 
fraction of revenues from oil (gas) production, HERF_OIL and HERF_GAS the indices that measure the geographical dispersion of oil and gas production, UNCER_OIL and 
UNCER_GAS measure the production uncertainty for oil and gas respectively, PQ_COR_OIL and PQ_COR_GAS measure the quantity-price correlation for oil and gas 
respectively, MV_CS_CEO for the market value of common shares held by the CEO, OPT_CEO for the number of stock options held by the CEO, %_CS_INST  for the 
percentage of common shares held by institutional investors, FUTURE_OIL, SPOT_OIL and VOL_OIL for  oil future and spot prices and volatility, FUTURE_GAS, SPOT_GAS 
and VOL_GAS for gas future and spot prices and volatility. Comparison of means is constructed using a t-test assuming unequal variances; comparison of medians is 
constructed by using the non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sum Z-score. Two sided p-values are reported. 
Oil hedging strategies firm-quarter 
 
Swap+Put Swap+Collar Put+Collar Swap+Put+Collar Swap+Put vs Swap+Collar Swap+Put vs Put+Collar Swap+Collar vs Put+Collar 
Variable Obs Mean Median Obs Mean Median Obs Mean Median Obs Mean Median t-Stat p-Value Z-Score p-Value t-Stat p-Value Z-Score p-Value t-Stat p-Value Z-Score p-Value 
Variables that proxy for hedging activity 
GAS_HEDG 99 0.879 1.000 627 0.955 1.000 63 0.968 1.000 136 0.949 1.000 -2.253 0.026 -3.100 0.002 -2.249 0.026 -1.970 0.049 -0.544 0.588 -0.479 0.632 
BASIS_HEDG 99 0.020 0.000 627 0.290 0.000 63 0.063 0.000 136 0.324 0.000 -11.719 0.000 -5.737 0.000 -1.271 0.207 -1.418 0.156 6.319 0.000 3.864 0.000 
IR_HEDG 99 0.374 0.000 627 0.442 0.000 63 0.175 0.000 136 0.456 0.000 -1.290 0.199 -1.269 0.204 2.901 0.004 2.698 0.007 5.125 0.000 4.097 0.000 
FX_HEDG 99 0.000 0.000 627 0.056 0.000 63 0.000 0.000 136 0.037 0.000 -6.084 0.000 -2.408 0.016 NA NA NA NA 6.084 0.000 1.923 0.054 
Variables that proxy for underinvestment costs 
INV_OPP 99 0.146 0.079 622 0.131 0.081 61 0.113 0.058 133 0.114 0.064 0.653 0.515 0.636 0.525 1.182 0.239 1.987 0.047 0.898 0.371 1.638 0.101 
UND_OIL 99 27.384 25.029 627 64.751 12.526 63 48.239 8.048 136 48.647 12.061 -7.072 0.000 0.248 0.804 -1.748 0.085 0.644 0.520 1.311 0.194 0.161 0.872 
UND_GAS 99 81.416 57.054 627 436.400 136.510 63 300.440 44.932 136 322.188 62.288 -13.250 0.000 -5.883 0.000 -2.421 0.018 -0.328 0.743 1.451 0.151 3.466 0.001 
CORR_1 99 0.181 0.133 627 0.090 0.070 63 0.100 0.085 136 0.074 -0.004 2.814 0.005 2.400 0.016 1.961 0.051 1.445 0.148 -0.365 0.716 -0.481 0.630 
Variables that proxy for overinvestment 
OVER_INV 99 0.242 0.000 621 0.273 0.000 61 0.295 0.000 132 0.166 0.000 -0.668 0.505 -0.652 0.514 -0.720 0.472 -0.733 0.463 -0.346 0.729 -0.355 0.722 
Variables that proxy for the tax advantage of hedging 
TLCF 99 0.100 0.000 624 0.062 0.000 62 0.068 0.000 133 0.072 0.000 1.874 0.064 0.063 0.950 1.150 0.252 1.189 0.235 -0.347 0.730 1.304 0.192 
TAX_SAVE 99 0.055 0.059 627 0.053 0.049 61 0.060 0.065 136 0.057 0.050 0.531 0.596 1.371 0.170 -1.167 0.245 -1.713 0.087 -2.095 0.038 -3.324 0.001 
Continued 
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Swap+Put Swap+Collar Put+Collar Swap+Put+Collar Swap+Put vs Swap+Collar Swap+Put vs Put+Collar Swap+ Collar vs Put+Collar 
Variable Obs Mean Median Obs Mean Median Obs Mean Median Obs Mean Median t-Stat p-Value Z-Score p-Value t-Stat p-Value Z-Score p-Value t-Stat p-Value Z-Score p-Value 
Variables that proxy for financial distress costs 
DTD 99 2.243 2.082 610 2.532 2.423 58 2.296 2.299 122 2.404 2.327 -2.483 0.014 -2.289 0.022 -0.276 0.782 -0.309 0.757 1.427 0.158 1.318 0.187 
DISTRESS 99 0.545 1.000 624 0.463 0.000 62 0.452 0.000 133 0.639 1.000 1.520 0.131 1.523 0.128 1.156 0.249 1.155 0.248 0.172 0.863 0.174 0.862 
LEV 99 0.215 0.197 624 0.181 0.166 62 0.233 0.194 133 0.220 0.196 3.988 0.000 4.140 0.000 -0.885 0.378 -0.212 0.832 -2.903 0.005 -2.671 0.007 
Variables that proxy for managerial risk aversion 
MV_CS_CEO 99 24.552 2.642 627 55.189 8.789 63 49.133 21.196 136 53.081 7.155 -3.265 0.001 -2.608 0.010 -1.963 0.053 -2.465 0.014 0.411 0.681 -1.289 0.197 
OPT_CEO 99 53879 23333 627 228965 25000 63 610305 0.000 136 485481 0.000 -3.598 0.000 -2.261 0.024 -1.718 0.090 1.813 0.069 -1.165 0.248 3.301 0.001 
Variables that proxy for information asymmetry 
%_CS_INST 99 0.662 0.715 627 0.621 0.760 63 0.560 0.512 136 0.477 0.441 1.402 0.163 0.517 0.605 2.207 0.029 2.103 0.036 1.527 0.131 1.603 0.109 
Variables that proxy for production characteristics 
UNCER_OIL 92 0.502 0.376 627 0.455 0.375 63 0.446 0.447 124 0.367 0.202 1.311 0.192 1.747 0.081 1.331 0.185 0.193 0.847 0.292 0.771 -1.182 0.237 
PQ_COR_OIL 93 0.415 0.651 627 0.448 0.670 63 0.553 0.748 124 0.399 0.650 -0.550 0.583 -1.493 0.135 -1.737 0.085 -2.552 0.011 -1.759 0.082 -1.760 0.078 
UNCER_GAS 99 0.593 0.649 627 0.483 0.340 63 0.408 0.439 136 0.480 0.353 3.329 0.001 5.698 0.000 4.717 0.000 4.080 0.000 2.263 0.025 -0.625 0.532 
PQ_COR_GAS 99 0.218 0.284 627 0.274 0.368 63 0.324 0.441 136 0.137 0.103 -1.431 0.155 -1.726 0.084 -2.109 0.037 -2.067 0.039 -1.327 0.188 -0.801 0.423 
COST_CV 99 0.285 0.252 604 0.366 0.256 63 0.312 0.243 136 0.286 0.221 -2.155 0.032 -1.017 0.309 -1.104 0.272 -1.019 0.308 1.426 0.155 -1.011 0.312 
OIL_REV 86 0.523 0.583 625 0.353 0.329 63 0.516 0.574 134 0.457 0.452 6.212 0.000 5.903 0.000 0.207 0.835 0.594 0.552 -6.900 0.000 -6.257 0.000 
GAS_REV 86 0.430 0.396 625 0.564 0.609 63 0.446 0.397 134 0.517 0.548 -5.358 0.000 -4.841 0.000 -0.531 0.595 -0.832 0.405 5.750 0.000 4.827 0.000 
HERF_GAS 99 0.096 0.000 627 0.062 0.000 63 0.072 0.000 136 0.063 0.000 1.568 0.119 0.160 0.873 0.773 0.440 0.543 0.587   -0.468 0.641 0.713 0.476 
HERF_OIL 99 0.020 0.000 627 0.154 0.000 63 0.066 0.000 136 0.136 0.000 -9.116 0.000 -2.815 0.005 -1.845 0.068 0.415 0.678 3.452 0.000 2.435 0.015 
Variables that proxy for Market conditions 
VOL_OIL 99 4.343 3.271 627 4.180 3.307 63 4.487 3.471 136 4.233 3.307 0.420 0.675 -0.364 0.716 -0.264 0.792 -1.234 0.217 -0.714 0.477 -1.256 0.209 
SPOT_OIL 99 60.126 62.910 627 62.934 65.870 63 67.144 69.890 136 59.592 61.045 -0.871 0.386 -1.052 0.293 -1.609 0.110 -1.832 0.067 -1.257 0.213 -1.372 0.170 
FUTURE_OIL 99 60.689 66.721 627 63.458 66.815 63 68.344 71.653 136 60.521 63.973 -0.849 0.398 -1.041 0.298 -1.736 0.085 -1.973 0.049 -1.441 0.154 -1.494 0.135 
VOL_GAS 99 0.794 0.543 627 0.853 0.760 63 0.868 0.760 136 0.778 0.543 -1.038 0.301 -1.043 0.297 -0.828 0.409 -0.736 0.462 -0.199 0.843 -0.036 0.971 
SPOT_GAS 99 5.554 5.530 627 5.937 5.771 63 5.870 5.780 136 5.384 4.602 -1.379 0.170 -1.486 0.137 -0.804 0.423 -1.021 0.307 0.211 0.834 0.137 0.891 
FUTURE_GAS 99 6.414 6.129 627 6.729 6.280 63 6.816 6.213 136 6.067 5.264 -1.159 0.249 -1.079 0.281 -1.042 0.299 -1.035 0.301 -0.281 0.779 -0.352 0.725 
 
